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PREFACE

The basis for this monograph grew from my efforts to explore employee
attitudes toward new labor-management issues. As a result of those efforts
over the past few years, I became increasingly aware of both the controversy
surrounding tiered compensation systems and the relationship between tiers
and employee attitudes. Given the plethora of articles concerning tiers and
the differing opinions expressed, I saw a need for a comprehensive treatment
such as this to summarize what others have stated and to assess the long-term
impact of tiers at one company.
The project was made possible by the primary financial sponsorship of the
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. Also, substantial support
was received from my ANR Pipeline Company Business Administration
Fellowship. The following units within Wayne State University provided ad
ditional support: the Master of Arts in Industrial Relations program, the School
of Business Administration, and the College of Urban, Labor, and Metropolitan
Affairs. Administrative assistance was received from a number of units on
campus, but particularly from the Center for Urban Studies and from my depart
ment, the Department of Management and Organization Sciences, whose able
secretary, Dawn Havard, coordinated the typing of numerous drafts of the
chapters and complex tables.
Although only two names appear on the cover of this book, in reality this
project represents the efforts of many people. I would like to take this space
to thank those individuals who were instrumental in the completion of the
project.
First, I would like to thank the many employees, union leaders, managers,
and neutrals who were interviewed, as well as those employees who completed
the survey. While the individuals in these groups must remain anonymous,
I must express my gratitude for their cooperation and support.
Second, students from Wayne State University assisted in all phases of the
project. The following School of Business Administration students were in
volved in the research as part of their course work: William Barnes, Pasquale
Cassasanta, Lawrence Cellini, and William Sturgeon. In addition, the follow
ing Industrial/Organizational Psychology doctoral students who served as
research assistants were heavily involved in this project: Nannette Black, Ruth
Berthiaume, John Gilbert, Raymond Lee, and Melanie Peterson.
Third, I would like to thank the staff of the Upjohn Institute, particularly
Timothy Hunt and H. Allan Hunt, for their considerable support throughout
the completion of this project, and Judith Gentry, who copy edited the
manuscript.
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Fourth, every research project of this magnitude certainly benefits from one
who contributes tremendously to all phases of the project. As this project pro
gressed, that role was taken by Thomas Heetderks, a doctoral candidate in
industrial/organizational psychology. His extensive theoretical and empirical
contributions to this monograph were indispensable and led to the resultant
collaboration.
Finally, I must thank my family, who bore the brunt of the many weekends
and long nights associated with my work on this project. I appreciate their
tolerance and support.
James E. Martin
Detroit, MI
November 1989
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1
An Introduction
to Tiered
Compensation Structures

The purpose of this monograph is to examine the impact of tiered
compensation structures on unions, employers, and employees. Several
methods were used to accomplish this goal. First, an extensive review
of the literature was conducted for the purpose of summarizing what
others have found concerning tiers. A detailed study was conducted at
one large company where various forms of tiers had been in existence
for many years, making it possible to assess the long-term impact of
tiers. As part of that case study, rank-and-file employees were surveyed
as to their attitudes concerning tiers and topics related to tiered com
pensation structures. Survey items were derived from the literature and
from additional information obtained in interviews. The survey was
designed to explore eight research questions related to tiers and to test
five hypotheses. These will be discussed in more detail at the end of
this chapter.
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to tiered compensation structures.
Tiered compensation structures are defined and a means for classify
ing tiers is introduced. In addition, a framework of the labor-management
relations process is presented, focusing on the influences that may af
fect the development of tiers. Finally, two views of the role tiers play
within the industrial relations system are presented. The chapter closes
with a section that briefly outlines the organization of the monograph.
Chapter 2 completes the introduction to tiers by examining the
characteristics and relative frequencies of tiers, how they have func
tioned in practice, and trends associated with the number of existing
tiered compensation structures.

2 Introduction to Tiered Compensation

Definition and Classification of Tiers
Tiers are defined as the result of a compensation system change that
adds lower compensation levels for workers who either change posi
tions or begin employment after a certain date, usually the date when
the union-management contract becomes effective. l These employees
perform the same or equivalent duties as workers employed prior to
that date, but they receive less compensation. This definition extends
the concept of tiers beyond two-tiered wage structures, upon which most
writers have focused, to other forms of tiers directly affecting
compensation.

Types of Tiered Compensation Structures
Tiered compensation structures can be classified into two categories:
permanent or temporary (Jacoby and Mitchell 1986; Ross 1985). Under
a "permanent" plan, the "new" or low-tier employees are compen
sated on a separate and lower scale than the high-tier employees.
Figure 1.1, adapted from the work of Cappelli and Sherer (1987),
illustrates for permanent tiers the compensation levels of employees on
each tier with differing levels of seniority. The compensation of the
high- and low-tier employees is represented by segments AB and CD
respectively. For a high-tier employee, point A represents a compen
sation level which exists at the time of the implementation of tiers. For
a low-tier employee, point C represents a starting compensation level
existing at any time after the implementation of tiers. Employees on
the separate tiers do not have identical seniority at the same time. For
example, one year after tiers are implemented, all high-tier employees
have seniority of one year or more, while all low-tier employees have
seniority of less than one year. Examined cross-sectionally, it can be
seen that the compensation level of the low-tier employees, represented
by line CD, will never equal that of the high-tier employees, represented
by line AB, regardless of how long the low-tier employees remain with
the company, unless the labor contract is changed. With permanent tiers,
when the contract is negotiated there is no understanding by the parties
that the tiers will merge at some date in the future.
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Figure 1.1
Permanent Tiers
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In figure 1.2, also adapted from the work of Cappelli and Sherer
(1987), the compensation level for the new employees on the low tier
under a "temporary" tiered compensation structure is represented by
segment CD. If these employees remain with the company for a given
period of time, their compensation level will eventually merge with the
higher-compensation level of the high-tier employees (represented by
segment AD) as a result of progression adjustments (at point D). Previous
"high-" and "low-" tier employees would then be on the same com
pensation scale, which is represented by segment DB. At that time, there
would no longer be two separate tiers. The entry-level compensation
for all employees would then be at point C, and all employees would
be on the compensation scale represented by line CDB.
It should be noted that the concept that underlies temporary tiers is
not a new one. For example, in many industries there are often wage
progressions of varying length through which employees pass before
they attain the top pay rate for their job class. Apprentices in the
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construction trades are an example of traditional wage progressions.
Although the concepts underlying temporary tiers and the traditional
wage progressions are similar, their usage differs in two respects. With
temporary tiers, for employees hired after a certain date, some portion
of the wage scale is lowered below that which existed for employees
hired prior to that date. In addition, the time it takes low-tier employees
to reach the top rate may be lengthened, therefore slowing down the
rate of increase in compensation relative to that of the high-tier
employees. For temporary plans, the length of time prior to the merger
with the high-tier rates is predetermined.
Figure 1.2
Temporary Tiers
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While permanent and temporary wage tiers are distinguished in theory,
in practice the demarcation between them can become blurred (Jacoby
and Mitchell 1986). All tiers are subject to the collective bargaining
process2 and thus may be altered or removed from the contract in any
future bargaining settlement. Further, temporary tiered agreements

Introduction to Tiered Compensation 5

where the low-tier scale merges into the high-tier scale during the term
of the contract in which they were implemented have different implica
tions from those that do not merge within that time period. Ross (1985)
noted that temporary plans with such a' 'long progression to parity that
the delay may seem eternal," (p. 82) represent a third classification
of tiered structures. Jacoby and Mitchell stated that if the period for
merger is sufficiently long, few employees are likely to work long enough
to reach the high-tier rates. They also noted that if the merger date is
set after the contract expires, the date may be postponed, perhaps in
definitely, in future bargaining. 3
Forms of Tiered Compensation Structures
In addition to being classified as temporary or permanent, tiered com
pensation may also be classified into several forms. Tier forms manifest
themselves when lower compensation is implemented for employees
hired after a certain date, for example, (1) affecting either wages or
benefits within the same job classification, (2) affecting new job
classifications with the same or very similar duties as already existing
job classifications, or (3) affecting part-time positions compared to fulltime positions in the same job classification. It should be noted that in
employment settings where more than one tier form exists, employees
may be concurrently on multiple tier forms, and within each tier form,
an employee may be compensated at either a high or low level. 4
Wage Tiers
Tiers with different wage scales for employees in the same job
classification are the most prevalent form of tiers and are generally what
is referred to by the term "two-tier wage structures." With wage tiers,
workers employed after a certain date are placed on a lower wage scale
than previously hired employees. Data from both Essick (1987) and
Thomas (1988) suggest that for a company or contract, the most com
mon average pay difference between the high- and low-wage tiers (as
a percentage of the high-tier wage) is in the range of 20 to 29 percent. 5
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Benefit Tiers
Tiers also have been applied to employee benefits, with new employees
receiving fewer benefits than high-tier workers. Such benefits may in
clude compensation given to employees in the form of health care, life
insurance, holidays, or vacations. A distinction should be made here
in benefit compensation between a tiered-employment situation and a
straight seniority system. In a tiered-employment situation, the dif
ferences in benefits between high- and low-tier employees are based
on whether the employee was hired prior to or after the date when the
benefit tier was implemented, as opposed to basing benefits only on
seniority as under a straight seniority system. Under a benefit tier, an
employer could give workers with approximately the same seniority
but on different tiers different amounts of vacation time. Thus, a benefit
tier takes into account both the fixed date when the tier was established
and the employee's seniority level. Under a straight seniority system,
all employees receive the given amount of vacation time as specified
in their contract for their level of seniority, irrespective of their hire date.
Other Tier Forms
Tiered compensation plans may be classified into other forms, but
these forms appear to be far more restricted in their applicability to par
ticular industries than wage and benefit tiers. For example, job-duty
tiers arise where new job classifications are created for at least some
new employees. The new job classifications generally contain job duties
that are similar to job classifications already existing but introduce lower
compensation. The most prevalent application of the job-duty tier ap
pears to be in the retail food industry. Here, nonfood clerks and food
clerks perform the same tasks with different products, yet the nonfood
clerks are paid considerably less (Jacoby and Mitchell 1986; Ross 1985;
Wessel 1985). Ross (1985) argues that such employees who do similar
tasks in new and "nonconventional" jobs while receiving a new lower
rate constitute a "third tier." 6
Another form of tier exists where new employees are paid less under
the same contract while performing the same duties at newly establish
ed work locations within the same general geographic region. This tier
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form, which will be referred to as the location tier, does not appear
to be very common, although it does exist in the retail food industry
where new locations are established to directly compete with nonunion
operations. Manufacturing firms have also implemented location tiers
(Wessel 1985).
A tier form that manifests itself through the division of employees
into part- or mil-time employment groups will be referred to as the
"employment status tier." This tier form has the widest application
within service-sector industries such as retail foods and airlines where
companies frequently have extended hours of operation and often hire
part-time employees to assist in servicing regular peak workloads oc
curring within the workweek. Employment status tiers may arise in
several different ways. For example, in some service-sector companies
where a progression from part- to full-time status comes only as vacancies
occur, new restrictions may be placed on the movement of new
employees from part time to full time. Also, the wage progressions may
be lengthened for the part-time positions, and/or the previously separate
part- and full-time wage progressions may be combined for low-wage
tier employees with the newly established wage progression equal to
or lower than that of the previous part-time, high-wage tier schedule.
Thus, employees would no longer receive an increase when moving
from part- to full-time status. Salpukas (1984) states that a new con
tract could allow the employer to hire part-time employees where none
were previously permitted. 7
An Example of Tiered Wage Rates
Figure 1.3 provides a specific example of the wage rates for one job
classification from the company involved in the case study. The figure
shows wage rates over time for the general merchandise clerk job
classification and illustrates how the wage tier and employment status
tier forms (implemented in 1978) may function together in an employ
ment setting. The figure shows that the high-wage tier rates for both
the part- and full-time employees were at the same rate ($3.13) in 1978.
Note that the two scales diverged in 1980 as the wage progression for
the high-wage tier, part-time employees was 24 months versus 36 months
for the full-time employees on the high-wage tier.

H^r
s-e P

If
if

i*£

oo
oo

oo

!

ix oj uoipnpojjui

H

oo

S §
d

?*

IQ2 <>>

ill
ysi rs
2 "

^
I?

£

o
us

I

I

oo

oo

00

OO
K)

00

o

OO

OO

OS

DOLLARS/HOUR

Introduction to Tiered Compensation 9

The figure indicates that the part- and full-time low-wage tier employee
scales that were implemented in 1978 are identical, with the result that
after 1978, it was no longer possible for low-wage tier, part-time general
merchandise clerks to receive additional hourly wage increases upon
becoming a full-time employee. Also, one can see in figure 1.3 the
lengthening of the wage progression, and thus the length of time it took
to reach the top rate within the low-wage tier. After the 1984 contract
negotiations lengthened the general merchandise pay progressions, new
general merchandise clerks took four years to reach the top rate; the
general merchandise clerks hired in 1981 took three years. While not
evident in the figure, a part-time, high-wage tier employee moving to
full-time status would not receive the full-time, high-wage rates that
would have been received prior to the implementation of these tier forms.
A Framework of Labor-Management Relations
A brief examination of the labor-management process should assist
in understanding the historical and environmental influences on the
development of tiers. The following framework is based on the con
ceptualization of labor-management relations developed by Holley and
Jennings (1988). Their framework is comprised of three primary
elements. The first element includes the principal participants in the
process employees, union leaders, and management. The second ele
ment includes all of the potential influences and pressures that may af
fect the labor relations process. The third element in the framework
is the focal point of the labor relations process work rules. Accord
ing to Holley and Jennings, work rules include the rules governing com
pensation, such as tiers, and the rules that specify obligations and job
rights of the employees and employers. The description of work rules
provided by Holley and Jennings has been expanded here to include
all the union-management agreements, both those written in the labor
agreement or contract, and those referred to as implicit or informal.
The next two sections will examine three of the principal participants
and look at some of the external influences in the process.
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Principal Participants
Holley and Jennings noted that since the employees' desires may in
fluence the existence and content of particular work rules, employees
should be considered as a principal participant in the labor relations
process. They contend that employees may represent the most signifi
cant participant category, since they often determine whether a union
is even present. Employees also determine whether a negotiated labor
agreement is accepted or rejected and whether a threatened strike is
actually carried through. Certainly, a goal of employees is to partake
in the rewards and successes of their organizations; the goal is specifically
directed at increased job security and improved work rules, such as
compensation.
Union officials are the second major participant in the labor relations
process. One goal of union officials involves keeping job security for
the union members, although this goal often becomes more important
to the union when management asks for labor cost concessions (Cappelli 1985b). In bargaining, particularly when concessions are granted,
this goal may be translated into preserving or increasing the number
of jobs available in the bargaining unit. Another goal of the union leader
ship is to satisfy sufficiently the needs of the different membership groups
so as to strengthen the leadership's political position. Instrumental to
obtaining this goal is the negotiation of a contract that will be ratified
by the membership by a wide margin. Given that the initial negotiation
of a tiered compensation structure does not decrease the compensation
of the previously hired union members, a contract that implements tiers
is usually more easily ratified than a contract involving an across-theboard cut. The simultaneous achievement of these two union goals may
not always be possible. For example, to obtain the wages desired by
the membership may result in layoffs later on.
A third major participant in the process identified by Holley and Jen
nings is the management officials who negotiate and administer the labor
agreements. The negotiated work rules involve managers at many dif
ferent organizational levels and functions. The labor relations objec
tives are developed and coordinated at the corporate and divisional levels
to ensure that a particular work rule, such as compensation for a specific
job classification, does not adversely influence conditions elsewhere.
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While greatly simplified, the goal of the management officials is to satisfy
the owners and other managers, mainly by increasing profits.
Obviously, the differences between the participants' goals may result
in conflict. For example, Holley and Jennings note that conflict may
occur between the members and officers over the specific tactics to be
used in accomplishing shared bargaining objectives. Also, factions may
develop within an employee group if different goals and work rule
preferences are present among the employees. As a result of these
member differences, the union leaders may not represent a consensual
grouping given the different viewpoints among the membership. Dif
ferent labor relations priorities may exist between locals within the same
international union and between a local union and the international union
with which it is affiliated. Thus, the resulting contract represents a com
promise among the different participant goals with the parties settling
for satisfactory goal attainment concerning work rule agreements.
External Influences
The second element in the Holley and Jennings framework includes
the external influences or constraints that affect the labor relations pro
cess. Holley and Jennings discuss several external influences, such as
international factors, the product market, and technology, which can
influence the process. Their discussion of the external influences also
included the state of the economy, which impacts on the union and
management negotiators and administrators, and the competitors, who
impact directly on management officials. The latter two influences will
be shown to be the most relevant to the implementation of tiers. Such
external influences may affect the goals of the participants, the means
by which participants attempt to attain them, and thus the subsequent
compromises reached.
Views of Tiered Compensation Structures
Kochan, Katz, and McKersie (1986) attempt to add a more dynamic
component to industrial relations theory by developing the concept of
strategy, or strategic choice. They indicate ways in which the framework
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for viewing industrial relations could be expanded and discuss the role
of strategic choice within a more complex paradigm. In their discus
sion of the prevailing paradigm, they outline some of the unexpected
developments that exposed the apparent inadequacy of the current
theoretical approaches. It does appear that the concept of strategic choice
adds a more dynamic component to industrial relations theory, and in
the first part of the following section we examine tiered compensation
structures in the context of a business strategy.
Two predominant views of tiers have been expressed in the literature:
(1) as part of a firm's business strategy, and (2) as an outcome associated
with concession bargaining. 8 The discussion of tiers as part of a firm's
business strategy will include both business strategies associated with
expansion/investment and strategies associated with economic survival.
Given the relative newness of tiers, most of the discussion will focus
on the initial negotiation of tiers as it relates to a firm's business strategy,
although a firm's strategy may be modified over time due to changes
in the external influences that operate on the union-management rela
tionship. Also, there will be a separate discussion of tiers as an out
come associated with concession bargaining. We recognize, however,
that a firm's business strategy for economic survival often incorporates
concession bargaining.
Tiers as Part of a Business Strategy
The economic environment of the 1980s has persuaded many firms
to adjust their human resource management and business strategies. As
the human resource management strategies were altered in the past
decade, firms reexamined their compensation systems. With our incon
stant economy along with the pressures for cost reduction and produc
tivity increases, many firms have sought new compensation policies and
new business operating strategies (Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.
[BNA] 1988; Katz and Milkovich 1986; O'Dell and McAdams 1986).
Attaining competitive advantage9 through human resources requires that
these activities be conducted from a strategic perspective (LengnickHall and Lengnick-Hall 1988). Tiered pay plans are one means for coping
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with the increased competitive pressures that have led to the revisions
in business strategies. 10
Katz and Milkovich (1986) state that a causal flow appears to run
from the economic environment through business strategies and then
on to human resource management strategies, i.e., compensation
policies. Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall (1988) suggest there is a
reciprocal interdependence between a firm's business strategy and its
human resources strategy. Researchers in industrial relations have recent
ly begun to investigate the relationship between business strategies 11
and such bargaining outcomes as tiers (e.g., Cappelli 1985a; Kochan,
Katz, and McKersie 1986). Such an investigation would be useful in
understanding the role of tiers in the American industrial relations
system.
The BNA (1988) and Katz and Milkovich (1986) view tiers as part
of a changed compensation policy in response to a new, more com
petitive economic environment and a revised business strategy. They
argue that deregulation, increased competition, technological change,
and other competitive pressures have forced companies to change their
operating strategies. These changes have resulted in compensation
policies that include tiered compensation plans, lump-sum payments,
gain sharing, profit sharing, stock ownership plans, and knowledgebased pay being made an explicit part of a new business operating
strategy. They state that compensation plans and other personnel policies
that were adequate in a stable growth environment would not work well
in a frequently changing environment.
It appears that the different business strategies selected in response
to competitive pressures, through their impact on the collective bargain
ing environment, have a large impact on the labor relations outcomes
(Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986). We propose the following pro
cess models of how tiers relate to business strategy, focusing on two
different strategic choices in response to external pressures: (1) the im
plementation of tiers as part of a strategy associated with expansion and
investment, or (2) the implementation of tiers as a strategy for economic
survival. 12

14 Introduction to Tiered Compensation

Strategy for Expansion/Investment
Tiers negotiated as part of a strategy for expansion/investment13 can
be understood in terms of the causal flow provided by Katz and
Milkovich (1986), which runs from the economic environment through
business strategies and then on to compensation policies such as tiers.
When tiers are negotiated according to an organization's strategy for
expansion, it appears that firms take a proactive position based on the
anticipation of possible future economic difficulties or to gain a com
petitive advantage. That is, the firms appear to have implemented tiers
for the purpose of reducing costs associated with expansion; such ex
pansion becomes a part of their long-term strategic objective. Two-tier
plans are an especially attractive cost control device in such a situa
tion, because as expansion takes place, all additional employees will
be on the low tier. To gain union and employee approval for this longterm strategic objective, however, management often provides monetary
and/or other forms of incentives in the new contract to the employees
who would be on the high tier (Cappelli 1985a; Harris 1983a).
Strategy for Economic Survival
While the negotiation of tiers for the purpose of expansion can be
understood in terms of the causal flow provided by Katz and Milkovich
(1986), the causal flow for the strategy for economic survival appears
to run from the economic environment directly to concessions.
Businesses that negotiate tiers for economic survival usually are under
great pressure from the competition. The increased external pressure
forces the employees, union, and management to share in the respon
sibilities of cutting costs during contract negotiations (Cappelli 1983;
Kassalow 1983; Mitchell 1983).
In short, businesses that negotiate tiers as part of a strategy for sur
vival believe that the new pay plan or some other cost cutting device
is necessary if their operations are to continue without exacerbating the
effects of the existing economic pressures. Employees who ratify such
plans also generally feel that they have to approve the two-tier plan or
some of them could lose their jobs (e.g., Cappelli 1985a). Thus, if tiers
are negotiated by management as a strategy for economic survival, they
are usually accompanied in the contract by other concessions; current
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employees' wages and/or benefits are often adversely affected, i.e.,
decreased or frozen. In contrast to the proactive stance taken by firms
negotiating tiers for the purpose of expansion, it appears that firms
take a reactive position if tiers are negotiated according to a strategy
for economic survival. Miles et al. (1978) contend that if the firm per
mits the environment to dictate its strategic choices in a reactive man
ner, the opportunities of long-term survival are reduced.

Tiers as an Outcome of Concession Bargaining
Since tiers are generally negotiated in response to a proposal by
management (Jacoby and Mitchell 1986), tiers are viewed by the union
and employees as a concession (e.g., Balliet 1984; Craft, Abboushi,
and Labovitz 1985). Many have labeled two-tier wage structures as an
outcome which is associated with concession bargaining (Balliet 1984;
Craft, Abboushi, and Labovitz 1985; Jacoby and Mitchell 1986; Mit
chell 1983). Most concessions generally affect the wages, benefits, or
working conditions of those workers already employed (e.g., Ploscowe
1986). Although the implementation of tiers alone typically affects on
ly those employees not yet hired, we contend that tiers are a conces
sion bargaining outcome resulting in potentially lower labor costs than
would have existed otherwise. Thus tiers meet the definition of a con
cession. 14
Plan of the Book
In this chapter, tiered compensation structures were defined, classified
according to type and form, and discussed in terms of their role in the
industrial relations system. Chapter 2 examines the characteristics of
tiers and the trends in their incidence. The different roles tiers appear
to play in the manufacturing and service sectors will also be discussed.
An explanation will be provided for why tiers are more likely to exist
in certain types of industries than in others. Also, chapter 2 discusses
the potential benefits and problems associated with tiers and concludes
with a discussion of the conditions affecting the incidence of tiers and
their future. Chapter 3 is a detailed discussion of labor-management
relations in one of the industries that has implemented many tiers, the
retail food industry. The chapter describes how the competitive pressures
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surrounding that industry changed and led to the subsequent implemen
tation of tiers.
Chapter 4 presents the historical and environmental factors that in
fluenced the development and maintenance of tiers in a retail food com
pany whose employees were surveyed. The chapter also shows how
tiers affected the company and the union representing its employees.
Chapter 5 discusses the sample characteristics, research design, survey
development, and data analysis used to survey the rank-and-flle
employees. Chapter 6 contains survey results in response to several
research questions. The following three interrelated research questions
focus on the employee views of why the two-tier wage plan at the
surveyed employees' company was originally negotiated, how much
various groups have benefited from its implementation, and the perceived
effects of the plan on employment-related outcomes.
(1) What goals of the negotiating parties do employees believe the
plan was negotiated to meet?
(2) To what extent do employees perceive that the various groups
have benefited from the implementation of the plan?
(3) What employment-related effects do employees believe have
resulted from the plan?
A second set of research questions focuses on the employee views of
the predicted outcomes of future bargaining over the wage structure,
attitudes toward selected changes in the compensation system and the
potential related outcomes, and general employee attitudes toward tiers.
(4) What changes related to the plan do employees believe are likely
to occur?
(5) What are the employee attitudes toward selected changes in the
plan and the potential related outcomes?
(6) What are the employee attitudes about the company and union
expectations, problems relating to the plan, and the relationship of tiers
to the duty of fair representation?
The next research question examines whether differences exist for
the first six research questions among the different geographic areas.
(7) What are the differences in the employee attitudes examined in
the first six research questions among the geographic areas of operation?
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The final research question focuses on equal employment opportuni
ty, which may be of concern if the low-tier groups contain a dispropor
tionate number of members from protected classes.
(8) Are the low-tier groups disproportionately comprised of women
and minorities?
Chapter 7 also focuses on the survey results and develops and tests
five hypotheses based on equity theory. The hypotheses focus on the
relationship of employee behaviors and attitudes to tiers. Equity theory
provides a particularly useful framework within which to generate
hypotheses concerning attitudes and behaviors of employees in tiered
compensation structures. Equity theory suggests that perceptions of
equitable pay have an important role in defining employment-related
attitudes and behaviors as individuals attempt to equate their ratios of
outcomes to inputs with the ratios of relevant others (Adams 1965; Mowday 1983). The five hypotheses are:
(1) The employees in the low-tier groups will have a higher
absenteeism rate and report less effort expended on the job than will
the employees in high-tier groups.
(2) The employees in the low-tier groups will participate less in union
activities, and be more likely to (a) vote against ratifying union con
tracts which maintain tiers, and (b) vote against incumbent union of
ficers than will the employees in the high-tier groups.
(3) Compared to the employees in the high-tier groups, the employees
in the low-tier groups will have: (a) perceptions of less pay fairness
and lower union instrumentality in obtaining fair pay; and (b) lower
satisfaction with their pay, the two-tier plan, and the number of hours
they work.
(4) The employees in the low-tier groups will perceive greater pro
motional opportunity and greater opportunity for external employment
than will the employees in the high-tier groups.
(5) The low-tier groups will have higher company and union com
mitment, and job satisfaction than will the high-tier groups.
Chapter 8 summarizes the key points and findings of this study and
presents the conclusions.
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NOTES
1. There is little mention in the literature concerning the effect of tiered compensation structures
on employees who change positions; therefore, the discussion of tiers will use the terms "lowtier employees" and "new employees." While it is recognized that the phrase, "employees who
change positions" could be substituted for these terms in some examples, the use of these two
phrases simplifies the discussion.
2. Tiered compensation structures also may exist for employees not represented by unions. For
example, Ruben (1987) noted that Delta Airlines had instituted tiers for that portion of its rankand-file employees who were not unionized. The company in which the case study was conducted
had instituted tiers for its managers. Further, the survey results of Essick (1987) indicated that
11 percent of all the companies that reported having two-tier wage structures were nonunion.
Given that most of the interest and concern expressed in the literature has centered on tiered com
pensation structures for unionized employers, the focus of this study is limited to that sector.
3. A noted example of where temporary tiers were modified before any employee on the low-tier
wage scale had moved onto the high-tier scale occurred at Northwest Airlines in 1988. A tem
porary low-wage tier that was supposed to merge in five years was implemented for Northwest's
flight attendants in 1984 (Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. [BNA], June 17, 1985). After a threatened
strike, partially because management wanted to lengthen the time of merger to nine years, a set
tlement was reached in which the two tiers would be merged in eight years (BNA, March 29,1988).
4. It should be noted that an increasing number of contracts provide for more than two levels
of tiers of compensation (BNA, February 26, 1987). For example, Sichenze's (1989) analysis
of all retail food contracts covering 1,000 or more workers found that over half contained three
or more tiers. Thus instead of being two-tiered agreements, many contracts are actually multitiered agreements.
5. Tiered wage structures generally affect multiple job classifications and within any contract
there may be variation in the percentage pay difference between the two wage tiers across job
classes. Thus, the average pay difference is the one that is reported.
6. Ross's "first tier" would be the high-wage tier for employees doing similar tasks in old and
conventional jobs. His "second tier" would be the low-wage tier for those same jobs. Compar
ing his first and second tiers with his third tier is the same as comparing the high and low levels
of a job-duty tier.
7. Sichenze (1988, 1989) identifies another tier form that is common in the retail food industry,
the work-rule tier. Her investigation reveals that more than 61 percent of the retail food contracts
contained modifications of work rules based on the date of hire. Sichenze notes that the work
rules governing the standard workday and job security were most commonly affected.
Typically, work-rule tiers only affect compensation indirectly. For example, altering the stan
dard workday to schedule new hires during peak hours eliminates the overtime pay opportunities
for new employees. Other work-rule tier forms, i.e., job security in the form of no job guarantees
for new hires, have no direct effect on compensation. Thus, this form is not discussed in the text.
8. There has been discussion in the literature that wage tiers initially were implemented to correct
the internal pay structure problem of wage compression (Bowers and Roderick 1987; Jacoby and
Mitchell 1986). While not viewing it as a pervasive influence, Jacoby and Mitchell conclude that
wage compression may have been an explanatory factor in some instances. We believe that the
implementation of wage tiers would do little to correct the problem of wage compression. Employees
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at different compensation levels on the high-wage tier in a situation where wage compression
exists would still have internal pay inequities. Other methods exist to correct for such a problem,
such as giving the higher-paid employees raises and the lower-paid employees (the ones who are
causing the wage compression problem) lump-sum payments. Thus, the text will not discuss wage
compression as a primary reason for implementing tiers.
9. "Competitive advantage" refers to those capabilities, resources, relationships, and decisions
that permit a company to capitalize on opportunities and evade threats within its industry (Hofer
and Schendel 1978).
10. In this monograph, the term "business strategy" will be used broadly to describe those deci
sions taken by companies to address the competitive pressures operating in the environment. The
term will apply to decisions that alter the company's role or its relationship with other parties,
thus eliminating minor decisions not changing goals.
11. Much of the research on business strategies has focused on management, given that manage
ment has made most of the important strategic decisions (Kochan, Katz and McKersie 1986).
The history of tiered compensation structures suggests that the initiative for such plans comes
from management (Jacoby and Mitchell 1986). It is management that selects both the initial and
subsequent role of tiers in a firm's industrial relations and business operating strategies. It should
be emphasized here that the suggestion that a company's goals in the product market help shape
its goals and priorities in collective bargaining needs to be understood within die framework mat
collective bargaining is a bilateral process. Thus, it is not certain how much impact a change
in one side's negotiating position might have on the final outcome (Cappelli 1985a). Cappelh
states that, at best, management's negotiating strategies influence contract outcomes by changing
the relative importance it attaches to different items considered in negotiation. He notes that
in practice, however, business strategies have a much stronger and more direct
effect through their influence on the bargaining environment. In bargaining, the
wage/employment trade-off mat helps shape union preferences is firm-specific and
is determined largely by management's business decisions, (p. 320)
12. It is assumed that "strategic decisions" can only occur where the parties have discretion over
their decisions in other words, where environmental constraints do not severely limit the par
ties' selection of options (e.g., Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986). Thus, in instances involving
a severe curtailment of alternatives, the term "strategy for economic survival" may be a misnomer.
13. Based on a review of the literature, it appears that the majority of proactive strategies involve
business expansion. While it is recognized that a strategy for expansion is typically accompanied
by investment, it will be referred to only as a "strategy for expansion."
14. Cappelli (1983) notes that while in theory it was easy to define concessions, determining which
settlements or outcomes are concessions could be difficult in practice. He defined concessions
as the outcome of a process involving an explicit exchange of labor cost moderation for im
provements in job security. Cappelli (198Sb) concluded "mat unions may moderate labor costs
through concession bargaining if jobs are threatened and if such moderation is likely to generate
a clear improvement in employment security." (p. 91)

2
Tiered Compensation
Structures in Practice
In chapter 1, tiers were defined, classified according to type and form,
and discussed in terms of their strategic role in the United States in
dustrial relations system. This chapter presents the characteristics and
relative frequencies of tiered compensation structures. Differences be
tween the manufacturing and service sectors are discussed in relation
to wage changes and the use of tiers as part of a business strategy. The
chapter examines the pressures that resulted in the implementation of
tiers in certain industry groups, along with examples of the roles tiers
have played in those industries. The chapter also examines the poten
tial benefits and problems that may result from maintaining tiers, and
concludes with a discussion of the factors affecting the present and future
incidence of tiers.
Characteristics and Frequency of Tiers
The most comprehensive source of information about two-tier set
tlements has been the Bureau of National Affairs. The BNA (March
1, 1988) reported that of the 82 two-tier wage plans in its represen
tative sample of contracts negotiated or modified in 1987, 41 percent
were temporary, 11 percent were permanent, and for 48 percent the
BNA could not determine whether the plans were temporary or perma
nent. Similarly, the BNA (February 23, 1989) reported for its 1988
sample that of the 45 two-tier wage plans that were newly negotiated
or modified, 44 percent were temporary, 2 percent were permanent,
and for 53 percent, they could not determine what type of plan was
negotiated. Nine percent of the settlements in each year contained tiers
for both wages and benefits. Fourteen additional settlements in 1987
and five in 1988 established tiers for benefits only, but the BNA did
not include these in its subsequent analyses.
21

22 Tiered Compensation Structures in Practice

Other sources providing information on the types of tiers found have
not been as detailed or as representative as the BNA's reports. For ex
ample, Jacoby and Mitchell (1986) received data from the BNA for 35
contracts with two-tier wage plans as of late 1984. Of these, 43 per
cent of the contracts involved permanent tiers, and the rest of the set
tlements established temporary tiers. Jacoby and Mitchell's data from
a sample of private-sector personnel and industrial relations managers
in the Los Angeles area showed that for the employers with two-tier
wage plans, 30 percent had permanent plans, 51 percent temporary,
and 19 percent had both types. While these data sources showed con
siderable variation in the types of tiers, 1 it may be concluded that tem
porary tiers are more prevalent than permanent tiers.
A characteristic of temporary tiers is the progression schedule, the
period of time it takes for a low-tier employee's compensation to merge
with that of the high-tier employees. Thomas (1988) analyzed the BNA's
sample of contract settlements in 1985 and 1986 and found roughly equal
percentages of merging tiers in one, two, three, and five years. An ad
ditional 17 percent of the contracts merged the tiers after a longer period
of time. Essick (1987), in a survey of a large number of personnel ad
ministrators from 123 companies with two-tier wage structures, found
that the temporary tiers of most companies merged the low-tier scale
with the high-tier scale within one to three years, but 20 percent of the
companies waited three to five years.
Table 2.1 summarizes Essick's (1987) findings that cross tabulate the
years of experience a company has had with tiers and the average pay
difference between the two wage tiers, which include temporary and
permanent tiers. There is a wide range of pay differences between the
high and low tiers, as can be seen in the table. The most common average
pay difference between the tiers was from 20 to 29 percent. When the
data are grouped into ranges encompassing 10 percentage points, it can
be seen that the firms with the least experience with tiers tended to have
the largest average differences between the tiers.
Table 2.2 shows the incidence of two-tier wage settlements by in
dustry group based on the BNA sample of representative nonconstruction bargaining units that included between 1,211 to 907

Table 2.1
Cross-Tabulation of Average Pay Difference Between Tiers by Experience with Plan
Average pay difference between the two tiers
(as percent of upper tier)
Years of experience
with two-tier plan
1 or less
2-5
Over 6a

Number of
responses

Less
than 5%

5-9%

10-14%

15-19%

20-29%

30% or
more

Total

39
55
23

5.1
5.5
13.0

7.7
14.6
13.0

30.8
20.0
21.7

12.8
23.5
21.7

28.2
27.3
13.0

15.4
9.1
17.4

100
100
100

SOURCE: Essick (1987).
a. 83 percent of responses in this category had more than 10 years experience with the plan.
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Table 2.2
Two-Tier Wage Settlements, by Industry, 1983-88
(Frequency Expressed as Percentage of Industry Contracts)

1983
All industries, excluding construction.........
Manufacturing sector.......................
Chemicals ..............................
Electrical machinery .....................
Fabricated metals ........................
Food processing .........................
Furniture...............................
Instruments .............................
Lumber ................................
Machinery, except electrical ...............
Miscellaneous manufacturing ..............
Paper..................................
Petroleum ..............................
Printing ................................
Stone, clay and glass.....................
Textiles ................................
Transportation equipment .................

1984

1985

1986

K)

H

1987

1988

5
8
11
10
9
5
2
4
6
6
7
2
1
1
0
2
5
0
0
5
16
3
3
0
0
15
0
10
0
0
5
4
17
4
24
14
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
13
0
0
8
0
0
0
20
19
0
0
3
11
10
5
8
3
0
10
0
0
33
11
228641
0
4
0
4
25
0
1
0
0
5
8
2
0
0
14
10
7
8
0
5
0
0
0
0
13
16
20
24
11
10

O

I

Service sector.............................
Airlines ................................
Communications.........................
Health services ..........................
Insurance and finance ....................
Motor transportation .....................
Postal..................................
Rail ...................................
Services, except health ...................
Utilities ................................
Wholesale and retail......................

9
8
0
0
0
5
0
0
3
4
28

17
35
7
9
5
17
0
0
11
14
32

18
62
0
7
0
16
100
100
5
0
37

16
70
2
12
27
20
0
50
22
2
25

12
20
0
5
14
10
100
44
4
13
20

9
33
0
3
0
6
0
0
5
11
20

Number of contract settlements analyzed ......

1,211

1,145

1,053

1,054

907

904

SOURCE: BNA, February 23, 1989.
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settlements annually. The BNA began counting two-tier settlements in
1983; the BNA counted as tiered contracts only those plans that specified
lower rates of pay for new employees or those settlements that modified
previous wage tiers. Because contracts in its sample that were renewed
with no modification to already preexisting two-tier contracts may not
have been counted, the BNA noted that its data likely underrepresent
the incidence of tiers (BNA, March 1, 1988). Also, the BNA data do
not include any tiers based on location, job duty, or employment status.
Furthermore, except for temporary plans, the BNA analyses do not
distinguish between newly negotiated tiers and those already existing
plans that were modified from a prior contract. Thus, it is difficult to
determine the prevalence of tiers in American industry and almost im
possible to assess the number of employees currently on the low levels.
Sector Differences in Relation
to Strategy and Wage Changes
In this section, we examine the differences between the service and
manufacturing sectors in strategies and wage changes when tiers are
negotiated. The strategies employed by the sectors have been largely
influenced by their economic development since World War II and dif
ferences in product market characteristics; most of the service sector
industries have experienced considerable economic growth, while most
of the manufacturing sector industries (with the notable exception of
the defense industries) have experienced a decline in growth. Bell (1973)
notes this trend and suggested that this pattern would continue into the
next century. Figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1988) show
that, in 1950, 60 percent of the workforce was in the service sector
and 40 percent in manufacturing. From 1950 to 1988, service sector
employment increased 290 percent, while manufacturing employment
increased 35 percent. Such a change in growth in the service sector
is indicative of an ever increasing need for services and has been
recognized as affecting union-management relations by industrial rela
tions scholars in the 1980s (Kassalow 1983).
The product market in the manufacturing industries had been essen
tially sheltered through the late 1970s and had experienced little foreign
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competition (Block, Kleiner, Roomkin, and Salsburg 1987), although
foreign products began to obtain a larger market share around that time.
Industries in the service sector operate in a product market where the
notion of imports is not relevant (Cappelli 1983), as services are delivered
where they are produced. Thus, not only was there much greater growth
in the service sector than in the manufacturing sector, but the former
was protected from foreign competition (though not from lower-cost
domestic competition). Certainly, these differences have influenced the
strategies used in each sector.
To meet the increasing market demands, management within the ser
vice sector industries has sought to expand current operations or to in
vest in other similar markets. Management has looked for new ways,
such as the implementation of tiers, to reduce the costs of expansion
plans. In contrast, many manufacturing firms have had difficulty com
peting successfully with foreign firms and have had to reduce their ex
penses in order to remain competitive. Some of these firms have sought
to contain labor costs by obtaining such concessions from their unions
as two-tier plans.
Two-tier plans appear to have been initially negotiated for very dif
ferent reasons in the two sectors. BNA data presented in tables 2.3 and
2.4 suggest that for most of the service sector, the initial negotiation
of tiers often includes significant wage increases for current employees.
There are some examples that suggest this is an incentive for contract
ratification (e.g., Harris 1983a). In most of the manufacturing sector,
the BNA data suggest that the initial negotiation of tiers was accom
panied by a small wage increase or none at all for the then-current
employees. Hence, we assume that when management views the im
plementation of wage tiers primarily as part of a business strategy for
expansion, the wage increases given to the high-tier employees will be
much greater than when management views tiers primarily as part of
a strategy for economic survival. 2
Table 2.3 shows the first-year median hourly wage changes in all
contracts (including two-tier contracts) and in the two-tier contracts from
1983 through 1988 based on BNA samples for the manufacturing and

Table 2.3
rirsi-iear ivieuian wage cnanges in tne Manufacturing and Service sectors
and Overall Inflation Rate, 1983-1988
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Sector and contracts
Manufacturulg
All contracts8

Service

Two-tier

All contracts8

g
Two-tier

§

Year

$/hour

%

$/hour

%

$/hour

%

$/hour

%

Inflation
rateb

1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

.40
.40
.35
.15
.18
.29

4.7
4.7
3.9
1.7
2.0
2.2

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
.25

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.0

.50
.35
.35
.27
.30
.35

5.5
4.0
4.0
3.0
3.2
3.5

.35
.33
.30
.08
.05
.30

3.5
4.0
2.7
0.7
1.5
2.4

3.8
4.0
3.8
1.1
4.4
4.4

SOURCE: Economic Report of the President, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, vanous years, and BNA, February 20, 1985; February
26, 1987; March 1, 1988; January 25, 1989; February 23, 1989.
a. Includes two-tier contracts.
b. Changes from December to December in Consumer Price Index.
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service sectors. The table also shows the inflation rates for these years.
The table illustrates different patterns of median wage changes between
the two sectors. In the manufacturing sector, for every year (except
1988) the median change for first-year wage settlements in two-tier con
tracts was zero, indicating a wage freeze. 3 For all manufacturing con
tracts from 1983 to 1985, the median increase was between 35 and 40
cents. On the other hand, in the service sector, two-tier settlements had
median wage increases well above zero, between 1983 and 1985, and
in contrast to the manufacturing sector, much closer to the median for
all service sector settlements.
As seen in table 2.4, BNA (February 20, 1985) data from 1983 and
1984 show median wage changes greater than zero in only two of the
six manufacturing industries that implemented tiers in 1983, and in eight
of the twelve that instituted them in 1984. In addition, the BNA data
indicate that none of the manufacturing industries that implemented tiers
in 1983, and only two that implemented them in 1984, had larger firstyear median wage changes than in all contract settlements for those in
dustries in the same years. This same data show that all but one service
sector industry with two-tier contract settlements had a positive me
dian wage change in 1983 and all had positive median wage changes
in 1984. Further, in three of the five service sector industries that im
plemented tiers in 1983, and five of the eight that implemented them
in 1984, the median first-year wage change was greater than in all
settlements.
These data support the previous discussion that viewed tiers as being
instituted primarily as either part of a firm's strategy for expansion or
as part of a strategy for economic survival. The data in tables 2.3 and
2.4 suggest that, initially, tiers were more likely to be used in relation
to a firm's strategy for survival in the manufacturing sector and in relation
to a firm's strategy for expansion in the service sector. Ballagh's (1985)
conclusions, also drawn from the BNA data, are consonant with the
above interpretation. He argues that the greater prevalence of tiers in
the service sector was due to the facilitation of expansion of unionized
employers into new markets where the employer would be competitive
with nonunion companies. He noted that in the manufacturing sector,
where tiers were less prevalent, rapid expansion of companies into new
markets was less practical.

Table 2.4
Comparison of First-Year Median Wage Increases in All Contracts
and Two-Tier Contracts by Industry, 1983-84

1983
All contracts
Sector and Industry
Manufacturing
Chemicals
Electrical machinery
Fabricated metals
Food processing
Instruments
Macinery, except
electrical
Miscellaneous
manufacturing
Paper
Petroleum
Printing
Textiles
Transportation
equipment

1984
Two-tier

All contracts

1

Two-tier

%

$/hour

%

$/hour

%

5
~

.25
~
-1.64
~

3
~
-17
~

.47
.31
.20
.28
.38

5
4
2
3
4

.00
.20
.00
.07
.06

0
2
0
1
1

.00

0

.00

0

.20

2
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Table 2.3 shows lower overall median first-year wage changes in 1986
and 1987 for each sector when compared to the earlier years, which
suggests that in both sectors at that time tiers were used primarily in
relation to a strategy for economic survival. 4 The changes were much
lower in the manufacturing sector for all contracts and for two-tier con
tracts in the service sector; the changes for all contracts in the service
sector were also somewhat lower. While those declines were likely af
fected by the low rate of inflation in 1986, the BNA (January 20, 1987)
attributes the lower level of median changes in part to an increase in
the percentage of settlements containing lump-sum payments. 5 These
are counted as wage freezes when they are accompanied by no firstyear raise because they are not included in the base pay rate. As they
moderate labor costs over general wage increases, they fit the defini
tion of a concession.
Industry Groups in which Tiers are Prominent
This section focuses on the experiences of selected industries shown
in table 2.2 or particular companies within those industries. The ex
amples used have been cited frequently in the literature and/or involve
situations where many employees have been placed on a low tier. The
industries are divided into four major groups, 6 based on the major force
operating in the industry that led to the implementation of tiers:
(1) manufacturing industries subject to competition from imports and/or
nonunion companies; (2) industries affected by pressure from the govern
ment to cut costs; (3) service sector industries affected by deregula
tion; and (4) other service sector industries subject to competitive
pressures.
Hall (1980) found that firms within the same industries addressed the
increasingly competitive markets through widely varying business
strategies. Cappelli (1985a) found that business strategies varied within
a specific industry according to the competitive pressures, the company's
current situation (product market, plant and equipment, finances, etc.),
and the view of the future held by management. He further argued that
the business strategy adopted played an important role in shaping
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a variety of labor relations outcomes. Although it is assumed that the
major force leading to the implementation of tiers is the same within
each of the four groups, the discussion will show that the strategy within
the groups varied considerably. Further, it needs to be emphasized that
these strategies and their associated outcomes may change over time
and may even vary between service sector companies (such as the retail
food industry) operating in several different geographic markets.
The discussion in this section also examines the factors that accom
panied the implementation of specific tiers. Thus, this section will help
us draw generalizations about the factors that may affect the incidence
of tiers.
Manufacturing Industries Affected by Imports
and Nonunion Competition
Nearly all of the industries in this group are in a decentralized bargain
ing structure. The best examples of tiered employers in this grouping
are the divisions of the automobile companies that make electrical com
ponents and are unionized by the International Union of Electrical
Workers (IUE). Leaders of the IUE have argued that their auto industry
members, who make small parts that can be easily purchased or manufac
tured elsewhere, are more threatened by low-wage competition than
the United Auto Workers (UAW) members who assemble cars or make
large parts (Wall Street Journal, October 14, 1985).
An example of where tiers have been implemented in a manufactur
ing industry affected by imports and nonunion competition is the General
Motors Delco Products plant in Rochester, New York. There had been
no hirings at the plant since 1979, and by 1982 the employment there
had decreased sharply. The union approached management about in
creasing employment at the manufacturing plant. While not making any
guarantees, General Motors suggested that lower labor costs were likely
to attract new business. A tiered-agreement implemented in 1983 reduced
health care benefits and days off for new employees. The top rate of
the low-tier employees was set at $9.68 per hour (compared to $13 for
those previously hired) and in the following two years, employment
increased from 2,220 to 3,550 persons. Management stated that 25
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percent of the increased employment was related to new business it would
not have received had the two-tier contract not been negotiated (Wall
Street Journal, October 14, 1985). This represents an example where
tiers were used as part of an expansion strategy.
Another example, which was described by Hoerr and Cook (1984),
was at the General Motors Packard Electric Division, where prior to
a two-tier contract, total labor costs (wages and fringe benefits) for
employees were $22 per hour. In contrast, similar manufacturing work
was being performed for a total cost of less than $3 per hour in the
Packard Electric plant in Mexico and for as little as $7 per hour at other
U.S. companies. In 1984 an agreement was reached with the Packard
Electric Division which guaranteed jobs to all employees hired before
January 1, 1982, with full pay and benefits until they retired. In ex
change, as a result of decreases in the wage and benefit package, the
total labor costs for new employees would be only $8.99 per hour. The
new low-tier wage scale will merge with that of the prior employees
after ten years. This example represents the use of tiers as part of a
firm's strategy for survival.
Government-Pressured Industry
Firms that make up the aerospace industry, a part of the transporta
tion equipment industry, were among the first manufacturing firms to
implement two-tier wage plans. The reason behind their implementa
tion of such plans, which separates this industry from the other industry
groups discussed, was the pressure from the government to cut labor
costs. Aerospace industry firms had little nonunion competition. A
spokesman for the aerospace industry noted that some executives had
received letters from military and other government officials warning
that excessive cost increases, especially for labor, would affect a con
tractor's ability to compete for government programs. Thus, it appears
that the implementation of tiers in this industry was primarily based
on management's desire to continue receiving government contracts,
and therefore related to a business strategy for expansion. The govern
ment campaign to decrease costs began in 1982. Prior to the beginning
of collective bargaining in 1983, Air Force officials and aerospace com
panies together examined options for holding down labor costs (Harris
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1983b). The government attempted to show that aerospace labor rates
were significantly higher than average manufacturing rates and cited
several job classifications for which pay under union contracts appeared
to be higher than in other industries.
The contracts between the Machinists union, the UAW, and Boeing,
Lockheed, and McDonnell-Douglas expired in late 1983. Boeing was
the first of these firms to propose a two-tier wage plan to the two unions.
The company executives said the reason for implementing tiers was to
save Boeing millions of dollars by attacking the problem of high wages
without adversely affecting the wages of the current workforce. The
unions stated that the company's objective was to reduce pressures from
the government to cut labor costs. Boeing helped to increase the accep
tance of the two-tier plan by offering the current employees a wage
increase of at least 6 percent (Harris 1983a).
Company executives stated that under the new contract, Boeing could
pay newly hired, less skilled workers up to 41 percent less than it would
have paid under the prior contract. Lockheed reported that the introduc
tion of tiers and the hiring of 2,800 employees on the low tier
in Georgia had lowered its average labor costs by 81 cents per hour.
Ross (1985) calculates that the tiers at Lockheed would save almost $19
million in labor costs during 1985. Ross, however, does not take into
account some of the potential costs (to be discussed later in this chapter)
that may accompany the implementation of tiers, such as increased turn
over and recruitment costs.
Industries Affected by Deregulation
The deregulation of the transportation industry, followed by the
development of nonunion firms with substantially lower labor costs than
the union firms, was the principal force behind the implementation and
spread of tiered compensation structures in this service sector industry.
Deregulation has had its most visible impact on the airline industry.
D. Walsh (1988) notes that two-tier plans were virtually nonexistent
in the U.S. airline industry in 1982, but by 1986 were an established
industry practice.
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The airline industry was among the most heavily regulated in the
United States until 1978. This regulation resulted in limitations on the
number of carriers assigned to any route and the absence of price com
petition between the airlines. Thus, during the 1970s, the bargaining
power of the unions increased relative to that of an unregulated market
as a result of such factors as increased air travel and higher employ
ment levels. That situation changed when the Airline Deregulation Act
of 1978 took effect, and competition between the airlines intensified
(Cappelli 1985a). New airlines established lower fares to compete with
the trunk carriers on heavily traveled routes between major cities. The
new airlines were primarily nonunion and therefore paid substantially
lower wages than the established carriers paid to employees in equivalent
positions.
Cappelli's (1985a) data on the four major airline craft groups at dif
ferent airlines, categorized by him according to their business strategies
since deregulation, revealed a relationship between the number of twotier wage plans and the airlines' business strategy. Airlines that operated
in markets with relatively little competition had two-tier plans in only
32 percent of their contracts. 7 Each of the other two groups of airlines
for which he presented data, the carriers near bankruptcy and the strong
carriers, had tiers in 82 percent of their contracts. Cappelli argues that
those in the "near bankruptcy" group used concessions and tiers to
avoid going bankrupt, and thus appeared to follow a strategy for
economic survival. Also, he states that the strong carriers, those with
sufficient financial resources to restructure their operations, used con
cessions (including tiers) to grow. In exchange, their employees received
increased job security. For example, when American Airlines negotiated
wage tiers, virtually all of its employees received lifetime employment
guarantees. After the tiers were negotiated at American, they became
a key element in its expansion strategy (Harris 1983c; Salpukas 1984).
Ross (1985) calculates that through employee turnover and hiring,
American Airlines' two-tier plans implemented in 1983 saved the airline
$100 million in labor costs during 1984.
Two-tier structures also appear to have had a role in the method by
which American Airlines decided to expand its operations. Brown and
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Agins (1987) describe the role that two-tier plans may have had at
American Airlines in its decision not to merge with Pan American World
Airlines in 1987. Given that Pan Am's workforce had many employees
on the high-wage tier, American Airlines expressed a preference to grow
internally rather than by merger. Brown and Agins (1987) note that
American preferred to buy routes from Pan Am, which it could then
staff with its own pilots and other personnel. Thus, American could
reduce average labor costs by increasing the percentage of employees
on the low tier.
Airline deregulation and the subsequent increased competition among
the airlines also led to the negotiation of tiers in the intercity bus transpor
tation industry. The company most affected by such competition was
Greyhound Lines, Inc. Greyhound had lost 45 percent of its New YorkBuffalo business, mostly to companies such as the People Express
Airline, Inc., which charged one-half of Greyhound's fare. Similarly,
Southwest Airlines flew from Phoenix to Denver for $65 versus $99
by Greyhound (Business Week, November 21, 1983). Labor costs were
also less at Greyhound's major bus competitor, Trailways Corporation
(Fortune, January 9, 1984).
As a result of the increased competition, Greyhound turned to labor
concessions and two-tier contracts as part of a survival strategy. In 1983
Greyhound Lines asked its employees for a 28 percent cut in wages
and benefits, as well as work-rule changes (Fortune, January 9, 1984).
One of the major work-rule changes proposed would have allowed
Greyhound to hire an unlimited number of part-time employees at 80
percent of the full-time employee pay with no benefits. The Amalgamated
Transit Union rejected the company's demands and struck. After a bit
ter two-month strike, during which the company started replacing the
strikers and attempted to operate, a settlement was reached. On the
average, salaries and benefits were cut 14 percent for prior employees
and 19 percent for new employees.
Compared to the airline industry, table 2.2 shows that the incidence
of two-tier contracts was much lower in intercity trucking (motor
transportation) and came later in the railroad industry. Cappelli (1985a)
argues that the industrywide bargaining structures in the trucking and
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railroad industries provided better protection for their unions from
bargaining concessions and two-tier plans than the decentralized struc
ture in the airline industry. For example, a permanent two-tier plan,
which would have modified the 1982 major industrywide trucking agree
ment (National Master Freight Agreement) (Lublin 1983), was over
whelmingly rejected by members of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters in 1983, thus keeping tiers out of almost the entire industry.
The Teamsters' president had supported the agreement and argued that
the unionized trucking industry needed help to compete with the non
union trucking companies that had arisen since deregulation. In the 1985
renegotiation of that contract, a temporary two-tier plan, which appeared
to be part of a strategy for survival, was approved with the two wage
scales merging in 1989 (the year after that contract expired). Jacoby
and Mitchell (1986) report that employee skepticism about whether the
tiers would actually merge led to a close ratification vote.
In the railroad industry, a national advisory study commission recom
mended major changes in its labor agreements to allow railroads to com
pete with trucking after the deregulation of the transportation industries
(Arouca 1985). Arouca notes that railroad employment and business
had steeply declined over the past three decades. Further, many railroads
were threatened with collapse. In the case of the Consolidated Rail Cor
poration, which represented about 20 percent of the rail industry, sur
vival was only possible with federal financial assistance. Therefore, in
the 1985 negotiations, railroad management sought labor concessions
in their labor agreements. The concessions that were obtained includ
ed wage tiers (Apcar 1985), which appear to have been part of a strategy
for economic survival.

Service Sector Industry Affected by Nonunion Competition
The major example of an industry in the service sector affected by
nonunion competition not related to deregulation or government pressure
is the retail food industry (wholesale and retail), the focus of chapter
3. The BNA data indicate that the greatest number of tiered plans are
in this service sector industry. There appear to be four factors that had
a major impact on the penetration of two-tier settlements in the retail
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food industry. First, the employee turnover in this industry has always
been high 30 or 40 percent per year is common (Ross 1985) thus
leading to more immediate savings to the employer from tiers than in
some other industries. Second, as with all of the industries discussed,
the retail food industry was subjected to pressure to reduce costs. Third,
the retail food industry faced very strong nonunion competition in most
of the markets it served. And fourth, since the retail food industry has
operated in many different geographic markets and economic en
vironments, there have been no nationwide contracts protecting its unions
from bargaining tiers or concessions.
Sichenze (1989) completed a content analysis of all tiered contracts
in the retail food industry covering 1,000 or more workers and also
interviewed managers, union leaders, attorneys, and others involved
in the industry. Her sources were unanimous "that two-tier labor con
tracts have helped management to be more competitive, and more pro
fitable. Union jobs have been saved and some expansion has been fuel
ed by these economic outcomes" (p. 493).
Chapter 3 shows that tiers of various forms were initially implemented
in this industry on a widespread basis before they were in other industries.
Many of the early wage tiers in the retail food industry were accom
panied by large wage increases for current employees, suggesting that
initially tiers were used primarily to help carry out strategic business
plans for expansion. More recently, however, the changes to already
existing tiers, along with the negotiation of new tiers, appears to be
primarily part of a strategy for economic survival, as those tiers were
generally accompanied by other concessions.
Potential Benefits of Tiers
The following sections will examine the potential benefits of tiers for
employees, unions, and employers, based on the discussion in the
literature and on what has actually occurred when tiers were im
plemented. It should be recognized that an outcome benefiting one of
the labor relations participants also may be beneficial for the other
groups. For example, the facilitation of an employer's expansion may
increase a union's membership and improve employees' job security.
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Thus, both Ploscowe (1986) and Ruben (1987) note that tiers, while
enabling employers to compete more effectively, may reduce labor costs
without increasing unemployment. Much of the following discussion
of the potential benefits and the subsequent examination of the poten
tial problems and concerns associated with tiers served as a source for
the research questions and hypotheses.

Potential Benefits for Employees
Certainly, any discussion of the potential benefits for employees from
tiered structures should examine benefits for both those in the low- and
high-tier positions. For the low-tier employees, the literature identifies
one major benefit, simply the creation of their jobs (Flax 1984; Ross
1985). For high-tier employees, the negotiation of a two-tier plan results
in no immediate costs; they do not share in the concessions that will
be made by the yet-to-be-hired, low-tier employees. When examining
the potential benefits to employees, one must consider whether the prob
lems that tiered structures present would be more or less severe than
the concessions that would occur in the absence of such structures. For
the high-tier employees, the comparison of tiers with alternative methods
of reducing or controlling labor costs (i.e., layoffs, wage/benefit con
cessions, or one of the newer forms of compensation discussed in chapter
1), becomes critical. For employees in tiered situations, an employer's
use of tiers to facilitate expansion may even result in greater job security.
Overall, the literature suggests that employees on both the low and high
tiers do not see any personal benefits to them resulting from tiers, par
ticularly in the long run (Bernstein and Schiller 1985; Bowers and
Roderick 1987; Salpukas 1987).
Potential Benefits for Unions
Several potential benefits for unions may result from tiers. It appears
that tiered structures have been responsible for keeping more jobs in
the unionized sector than would have otherwise existed. This, of course,
relates to the process of concessions, described previously by Cappelli
(1985b), where labor cost moderation is exchanged for improved job
security. Further, when a company implements tiers as a part of a
strategic business plan facilitating expansion, new unionized
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jobs may be created. For example, Seaberry (1985) reports the case
of a midwestern supermarket chain where a two-tier plan helped the
company to expand and add about 3,000 new jobs. The Wall Street Jour
nal (October 14, 1985) reports that tiers were responsible for over 300
jobs created at the Rochester Delco Products General Motors plant.
Ploscowe (1986) states that tiers lower labor costs without resorting
to layoffs and may provide the employer with an incentive to hire new
employees. Certainly, the creation of new jobs and the preservation
of the existing ones would appear to benefit the union.
It has also been argued that two-tier plans are politically much easier
for the union to sell to the membership and obtain ratification than other
kinds of concessions. Ploscowe (1986) notes three advantages tiers have
over other concession forms: (1) tiers do not cost current members
anything, since they provide a vehicle to preserve the contract gains
achieved over the years; (2) new members are more likely to support
the union if they know that the implementation of tiers led to the crea
tion of their jobs; and (3) tier systems result in more, not fewer, members
for the unions.
Potential Benefits for Employers
There are several major interrelated benefits for employers that may
result from the implementation of tiers. Tiered structures may save the
employer money and facilitate expansion, both of which allow employers
to compete more effectively. Ross (1985) cites the examples of American
Airlines and Lockheed Aircraft. After negotiating tiers, these companies
subsequently expanded and increased employment, thus lowering their
average hourly labor cost.
An employer's labor cost savings will be large in industries with a
high turnover of workers who are unskilled or require little or no train
ing. The BNA data indicate that tiered plans are indeed concentrated
in the industries characterized by rapid turnover; the industry with the
greatest number of tiered agreements, for example, is retail food, where
turnover is great. Dalton and Kesner (1986) argue that turnover under
two-tiered agreements may result in "windfall" savings for a company
as employees on the low tier replace much more expensive employees
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on the high tier. The cost savings will not be great, and may not even
exist, in industries or companies experiencing declining employment.
Tiers offer an advantage to employers compared to across-the-board
cuts, as the employer can reduce labor costs without losing valuable
employees (Ploscowe 1986). Such employees, who would be on the
high tier, would not have their compensation reduced, and thus would
be less likely to search for alternative employment. Companies experien
cing declining employment would appear to need across-the-board wage
or benefit cuts to lower their average labor costs.
A related benefit to the employer is that tiers can reduce the costs
of early retirement plans (Fogel 1985). In a tiered employment situa
tion, employees who retire early are replaced by employees on the low
tier, similar to what occurs with employee turnover. The result is that
the company saves money over what it would have cost without the
tiers. In some cases, companies have expanded early retirement plans
for the purpose of obtaining greater cost reductions (Jacoby and Mitchell 1986).
It should be noted that even when tiered structures are eliminated,
the potential cost savings may continue into the future. Wessel (1985)
cites an example of a drugstore chain in which a two-tier plan had been
in effect for 16 years. After that length of time, the wage difference
between the two tiers had been nearly eliminated. The high-tier
employees had received much lower increases than the low-tier
employees, and management estimated that the average hourly wage
cost was 8 to 10 percent lower than it would have been had tiers not
been implemented. Similarly, Salpukas (1987) cites an example of a
supermarket chain which provided wage increases to low-tier employees
and lump-sum payments rather than wage increases for the high-tier
employees. The tiers were to be merged after the high-tier rates had
been frozen for six or seven years. Thus, when unions attempt to
eliminate tiers, an employer can obtain additional labor cost savings
through concessions of the high-wage tier employees. The BNA (1988)
notes that an employer can obtain cost savings by playing off employees
on one tier against those on the other tier in alternating contracts.
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Potential Problems and Concerns Associated with Tiers
Several potential problems or concerns that may result from the im
plementation of tiered structures are identified in the literature. This
discussion of potential problems focuses on those specific to employees,
unions, and employers. Few of the potential problems have been the
subject of academic scrutiny or examined empirically. Many are inter
related and appear to have their basis in the commonly held viewpoint
that tiers, with their unequal pay for equal work, are unfair wage
discrimination. As was the case with potential benefits, it is recogniz
ed that major problems resulting from tiers that affect one group of par
ticipants also may affect the other groups. For example, although it is
often stated in the literature that lower employee morale resulting from
tiers may impact adversely on both union and management in the form
of increased grievances or lower productivity (Bowers and Roderick
1987; Essick 1987; Salpukas 1985; Wessel, 1985), lower employee
morale is discussed in the section on potential problems for employees.
A discussion of the potential problems/concerns includes public policy
issues related to the union's duty to provide fair representation and to
promote equal employment opportunity.
Based on a review of the literature, it appears that few of the poten
tial problems associated with tiered systems become a major concern
or political issue until one of the following two conditions is met: (1)
the percentage of low-tier employees in any particular bargaining unit
is relatively high, or (2) the low-tier employees gain enough seniority
so that the other distinctions between them and the high-tier employees,
such as skill, knowledge and familiarity with the job, disappear (Bern
stein and Schiller 1985). Also, potential problems are likely to surface
beyond the initial contract in an employment situation with temporary
tiers or after several years for a permanent tiered contract (Balliet 1984;
Flax 1984; Liggett 1984). With a strong economy and a tight labor
market, however, problems with recruitment and turnover may arise
even where tiers have not been in effect for a long time (Ross 1985;
Salpukas 1987; Wessel 1985). In some cases, it appears that manage
ment has made changes to or eliminated tiers to alleviate the problems
perceived as resulting from tiers.
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Potential Problems for Employees
The potential problems for employees caused by tiers generally are
thought to be related to lower morale (Bowers and Roderick 1987;
Ploscowe 1986; Ross 1985: Salpukas 1987); the lower morale is certainly
of great concern to the employer and union. Essick (1987) found that
38 percent of the managers from two-tier firms reported that tiers had
had either a somewhat negative effect on morale or a significantly
negative effect on morale. He also found that 17 percent of the managers
surveyed reported that tiers had either a somewhat negative or significant
ly negative effect on the number (i.e., had increased the number) and
significance of grievances filed. It should be noted that Sichenze (1989)
found that "there are no reports of increased grievances, and no
grievances have been filed that focus on two-tier provisions" (p. 493).
Jacoby and Mitchell (1986) report that one-half of the managers from
firms with tiers stated that tiers would result in a decline in employee
morale.
Often cited as a problem is the job site friction between those on dif
ferent tiers or between groups of workers opposing each other (Bern
stein and Schiller 1985; Harris 1983c; Salpukas 1987). Balliet (1984)
states that even if contract language protects more senior employees
from easy replacement, two-tier agreements are almost certain to create
severe strains within the worker/union community of interest. Salpukas
found managers who believed that the low-tier employees often did just
what was required on the job and no more, sometimes refusing to help
the high-tier employees. Ross (1985) found high-tier employees who
reported that occasionally low-tier employees refused to do a task because
they were earning less. Bowers and Roderick (1987) state that workplace
safety could become worse because of tiers. As a result of the morale
problems and the constant arguing and complaining arising from a tiered
plan, Ploscowe (1986) reports that one of his management clients had
him negotiate away the tiers in exchange for work-rule concessions.
Possibly leading to both increased friction between groups and low
morale for high-tier employees are the perceived threats to their job
security, given the economic incentive to substitute lower-cost new
employees for those on the high tier (Bernstein and Schiller 1985; Bowers
and Roderick 1987; Ploscowe 1986). While seniority provisions general-
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ly protect the high-tier employees from being laid off, there are two
widely cited examples in the retail food industry of high-tier employees
being laid off and essentially replaced by low-tier employees (Bern
stein and Schiller 1985; Bowers and Roderick 1987; Wessel 1985). Also,
Wessel notes that equalizing tiers usually means that the high-tier
employees' raises are sacrificed.

Potential Problems for Unions
The potential problems for unions relate to the belief that tiers create
a different (and perhaps lower) class of members, with the low-tier
employees having different interests than the high-tier employees. Thus,
many observers contend that tiers are divisive and challenge the con
cept of union solidarity. Harris (1983c) discusses both the union and
management perspectives on this divisiveness and the treatment of lowtier employees as creating "a bitter second class of workers" (p. 33).
Craft, Abboushi, and Labovitz (1985) note that tiers, as a form of labor
union concession, create new group differences in the union "that may
stimulate factional fights and divisions within the ranks" (p. 174). In
Wessel's (1985) discussion of this problem, he notes that tiers had caused
such problems for the United Food and Commercial Workers Interna
tional Union (UFCW) that it adopted a national policy opposing tiers
for, among other reasons, "their inherent divisiveness" (p. 9). Balliet
(1984) notes that union adoption of such clearly discriminatory wage
packages is likely to heighten divisions within the rank and file and the
union leadership. Ross (1985) notes that nothing could be more destruc
tive to union solidarity than a pay structure giving unequal pay for equal
work.
With the division of the union into classes and the weakening of union
solidarity, it is unlikely that high-tier employees would be willing to
strike along with low-tier employees to increase the low-tier rates if
the high-tier rates did not receive an equal increase. Balliet (1984) fur
ther argues that if management attempted to lower the high-tier rates
to those of the low tier, the low-tier employees would be unlikely to
support a strike to prevent that. He believes the low-tier employees would
have little interest in protecting the higher rates "of those who originally
negotiated their inferior status" (p. 7). As noted previously, management
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can play off employees who are on different tier levels against each
other in successive contract settlements, likely increasing the divisiveness
among employees.
Thus, it is not surprising, as Ploscowe (1986) notes, that even the
economic advantage to the current members and the potential for in
creasing union membership through employer expansion may be
outweighed in some cases by the political damage to the union caused
by tiers. Tiers may cause conflict within the union generally and prob
lems at the bargaining table, leading to union-management conflict
(Bowers and Roderick 1987). Wessel (1985) documents a case where
a tiered agreement exacerbated a feud within a union. Ploscowe notes
that tiers "may ultimately breed a radicalized and disaffected class of
members more interested in overthrowing union leadership than in
preserving the status quo" (p. 27).
If the low-tier employees become a majority of the bargaining unit,
the union could be thrown into political turmoil. Ploscowe (1986) found
some union officials who shared this concern and who conceded the
possibility that the low-tier employees could vote the current leader
ship out of office or decertify the union. Bowers and Roderick (1987),
recognizing these potential problems, even go so far as to suggest that
implementing tiers may now be a union-busting technique used by
management.
As tiered contracts have become more prevalent and unions have gain
ed more experience with tiers, union leader fears about them have in
creased. Union leaders also are aware that high-tier employees are more
concerned about their job security than previously. Ploscowe (1986)
believes such concerns had led unions to become much less willing to
accept tiers than previously.
Potential Problems for Employers
Some of the potential problems for employers appear to be related
to the local labor market and the level of the low-tier pay scales, par
ticularly the potential for increased turnover and for difficulties in recruit
ment. Turnover may be higher for low-tier employees than for similarly
situated employees in firms without two-tier plans. Sichenze (1989)
reports that turnover in the heavily tiered retail food industry was more

Tiered Compensation Structures in Practice 47

than twice as high as the historical rate had been, going beyond the
tightening of the labor market that occurred in the late 1980s. Wessel
(1985) reports that the pay scale for low-tier employees at Hughes Air
craft Co. was so low that new workers did not stay. Ross (1985) reports
that Giant Food found two-thirds of its new employees quit before the
end of three months. American Airlines found some of its low-tier pilots
quit and went to other airlines without a two-tier plan (Bernstein and
Schiller 1985). In a study of a tiered employment situation that used
a strategy of turning over low-tier employees rapidly, Granrose, Applebaum, and Singh (1986) found that unit labor costs were higher in
those locations where turnover was higher. Essick (1987) obtained data
on employee resignations from 76 companies with two-tier plans. A
comparison of the data the year before the plan was implemented with
the most recent 12-month period found essentially no difference, sug
gesting that tiers did not result in increased turnover.
Turnover is not always viewed as a problem, however. In companies
whose workers are unskilled or require little or no training, turnover
may be desirable as it keeps employees on the lower steps of the pay
scales, thus helping to reduce labor costs (Dalton and Kesner 1986; Ross
1985). Obviously, savings from increased turnover have to be balanc
ed against the increased costs of recruitment, training, and the lower
productivity of new employees while they learn their jobs.
In a growing number of instances, often related to improvements in
the economy and a tightening of the labor market, the two-tier systems
have made recruitment difficult for employers. American Airlines had
such difficulty recruiting pilots at its initial starting rate on the low tier
that it had to raise the scale (Salpukas 1987; Wessel 1985). Giant Food
had to raise the low-tier starting rate to attract new employees because
the nature of the labor market in which it operated changed (BNA, March
2,1988; Salpukas 1987). Those changes to the tiers at American Airlines
and Giant Food were also introduced to reduce turnover. Lockheed could
not recruit enough applicants at its California facility for some job classes
at the starting rates and thus let applicants bargain individually for a
higher rate of pay (Ross 1985).
Some employers found that the qualifications of applicants appeared
to have declined after tiers were introduced (Salpukas 1987), though
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it can be argued that this is related to a tightening of the labor market
(BNA, March 2, 1988). Salpukas even notes that some labor experts
believe tiers for skilled workers will disappear due to labor market fac
tors. 8 Ploscowe (1986) states that a careful investigation of prevailing
wages in the relevant labor market must be conducted to determine that
an adequate labor supply can be attracted at the desired rate.
An additional potential problem for the employer, as for the union,
is the worsening of union-management relations. Thirty-two percent
of the companies that Essick (1987) surveyed reported that tiers had
had a somewhat negative or significantly negative effect on the overall
labor relations climate. In contrast, 20 percent reported a somewhat
positive or significantly positive effect on the climate. 9 Overall, a higher
percentage of the respondents perceived a negative effect of two-tier
wage systems on the labor relations climate, with the rest (49 percent)
being neutral. Similarly, Jacoby and Mitchell (1986) report that 36 per
cent of the managers in firms with tiers perceived that two-tier plans
had led to a decline in the climate of union-management relations, while
13 percent perceived it had led to an improvement. Based on the available
survey data, it appears that most managers believe tiers result in a
worsening of the labor relations climate.
Perhaps the most critical potential problem that tiers may create for
employers is lower productivity. The prior discussion of the potential
problems for employees, i.e., job site friction and morale problems,
indicate that low-tier employees may put less effort into the job (Ross
1985; Salpukas 1987). If correct, this would result in lower produc
tivity than would have otherwise been the case. However, unlike the
issue of turnover and recruitment, there is little evidence that tiers result
in less productive employees, with the exception of the special case of
Hughes Aircraft Co. (Bowers and Roderick 1987; Wessel 1985). There,
it appears that poor morale, low-tier employee dissatisfaction, and a
lack of teamwork resulting from the implementation of wage tiers con
tributed to such low productivity and quality that contract payments were
temporarily suspended by the Air Force. Subsequently, the low-tier start
ing rate was raised and the permanent plan converted to a temporary
one. The available literature does not discuss whether those changes
resolved the problems.
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The only multiple-employer study using a productivity-related criterion
is that of Essick (1987). He examined absenteeism, a variable that Katz,
Kochan, and Gobeille (1983) found was negatively related to directlabor efficiency and product quality, both of which have been viewed
as indicators of productivity (Greenberg 1975; Siegel 1983). Essick
analyzed absenteeism rates and other hard empirical data from com
panies with tiers, both before and after tiers were implemented. He con
cludes that, overall, his findings did not support the view that two-tier
plans adversely affect the workforce. 10
Essick (1987) and Jacoby and Mitchell (1986) also examined
managerial attitudes about tiers and productivity. Essick found that 24
percent of the surveyed managers reported that tiers had had either a
significantly positive or somewhat positive effect on employee produc
tivity, 67 percent reported tiers had had a neutral effect, and only 9
percent reported tiers had a somewhat negative or significantly negative
effect on employee productivity. Jacoby and Mitchell found that 13 per
cent of the managers they surveyed thought that tiers had improved
employee productivity, 63 percent believed tiers had had no effect, and
24 percent believed that productivity had declined as a result of tiers.
Thus, many surveyed managers believed that the implementation of tiers
did not adversely affect productivity." It should be emphasized, however
that the survey data presented above only capture the subjective percep
tions of managers. These studies and the Hughes case, while not pro
viding a definitive answer concerning the effects of tiers on productivi
ty, suggest that the relationship of tiers to employee productivity may
vary depending on the situation. Nonetheless, the predominant belief
expressed in the literature is that low-tier employees are less produc
tive than those on the high tier (e.g., Ross 1985; Salpukas 1987).
Potential Public Policy Problems
Two legal public policy issues appear to be potential concerns/prob
lems related to tiered-employment agreements: (1) Do tiered agreements
violate the union's duty of fair representation? and (2) Do these
agreements lead to legal problems related to equal employment oppor
tunity (EEO)? While these issues in relation to tiered agreements have
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not been ruled on by the courts, they have been the subject of research
and debate by scholars.
Duty of Fair Representation
Under the duty of fair representation (DFR) doctrine, a union must
abstain from arbitrary, unfair, discriminatory, or bad-faith behavior in
its responsibilities as the members' representative and fairly represent
their interests. The DFR doctrine means a union is liable to all of its
members and provides a safeguard against majority abuse of the in
terests of the numerical minority of the bargaining unit (Harvard Law
Review 1985). Two-tier agreements potentially represent a threat to the
capability of the union to safeguard the class of new low-tier employees
in the bargaining unit. The doctrine currently provides only a small
number of restrictions on agreements, such as two-tier agreements, that
discriminate at the time of entry into the bargaining unit.
In several major cases, the Supreme Court outlined the nature of the
DFR, generally avoiding a rigid definition of DFR, but instead opting
for a flexible standard based on good faith. In Ford Motor Co. v. Huff
man 345 U.S. 330 (1953), a union was allowed a "wide range of
reasonableness ... in serving the unit it represents." The Court stated
that the tests were actions that could be described as manifesting "com
plete good faith" and "honesty of purpose." Thus a union did not violate
its DFR merely if its conduct had some unfavorable effects on certain
groups in the bargaining unit. If a union has acted in good faith with
an honesty of purpose in attempting to reconcile the competing interests
of different groups, it may favor one group over another. In Gray v.
Asbestos Workers Local 51 416 F.2d 313 (6th Cir., 1969), the Circuit
Court ruled that a job applicant enjoyed no right to fair representation,
thus limiting application of the DFR to members of the bargaining unit
only. Using the standard in Gray, any contracts into which tiers were
introduced (not those that continued tiers) would not violate the union's
DFR, as the new hires were not in the bargaining unit when the con
tract was bargained.
Two cases under the Railway Labor Act, Steele v. Louisville and
Nashville Railroad 323 U.S. 192 (1944), and Tunstall v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen 323 U.S. 210 (1944), approv-
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ed discrimination on bases relevant to the union's statutory purposes.
In stating that a union could not bargain differences based on irrelevant
factors, the Courts went on to state what might be permissible and that
variations could be based on differences that were relevant to the
authorized purpose of the contract. Yet the set of "relevant" distinc
tions in terms of employee expectations yields virtually no restriction
on the union's discrimination at the time the new employee enters the
bargaining unit.
Summers (1984) states that such "relevant" differences could include
those based on seniority, skill, and the type of work performed. Ploscowe
(1986) notes that seniority, or date of hire, has always been a basis for
the allocation of certain benefits under a collective bargaining agree
ment; thus it is unlikely that a Court would view differences based on
that distinction to be arbitrary. In Foxworth v. Airline Pilots Associa
tion 83 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 10,498 (S.D. N.Y., 1978), the court stated
that' 'it is not a breach of the duty of fair representation to provide special
grandfather benefits on the basis of an employee's date of assignment.''
In an analysis of the DFR in relation to tiered agreements, Liggett
(1984) examined those court cases and others attempting to determine
whether a contract that continues tiers previously negotiated violates
the union's DFR to those low-tier employees continuing their employ
ment. Liggett asks two questions relating to the DFR and tiered
agreements. First, does the protection provided for one group's interests
adversely affect another group's interests in a manner that violates the
sense of permissible distinctions as found by the Court? Second, does
the protection provided for a group's interests adversely affect another
group's interests in a manner that violates the criterion set out by the
court in Huffman! Liggett concludes that a union has failed in its duty
of fair representation in the negotiation of a permanent two-tier agree
ment; permanent tiered agreements are much more vulnerable to DFR
charges than are plans that merge. In addition, the availability of op
tions other than tiers, i.e., across-the-board decreases for all members
of the bargaining unit, raises questions concerning the defenses of
"honesty of purpose" and "complete good faith" available under Huff
man. Although the establishment of permanent tiers may be inconsis
tent with the fair representation doctrine, both the BNA (January 10,
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1985) and Jacoby and Mitchell (1986) interpret Liggett's analysis to
mean that tiers would likely withstand a DFR suit.
Equal Employment Opportunity
Equal employment opportunity (EEO), as stated in Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act as amended, prohibits employment discrimina
tion on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. The
courts have held in several cases that an employment practice must not
have a disparate impact on a "protected class," generally considered
to be those of minority races, females, or foreign born, unless the
employment practice is based on a business necessity (Lopatka 1977).
The courts have held that there are three tests to determine the legitimacy
of a business practice. It must serve a business purpose; that purpose
must be sufficiently compelling to override the effects of any disparate
impact; and there must be no alternative practices to equally or better
accomplish the business practice with less disparate impact (Lopatka
1977).
Tiers have become an EEO concern because the lower tier could con
tain a disproportionate number of members of protected classes, such
as women and minorities. Ploscowe (1986) suggests that this EEO con
cern is legitimate because the percentage of females and minority race
employees is increasing in industries with tiers. Bowers and Roderick
(1987) note that the continuing movement of women into the workforce
suggests a potential EEO problem for tiers, as women would not be
on the high tier.
A wide range of views regarding EEO is found in the results of two
managerial surveys regarding tiers. Essick's (1987) survey of companies
found that, of those with tiers, 5 percent stated that two-tier wage systems
had a somewhat or significantly negative effect on the number and
significance of EEO grievances filed, while 93 percent said it had a
neutral effect. The Jacoby and Mitchell (1986) data gathered from
managers at firms with two-tier plans showed that 51 percent agreed
with the statement: "Legal problems for employers are created by twotier plans if new hires are disproportionately female and minority
workers." The remaining 49 percent of the respondents disagreed with
that statement.
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For two-tier systems, the question of concern is: "If women and
minorities are disproportionately employed in the low tier, would they
have grounds to win an EEO complaint?" 12 Rosenblum (1984) of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission argues that a tiered struc
ture would likely be safe from discrimination claims under Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act so long as the lower tier was implemented
without race or gender bias. Rosenblum's argument is supported by
a law professor quoted in Flax (1984), who noted: "If such plans can
be shown to have a serious business consideration rather than being
a covert attempt by one group to do in another, I'd be surprised if respon
sible courts failed to uphold them" (p.77). Rosenblum further argues
that even if women or minorities were disproportionately concentrated
in the low tier, tiers negotiated in exchange for job security measures
and agreed to in good faith, not as a way to get around the EEO laws,
would probably be viable in an EEO suit.
There is still the possibility that low-tier employees will file a suit,
even if the suit were not viable (Bowers and Roderick 1987; Jacoby
and Mitchell 1986). Certainly, employers and labor unions should be
concerned with the employee perceptions concerning EEO issues. The
feelings of not being fairly represented and of being discriminated against
also have the potential to lead to low morale and productivity problems
(Bowers and Roderick 1987; Flax 1984).

The Incidence of Tiers
The review of the literature and the examples discussed above sug
gest several conditions that appear to have influenced the incidence of
tiered settlements. The following conditions seem most relevant: the
nature of the competition affecting the employer and its industry; the
nature of the local and national economies; the nature of employment
trends in the company and its industry; and the industry's collective
bargaining structure. These conditions affected the needs and goals of
unions and management, and therefore their willingness to negotiate
and maintain tiers.
Certainly, it appears that the implementation and maintenance of tiers
in several industries have been closely related to the competitive en-
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vironment in that industry. For example, tiers are more common where
an employer is confronted with competition from companies (general
ly nonunion) with lower labor costs. Also, the relationship between tiers
and concession bargaining suggests that when the local and national
economies are stronger, with relatively low unemployment rates and
therefore a lower number of union contract concessions, fewer new tiers
are negotiated.
Additionally, the literature suggests that the nature of employment
trends within an industry or company may be related to the incidence
of tiers. For example, tiers are more likely to be found in industries
or companies that are expanding or companies that have a high amount
of turnover. Similarly, industries, and companies within them, with a
very stable workforce or declining levels of employment have a lower
incidence of tiers.
The nature of the industry's collective bargaining structure also ap
pears to be related to the implementation of tiers. The broader the
bargaining structure, i.e., industrywide or company wide versus in
dividual plant bargaining structures or those based on a local union's
jurisdiction, the less likely are tiers to be found. In broader structures,
where unions have organized the product market to a greater extent,
unions possess greater bargaining power and thus are more able to resist
management pressure to negotiate tiers. The nature of the bargaining
structure appears to be less of a factor today, however, as industrywide
and pattern-setting bargaining have become less common during the
1980s (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986).
The previous discussion of the potential problems perceived to be
associated with tiers provided several examples of management either
eliminating or substantially modifying the tiered compensation systems.
In each situation, management moved to reduce what it viewed as a
disadvantage or cost associated with tiers. The descriptions of those
cases indicates that the tiers were eliminated or modified to accomplish
the following goals: improve employee morale; facilitate employee
recruitment; decrease employee turnover; and improve product quali
ty. Tiered compensation plans are more likely to be eliminated or
modified to reduce the difference between the tiers where management
believes that the costs have exceeded the benefits to the company.
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Further, if management is already experiencing difficulties in recruiting
employees, they may decide not to negotiate disparate compensation
rates in the first place.
Recent Trends
To ascertain whether the BNA two-tier settlements reported in table
2.2 were new or modified plans and thus how prevalent tiers are, it
is necessary to determine when such plans came into widespread use.
While it is not certain when two-tier contracts first appeared on the
American industrial relations scene, Flax (1984) states that two-tier con
tracts go back to the thirties. Balliet (1984) argues that it was only with
the advent of widespread employer demands for contract concessions
in the 1980s that two-tier provisions became common enough to attract
much attention. Using data on concession settlements, Jacoby and Mitchell (1986) estimate that in 1982, less than 1 percent of all settlements
were two-tier agreements. It is apparent, however, that some currently
existing tiered plans were negotiated before then. For example, roughly
20 percent of Essick's (1987) 1986 sample had six or more years of
experience with such plans.
It seems then, that the major increase in the number of new tieredsettlements took place around 1982. Given the large increase in the
percentages of settlements with wage tiers as reported by the BNA and
the three-year length of the majority of contracts (BNA, October 8,
1987), it appears that almost all of the 1983 and 1984 settlements would
represent new plans. Also, it appears that enough of the two-tier set
tlements in 1985 would be new to represent an increase over the number
of new settlements for 1984. By 1986, many of the earlier tiered
agreements would have come up for renewal, with or without modifica
tion. It is probable that employers which had sought dual wage rates
the most would have already negotiated them. Thus, the decrease in
the number of new two-tier plans starting in 1986 is likely greater than
that which is assumed when one interprets the BNA data in table 2.2
as representing new plans only, as many of the preexisting plans could
have been modified.
The BNA's data also reveal that an increased proportion of the new
plans are temporary rather than permanent (BNA, March 1, 1988;
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February 23, 1989; Thomas 1988). Unions appear to be largely respon
sible for this recent trend. For example, the policy statement issued
by the executive board of the UFCW in February, 1985, strongly
discouraged permanent wage tiers while not ruling out temporary wage
tiers (Bernstein and Schiller 1985). Based on his experience as a manage
ment negotiator, Ploscowe (1986) concluded that unions "will not readily
negotiate a permanent two-tier structure, [but] will continue to negotiate
temporary dual pay plans" (p. 27).
The available data also show a trend toward the elimination of ex
isting tiered compensation structures. The BNA data base contains 4
settlements in which tiers were eliminated in 1985 and 3 in 1986, but
15 in 1987 and 5 in 1988. While there has been an increase in the number
of settlements eliminating wage tiers and a decrease in the number of
newly negotiated tiers, the BNA data indicate that for both 1987 and
1988 there were still five times as many settlements (127 total) in which
tiered plans were negotiated or modified (without elimination) as there
were plans (20 total) that were eliminated.
In addition, it can be calculated from the BNA data that 27 of the
temporary plans negotiated in 1987 were new plans, 6 lengthened the
wage progressions, and 1 shortened them (BNA, March 1, 1988). In
1988, 14 new temporary plans were negotiated, 1 lengthened the wage
progressions, and 6 shortened them (BNA, February 23, 1989). 13
Adding the number of new plans to the number of those with lengthened
progressions indicates that for each of those two years, there were more
than two times as many settlements in which tiers were newly instituted
or extended as there were settlements which eliminated tiers. Even with
the decline in the number of new plans being negotiated, more tiers
currently are being either newly negotiated or modified to contain
lengthened wage progressions than are being eliminated. Thus, it can
be assumed that both the number of contracts with tiers and the number
of workers employed on the low-wage tier are still increasing.
Others have misinterpreted the BNA data as indicating the imminent
demise of two-tier structures. Newspaper reports, such as those by
Crawley (1988) and Lewis (1989) seem to have misinterpreted the BNA
yearly figures as representing the total percentage of contracts existing
with tiers in them rather than the percentage of contracts with tiers
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negotiated in a given year. Even the BNA (1988) has suggested that
"since [1985], the prevalence of plans has declined" (p. 55). It ap
pears that some of these reports have been overly influenced by the
prevailing attitudes expressed in the literature concerning the "un
popularity" of tiers (e.g., BNA 1988) in their assessments of the in
cidence of tiers.
The Future of Tiers
The literature suggests several factors likely to affect the future penetra
tion of tiered compensation structures. Bernstein and Schiller (1985)
argue that employees who were willing to accept tiers previously, when
unemployment was higher and the economy was not as healthy, will
be less willing to accept their low-tier status. In addition, in many
bargaining units, low-tier employees will reach sufficient numbers to
exert increased pressure on both employers and union leaders for the
elimination of tiers (Borum, Conley, and Wasilewski 1987).
These changes and greater union knowledge about the impact of tiers
appear to have made unions (both those that had negotiated many tiers
and those that had not) increasingly reluctant to negotiate such plans
(Ploscowe 1986). For example, the UFCW, which had negotiated many
two-tier plans, recognized the unpopularity of tiers with its members
when it adopted a bargaining goal in 1985 that opposed permanent tiers
and supported working toward the equalization of the rates (BNA, March
2, 1988). 14 Further, union leaders are expected to find none of the other
new compensation strategies discussed in chapter 1 as inherently un
fair as two-tier plans (BNA 1988).
The results from the BNA annual surveys of employer bargaining
objectives for 1988 and 1989 (BNA, March 2, 1988; October 6, 1988)
reveal subtle changes in management views of tiers, which will likely
affect the prevalence of tiers in the future. These surveys indicated that,
of the employers with labor agreements expiring in 1988, 95 percent
of those with wage tiers planned to continue them, versus 81 percent
of those with agreements expiring in 1989. Of employers without tiers,
18 percent planned to negotiate them in 1988 versus 12 percent in 1989.
These findings seem to support the view that the rate of decline for new
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tiered compensation plans will continue to increase and that more plans
will be eliminated. It may be that many of the employers who most
strongly desired to implement tiers and were able to convince their unions
to do so have already negotiated them.
Changes in the economy and labor force since the early 1980s will
also likely play a part in determining the prevalence of tiers. An im
portant short-term change was the economic recovery from the 1981-82
recession, which resulted in unemployment rates in 1988 almost half
the size of those earlier in the decade (BNA 1988; BNA, January 25,
1989). The improved economy and lower unemployment at the end of
the 1980s, by themselves, probably made management less willing to
negotiate tiers, as tiers make it more difficult to attract new employees.
Also, the BNA (1988) recognized that a long-term demographic change,
i.e., the "baby bust," would eventually lead to a shortage of new en
trants to the labor force. When the effects of this demographic change
are combined with those taking place in the economy, they concluded that
the demographics of a middle-aged workforce have elevated
employee recruitment and retention to a similar status [as
labor cost containment]. The problem has become even more
complicated how does an employer hold down labor costs
to remain competitive without losing its employees to its com
petitors [p. 23].
In contrast to the difficulties in recruitment and retention associated
with tiers (resulting from the lowering of the entry wage level), all of
the other new forms of compensation can facilitate recruitment and reten
tion through means of additional employee incentives. O'Dell and
Me Adams (1986) argue that two-tier plans are the one new compensa
tion strategy that does not enhance the use of a participative human
resource strategy. Thus, it is not surprising that the BNA data indicate
that as new wage tiers were becoming less common, lump-sum payments
have become more common. 15 Lump-sum payments are often accom
panied by participative employee human resource strategies and profit
sharing plans (Brophy and Walsh 1987; Uchitelle 1987). Overall, the
factors discussed here will likely continue to be related both to the
decrease in the number of new tiers being negotiated and to the trend
toward the elimination of tiers.
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Although the above discussion may be interpreted by some as sug
gesting that tiers will rapidly fade away in the near future, this seems
unlikely, as a sizable but decreasing proportion of management have
an interest in implementing or maintaining tiers. Beyond the interest
expressed in the BNA annual surveys of management collective bargain
ing objectives, that interest is documented in the 1986 survey data
reported by Essick (1987) concerning management intentions for tiers.
His survey focused only on tiers and provides some additional insight
beyond the BNA annual surveys. He found that more than 60 percent
of the 311 companies without tiers reported that they would consider
adopting a two-tier plan in the future. Of the 123 respondents with tiers
(28 percent of the survey group), about two-thirds intended to increase
the use of tiers by extending the number of employee groups covered,
by widening the pay difference between the tiers, by converting tem
porary tiers to permanent tiers, and/or by implementing benefit tiers.
Insofar as management attempts to achieve these goals, tiers will still
remain a major collective bargaining issue.
Essick (1987) concludes his analysis with the following prediction.
Because American companies continue to face increasing
competition, both at home and abroad, two-tier wage systems
are expected to grow in popularity as an innovative approach
to controlling labor costs [p.232].
Ploscowe (1986) offers the following strong arguments concerning
the future of tiers.
Both management and labor will continue to negotiate twotier contracts because of increased competition from non
union operators and the growing wage disparity between
union and nonunion employees. The question is not whether,
but how, management and labor will respond to this pressure.
Labor costs will be reduced, whether by wage and benefit
concessions, layoffs, work rule changes, two-tier contracts,
or a combination thereof. Labor, although finding two-tier
contracts distasteful, will continue to find the other alter
natives completely unacceptable [p.28].
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Salpukas (1987), while recognizing that tiered compensation systems
are under attack, similarly notes that "with the increasing competition
from deregulation and lower-cost nonunion or foreign companies, they
are not going to disappear anytime soon" (p. 1). He quotes airline ex
ecutives who stated that they would maintain tiers as long as nonunion
competitors maintained low fares and possessed lower labor costs than
established unionized carriers. Sichenze (1989) states that "two-tier labor
contracts appear to represent a restructuring of the total wage package
in the retail food industry one that will continue into the immediate
future" (p. 494). None of the above predictions, however, appears to
have considered the other new compensation strategies as a viable alter
native to tiers. Also, with the exception of Salpukas (1987) and Sichenze
(1989), little attention has been given to the tightening of the labor market
or to the change in the workforce demographics.
One prediction by Jacoby and Mitchell (1986) was slightly less op
timistic. Based on a late 1984 and early 1985 survey of managers, Jacoby
and Mitchell report the management belief that the number of two-tier
wage structures would increase substantially in the short run. They con
clude that two-tier plans will likely outlast the era of concession bargain
ing. Jacoby and Mitchell state that such plans are likely to be temporary
plans, however, as the managers believed the collective bargaining pro
cess would eventually merge the permanent tiered wage scales into one
unified scale. Our own conclusions concerning the future of tiers will
be presented in chapter 8.
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NOTES
1. Essick (1987) reports that approximately half of his 123 respondent companies with tiers had
permanent wage tiers. Also, his survey revealed that 25 percent of two-tier systems cover employee
benefits, while relatively few companies reported having tiers for employee benefits only. However,
unlike other sources that sampled more broadly, 71 percent of his respondents with tiers were
in manufacturing versus approximately 57 percent sampled by the BNA in 1988. In addition,
49.6 percent of the tiered companies Essick surveyed had less than 1,000 employees, and thus
would not be included in any of the Bureau of Labor Statistics analyses of major collective bargaining
settlements. Thus, it appears that the Essick data on the types and forms of tiers is not representative.
2. It should be recognized that some of the individual companies or individual industries that will
be discussed in the following sections are exceptions to the generalizations reached concerning
the two sectors. Also, since individual data by company were not readily available, aggregated
data by sector or industry must be used in examining patterns of wage changes and tier
implementation.
3. Given that there were only 10 two-tier manufacturing contracts in the BNA sample for 1988
(versus 38 in 1987), no conclusions are drawn concerning the business strategy employed.
4. The BNA service sector 1988 data are based on 35 contracts. It is highly likely that in 1988,
based on the similarity of the 1988 settlements in that sector to the 1985 settlements, tiers again
were used primarily as part of a strategy for expansion.
5. The BNA (March 27, 1987; March 15, 1989) data show lump-sum payments in 36 percent
of their sample of all nonconstruction agreements in 1988, 32 percent in 1987, and 33 percent
in 1986, compared to 19 percent in 1985 and 6 percent in 1984.
6. Our placement of industries into the industry groups is as follows: (1) manufacturing industries
subject to competition from imports and/or nonunion companies; electrical machinery, fabricated
metals, food processing, furniture, lumber, machinery except electrical, paper, printing, and stone,
clay and glass; (2) industries affected by pressure from the government to cut costs; transporta
tion equipment and postal (this is the only group that includes both manufacturing and service
sector industries); (3) service sector industries affected by deregulation; airlines, communications,
motor transportation, rail, and utilities; and (4) other service sector industries subject to com
petitive pressures; health services, insurance and finance, other services except health, and wholesale
and retail. It is recognized that some of those industries, or some companies within a particular
industry, could be placed into a different group as more than one force may have led to the establish
ment of tiers in any one instance.
7. By 1987, the airline industry had moved into a second phase of deregulation that involved
multiple mergers and subsequent changes in the competitive climate. The analysis of Cappelh's
(1985a) data focuses on the role of tiers in the premerger era.
8. Survey data from Essick (1987) indicates that tiered agreements have the greatest frequency
for production workers, but very few cover skilled trades and maintenance workers. Cappelli
and Sherer (1987) note that tiered plans offer little advantage in skilled areas, given that the strong
external labor market makes it comparatively easy for such employees to find alternative
employment.
9. One can only speculate as to why some managers perceived that tiers had resulted in an im
proved labor relations climate. Some possible reasons would be that the implementation of tiers:
(1) had enabled the union and management to avoid other types of concessions; (2) had prevented
facilities from closing; (3) had enabled the company to expand; or (4) had been bargained in ex-

62 Tiered Compensation Structures in Practice
change for something else the union wanted. With any of these reasons, the labor relations climate
could have improved.
10. Sichenze (1989) also found no reports of increased absenteeism, tardiness, or sick leave usage.
11. Sichenze (1989) notes that while there were no clear-cut productivity figures, the labor cost
figures of the companies where she interviewed did not indicate that employees' work-related
behaviors were impacted.
12. The 1989 Supreme Court decision in Ward's Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio 109 S. Ct.
2155 (1989) qualified the interpretation of disproportionate section and employment practices.
The burden on the plaintiff to prove the allegation of discrimination has been substantially increased.
13. In 1985, the BNA reported that 5 percent of the settlements lengthened the progressions and
another 5 percent shortened them (BNA, February 24, 1986). In 1986, 14 percent of the set
tlements lengthened the progressions (BNA, February 26, 1987).
14. In the short run, however, the BNA reported that the UFCW has had to settle for a narrowing
of the compensation gap between the tiers.
15. Refer to the data in table 2.2 and in note 5 for the proportion of settlements containing tiers
and lump-sum payments, respectively, in each year after 1984.

3
Labor-Management Relations
in the Retail Food Industry
The study of tiers in the retail food industry is useful because of the
variety of tier forms, the large number of labor agreements containing
tiers, and the extended length of time tiers have existed there. The pur
pose of this chapter is to present a brief introduction to this industry,
its labor-management relations, and the resulting changes in the bargain
ing process and outcomes, such as tiers. This chapter lays the ground
work for the next chapter, which examines in depth a specific retail
food company that negotiated tiers. Together, these two chapters pro
vide the context for the survey results presented in the later chapters.
This chapter is divided into three major sections. The first section
looks at the history of the retail food industry through the 1960s, focusing
on the evolution and development of the industry, its subsequent
unionization, and the structure of bargaining there. The second section
examines the effect of market saturation and increased competition on
the industry. The last section focuses on the resulting changes in the
bargaining process and outcomes that have occurred in the past two
decades. This and the following chapter incorporate information ob
tained from an extensive number of interviews with officials from the
unions, companies, and others involved in the industry.
Before looking at the history of the retail food industry, it is useful
to define some of the terms commonly used to describe stores and their
organization (Food Marketing Institute (FMI) 1986). The term "indepen
dent" is used to refer to an operator of 10 or fewer retail stores. The
term retail "chain" is used to define an operator of 11 or more retail
stores. A "supermarket" is viewed as any store, owned by a chain or
independent, having self-service grocery (and usually self-service in
other departments), whose annual sales volume is $2,000,000 or more.
This definition has been upgraded in the retail food industry from time
to time.
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The unions representing retail food employees are often referred to
in shortened form. For example, the term "Retail Clerks" comes from
the Retail Clerks International Association (later Union). In the past,
this union usually represented all food clerks in grocery stores, except
those in the meat department. The term "Meat Cutters" is derived from
the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America
and refers to meat department employees in grocery stores. The United
Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW) was form
ed in 1979 by a merger of the Retail Clerks and Meat Cutters Unions.
Some UFCW local unions were formed where former Retail Clerks
and Meat Cutters locals merged. In other geographic areas, there are
separate Retail Clerks and Meat Cutters locals. The International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
usually represents the truck drivers and the warehouse employees within
the retail food industry.
History of the Retail Food Industry Through the 1960s
The Development of the Industry
Prior to the 1850s, retail food sales were the exclusive domain of
small family businesses, but at about that time, the structure of food
retailing in the United States began to evolve through a series of major
changes. As a result of these changes, food retailing shifted from a large
collection of small family businesses to a more consolidated industry.
The first of these changes was the "chain store movement," which began
in 1859 with the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company (National
Commission on Food Marketing (NCFM) 1966).
The chains involved in this movement reorganized food wholesal
ing, integrated food wholesaling and retailing, and substantially improved
the efficiency of physical distribution (NCFM 1966). By combining
wholesaling and retailing, chains were able to substantially lower costs
through relative economies of scale. Thus, their profit margins were
greater and their prices lower than the typical small family businesses
with whom they were competing (Northrup and Storholm 1967). Chain
stores eventually had their greatest expansion between 1910 and 1930.

Labor-Management Relations 65

The number of chain stores reached a peak in the early 1930s, with
80,000 total stores, controlling nearly one-third of the nation's total retail
food business (NCFM 1966). The depression, along with severe com
petition, eventually halted the expansion of the chain stores. These same
two economic factors, however, contributed to the development of the
supermarket in the independent sector and its subsequent expansion.
Supermarkets, which introduced modern mass retailing, were large lowoverhead stores that combined several departments, such as meat, pro
duce, and dairy, with the traditional grocery line of products. Most of
them were self-service (NCFM 1966).
Following World War n, increased consumer mobility and income,
the establishment of shopping centers, a strong desire for convenient
one-stop shopping by many families, and the elimination of less effi
cient independents all contributed to the further growth of supermarkets.
Thus supermarkets were able to increase their share of the retail food
market from 28 percent in 1948 to 69 percent in 1963 (NCFM 1966).
The chains, and subsequently many independent operators converted
many of their neighborhood stores to supermarkets in order to reduce
retailing costs. Also, to compete more effectively, many of the indepen
dent operators joined together with other independents into groups known
as "affiliated independents." The affiliated independent group is
characterized by a wholesaler-retailer interdependence in which the two
parties typically enter into an agreement. The retailer receives the ad
vantage of economies of scale through the concentrated purchasing power
exercised by the wholesaler, who in turn receives the assurance of sell
ing the retailer goods for resale (NCFM 1966).

Unionization of the Industry
When the structure of food retailing was altered, the degree of
unionization of the retail food industry also changed. Prior to 1900,
the Meat Cutters' retail membership had been confined to grocery and
specialty meat stores (Estey 1968). Founded in 1890, the Retail Clerks
had only 5,000 members in 1933 (Northrup and Storholm 1967). The
Retail Clerks grew rapidly to 246,000 members in the following 20 years
and to 444,730 by 1966 (Northrup and Storholm 1967). Estey (1968)
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argues that as the small independent stores were combined into chains
and subsequently converted into supermarkets, the working environ
ment became more conducive to unionization than it was elsewhere in
the retail industry.
Throughout the history of the retail food industry, the small familyowned store has been difficult to unionize because of the personal rela
tionships and frequent contact between employee and employer. The
chains and supermarkets are very large-scale businesses. A single super
market may employ over 100 people, and some of the chains employ
several thousand workers in one metropolitan area. With the passage
of the Wagner Act (National Labor Relations Act) in 1935, the larger
chains and supermarkets became ready targets for unionization. Their
size meant that the per capita cost of union organizing was lower, and
they provided the Retail Clerks with a basis for bargaining power.
Generally, the Retail Clerks could not obtain such bargaining power
in other parts of the retail sector or in family-owned grocery stores where
small size combined with the relative lack of employee skills meant that
the entire workforce could be easily replaced in the event of a strike.
Estey (1968) notes that an additional factor that may have contributed
to the unionization of chain groceries and supermarkets was their employ
ment of highly skilled meat cutters. The meat cutters' skill, in associa
tion with a highly perishable food product, made them a focal point
from which unionization spread to other employees. Once the meat cut
ters were organized, the task of organizing the less skilled and less
strategically located food clerks was greatly simplified.
Northrup and Storholm (1967) report three primary factors that led
to the organization of employees by the Retail Clerks and Meat Cut
ters. First, these two unions received support from the Teamsters, whose
driver and warehouse members controlled the supplies upon which the
retailers depended. When the Teamsters' members failed to cross the
picket lines at the retail stores, thus halting the flow of goods, the stores
were forced to close. Although the Teamsters represent a small per
centage of employees in the retail food industry, they have had a very
influential role in the development of its labor relations.

Labor-Management Relations 67

Second, Northrup and Storholm state that when a union received
recognition from a chain, it generally bargained both the union shop
clauses (which provided for automatic extension of membership to new
employees of existing stores in the bargaining unit), and accretion clauses
(which extended the union shop to stores built or acquired in the future).
As recognition was traditionally granted on a local marketwide and/or
areawide basis, the rapid increase in union membership appears at
tributable to employer expansion, since much of the growth of major
grocery chains through the 1960s occurred by opening new stores or
by acquisition of existing nonunion stores (Estey 1968).
A third technique utilized by the unions in organizing employees was
the establishment of direct contact with employers seeking to open the
door to unionization of the chains. In this way, the unions often "organiz
ed the employer" as opposed to soliciting the votes of the employees
(Estey 1968). Additionally, the unions cooperated with the retail food
industry on a number of lobbying activities, including opposing antichain legislation (Northrup and Storholm 1967). In some areas, this
cooperation certainly led to a decrease in the opposition to unionization.
The Structure of Retail Food Bargaining
With the radical changes in structure and the subsequent unioniza
tion of the industry, labor costs became the most significant operating
cost in the retail food industry (Merwin 1984; Northrup and Storholm
1967). Such costs, including both direct and fringe benefits, represented
11.5 percent of gross sales in 1985 (FMI 1986); costs were generally
higher for the major national chains than for the regional chains and
independents (Merwin 1984; Northrup and Storholm 1967). Differences
in labor costs may result in differences in food prices or company pro
fitability. The industry gross profit margin on sales in recent years has
averaged between 20 and 24 percent, while the net profit has averaged
only about 1 percent.
To circumvent the possibility of competitors obtaining an advantage
due to lower labor costs and to protect themselves in the event of a strike,
major chains in many geographic markets organized themselves into
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multi-employer bargaining associations. These associations negotiated
one contract with each of their unions, with identical terms covering
all the member employers. This helped to stabilize labor costs among
the different companies operating in a market (Northrup and Storholm
1967). Even chains who did not belong to a multi-employer group could
usually be counted on to follow the pattern set by the other employers.
In addition, multi-employer bargaining prevented other association
members from taking advantage of a strike. Northrup and Storholm
(1967), assessing labor relations in the industry in the 1960s, note that
a strike was a situation feared by individual chains. They cite three
reasons why losses to supermarkets in a strike are "severe, immediate,
nonrecoverable and can result in permanent defection of customers"
(p. 21). First, sales that are not made during a strike are lost forever.
Second, the perishable inventory is likely to be damaged. Third, because
food shopping is habitual behavior, customers who are diverted from
their regular store are likely to continue shopping at the new source
after a settlement. With a strong multi-employer group, such a perma
nent loss of business was less likely to occur because the customer op
tions would be more limited. With the apparent benefits of multiemployer bargaining, it is not surprising that between 60 and 80 per
cent of the Retail Clerks membership were included in multi-employer
bargaining arrangements. 1
Although many of the companies were included in the multi-employer
bargaining units, there were many other factors that contributed to
relatively unstable labor relations in this industry. Northrup and Storholm
(1967) report that, within the multi-employer groups and with other
retailers who might have followed the pattern those groups set, there
were often conflicts between the regional chains and the national chains,
given that the former had relatively limited resources and thus had less
ability to pay wage increases and/or withstand a strike than national
chains.
Second, the affiliated independent groups, many of whom were non
union, were active in many of the markets. If they were unionized,
whether or not they paid the same wage rates as the chains, they generally
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provided benefits at a level below that of the supermarket chains and
almost always had work rules that provided them with savings that
members of the multi-employer group did not have. Thus, such affiliated
independent groups had no interest in being a part of a multi-employer
group.
An additional problem resulted from the fact that, in most retail food
markets, some portion of the employees were organized by the Meat
Cutters, some by the Retail Clerks, and still others by the Teamsters.
In some of the retail food markets, still other unions had recognition.
As a result of this condition, there was constant pressure on the employers
to increase labor costs, since each union would try to obtain a "superior"
contract with the multi-employer group.

Market Saturation and Increased Competition
Changes in Growth Patterns
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the growth patterns within the retail
food industry in many geographic areas changed as markets became
overcrowded or saturated (Merwin 1984; NCFM 1966). Merwin's
description of what took place when a chain opened a supermarket on
the fringe of a fast-growing city prior to the saturation point showed
how this change in growth affected labor costs. A recently opened super
market would typically have relatively low labor costs. Employees would
be hired at the bottom of the seniority ladder, and thus they would be
at the bottom of the compensation progression.
During this same time period and prior to a realization that the in
dustry growth patterns were changing, companies often negotiated labor
agreements that would substantially increase their labor costs. In those
labor agreements, companies would often trade lower wage increases
for more restrictive contract language and greater benefits (Retail/Ser
vices Labor Reports (RSLR), 2 April 6, 1982). For example, the A&P
agreement of double time and then triple time as a Sunday premium
was based on the belief that it would never operate on Sundays. In ad
dition, employers often added fourth, fifth, and sixth weeks to their
vacation schedules, because there were very few employees who had
the seniority necessary to take the longer vacations.
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When a geographic area became saturated, as many areas of the coun
try outside the Sunbelt and the West did, the new supermarkets no longer
replaced small independent stores; instead they took business away from
other already established supermarkets, possibly even from those owned
by the same chain. As the chains altered their business strategies in an
effort to compete for customers, some of the stores opened on Sundays
and most stores lengthened their hours of operation. When the markets
ceased to expand, the labor costs increased as employees moved up the
seniority ladder and few new employees were hired. Many such stores
were no longer profitable, as the operating costs began to increase faster
than inflation-adjusted sales (Merwin 1984).
Store Closings
The intensification of competition coupled with increased labor costs
threatened company profits, particularly in the markets that had become
saturated. Thus, A&P, which at the time was the largest supermarket
chain with about 3,600 stores, announced in 1975 that it would be closing
1,200 stores (RSLR, May 1, 1975). For the most part, these were the
older, smaller stores, although A&P intended to cease operations com
pletely in some areas. It should be noted that there is a shared percep
tion among industry observers that the A&P store closings were not
related to the high labor costs.
A&P and some of the other companies found, however, that closing
stores did not necessarily lead to an improvement in company profitabili
ty. Because many employees had rights to transfer between stores within
an area, the retention of the expensive senior employees and the layoff
of less expensive newer employees led to an increase in the average
labor costs in the area. A&P also noted that some of its strongest com
petition in certain areas came from stores that had been sold to in
dependents and regional chains (RSLR, January 1, 1982). These in
dependents and regional chains were often not unionized, which gave
them a further advantage of lower costs and more flexible work rules
(Northrup and Storholm 1967; Ray 1980). Competition also came from
small convenience stores (Northrup and Storholm 1967), and later on
from nontraditional outlets, such as drug stores and service stations,
which sold some grocery items.
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By 1980, a total of 7,000 stores had been closed and about 100,000
unionized jobs had been lost (Ray 1980). It needs to be recognized that
when all stores in a given area were closed, the major chains had alter
native opportunities to adjust their business strategies to address the prob
lems represented by market saturation and increased competition. The
operational losses from the stores, if any, were necessarily eliminated
through the closings. Further, when a major chain closed a store, the
chain could sublease it to an independent operator at a rate higher than
the cost of the original lease. Because of the chains' financial resources
and credit ratings, they generally obtained relatively long-term and in
expensive leases for a store (RSLR, April 6, 1982).
As wholesalers of goods to individual stores, the largest national chains
would keep open an individual store that was not profitable (Merwin
1984), as it helped protect total company profits. The national chains
could also wholesale food products to stores that were purchased by
the independents or, alternatively, they could sell all of the stores in
an area to wholesalers who then would sublease the stores to in
dependents. A notable example of the former was when a major chain
sold several of its stores in a midwestern state in 1981 to an indepen
dent operator and then continued to supply those stores with goods of
its own brand (RSLR, February 9, 1982). An example of the latter oc
curred in 1984, when Kroger closed all its 44 Pittsburgh area stores
after UFCW members rejected a proposal to reduce wages by two dollars
per hour (RSLR, February 20, 1984). Kroger subsequently sold the
stores to a wholesaler who subsequently sold them to independents to
be supplied by the wholesaler.
Another approach was for a national chain to form a joint venture
with a wholesaler to offer a full line of food products and to supply
services, as occurred in 1984 in a midwestern state (RSLR, May 28,
1984). There, the chain closed about 30 percent of its stores in that
state, sold them to independent operators (none of which became unioniz
ed), and then supplied the chain's products to the independent stores
through a new wholesaling joint venture.
In some situations, even the closing of marginally profitable stores
allowed companies to increase profitability through such means as
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wholesaling and, at the same time, put substantial pressure on the UFCW
local unions through temporary or permanent loss of membership. In
addition, the unions incurred the costs associated with organizing the
stores when they reopened. In the Pittsburgh area, the UFCW was suc
cessful in organizing 18 of the 26 former Kroger stores that reopened
by August 1984 (RSLR, August 20, 1984). Another six of those stores
were organized by the United Steel workers of America; the six stores,
according to the UFCW, paid lower rates than those organized by the
UFCW. 3
The store closings also applied substantial competitive pressure to
the remaining chains, even if the sold stores were subsequently unioniz
ed. As a result of these store closings, the percent of the retail food
market held by major national chains declined dramatically in the 11
years from 1973 to 1983 in cities with decreasing population growth
(Merwin 1984). Merwin reports that the most dramatic drops were found
in Baltimore, where the national chains' market share went from 82
to 39 percent, and in Pittsburgh, where the share dropped from 48 to
29 percent. 4 A significant outcome resulting from these changes was
the breakdown of the multi-employer bargaining structure in many cities.
The previously existing pattern wherein most companies in a city ap
plied the same negotiated settlement became less common.
Changes in Bargaining Process and Outcomes
Increased Management Willingness to Take a Strike
While there had always been strikes in the industry (Northrup and
Storholm 1967), their frequency increased after the wage-price con
trols instituted by President Nixon ended. During the 1970s and 1980s,
there was a greater willingness on the part of management to take a
strike as the companies attempted to hold the line on their labor costs.
Management's ability to take a strike had been enhanced by product
innovations and changes in technology, i.e., prepackaged meats,
checkout line scanners. Such developments facilitated the operation of
stores by supervisory staff and by replacements of the regular workforce
during a strike. In addition, many management officials believed that
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the public had become less supportive of unions in general, and that
customers would be willing to cross picket lines to shop.
The aggressive bargaining stance taken by the management of Safeway
Stores Company, currently one of the largest national chains, resulted
in several strikes in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In a 1980 speech,
the then presiding chairman, Peter McGowan, cited important lessons
learned from a 1978 Teamsters' strike and a 1980 Retail Clerks' strike,
both in northern California (RSLR, November 27, 1980). Essentially,
Safeway management perceived that they had "won" those strikes
because contract restrictions were removed and additional clauses were
avoided, thus reducing labor costs over what they would have been other
wise. Interestingly, at the time of McGowan's speech, Safeway was
involved in three additional strikes. The company maintained that they
had not been damaged in the marketplace by those strikes, but instead
had maintained their market share.

Changes in Wage Settlements
Table 3.1 presents estimated retail food industry negotiated settle
ment figures for first-year wage increases and the Consumer Price In
dex (CPI) changes for selected years in the late 1970s and the early
1980s. Based on these figures, it appears that management officials were
able to reduce the rate of increase in labor costs to below that of the
change in the inflation rate. Also, the settlement figures for the late
1970s are shown to be relatively high in comparison to the later set
tlements. During this time period, many retail food companies exchanged
the greater wage increases for lower premium rates for Sundays, reduc
tions in vacations and other paid time off, the elimination of other restric
tive contract language (RSLR, April 6, 1982), and the implementation
of some tiers.
During the early 1980s, the profits of most of the chains were fur
ther reduced by such factors as a recession, an increase in nonunion
supermarkets, and a decrease in the inflation rate, which caused inven
tory profits to disappear (Business Week, March 19, 1984). These fac
tors, along with management's reaction to the changes in the economic
environment, caused the unions to settle for somewhat less in 1981.
At the end of 1981, the director of collective bargaining for the UFCW
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acknowledged that the union was making concessions that it probably
would not have made previously (Business Week, December 28, 1981). 5
He contended that the union was more concerned with job security and
predicted that the union would therefore probably settle for lower wage
increases in 1982 (Business Week, December 28, 1981). This predic
tion was subsequently confirmed. The settlement figures were even less
in 1983 and were greatly reduced in 1984. 6
Table 3.1
Overall Inflation Rate and Estimated Negotiated First-Year Wage
Increases in the Retail Food Industry
Year

Inflation
rate8

Percent increase
in base wage

1978
1981
1982
1983
1984

9.0
8.9
3.9
3.8
4.0

11. Ob
10. lc
5.5C
3.6C
.4d

a. Changes from December to December in Consumer Price Index, Economic Report of the Presi
dent, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., various years,
b. Business Week, December 28, 1981.
c. Business Week, August 27, 1984.
d. RSLR, February 25, 1985.

Implementation of Tiers
During the 1960s, an additional method, which later became known
as "tiers," was instituted to reduce the increase in labor costs. Because
the retail food industry was among the earliest to implement tiers (before
the term "tier" came into widespread use), "two-tier wage structures"
would not appear in the earlier labor agreements or in industry reports
in the Bureau of National Affairs Retail/Services Labor Reports. Most
early references to tiers only mentioned "new-hires" or restrictions
on "new hires." 7
The following paragraphs examine some examples of the forms that
tiers, as a bargaining outcome, have assumed in this industry. These tier
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forms were used both as part of a strategy of expansion and as part
of a strategy of economic survival. Sichenze (1989) argues that tiers
in this industry effectively capped the upward climb of wages and benefits
and permitted food retailers to compete more effectively in a changing
environment. Individuals familiar with the industry provided examples
of where the union was presented with a choice: either to negotiate tiers
(or other labor cost-reducing mechanisms) and thus allow a particular
chain to expand at less cost, or not to negotiate, and a nonunion sub
sidiary will be established to carry out the expansion. Those individuals
also believed that in many instances where an employer wanted to ex
pand into an adjacent market, that choice was implied even when it was
not stated. Unions that desired to represent those new stores logically
agreed to tiers.
Wage and Location Tiers
A thorough examination of reports from the RSLR, along with in
formation obtained from interviews, suggests that the first retail food
wage tiers appeared in 1974. The tiers implemented at this time were
accompanied frequently by substantial wage increases for high-tier
employees. An illustrative example was the 1974 Meat Cutters settle
ment, which covered storewide units of A&P and Kroger in Kentucky
and southern Indiana. As a result of this settlement, high-tier food clerk
wages went from $4.41 per hour to $5.76 per hour over a three-year
period. In addition, they received three unlimited cost-of-living ad
justments (COLA), which moved them to a $6.17 hourly rate, for a
total three-year increase of 40 percent. The employees hired after the
expiration of the prior contract received 25 cents less per hour than
previously hired employees, a differential that was maintained as they
progressed through the rate progressions (RSLR, November 12, 1974;
RSLR, December 1, 1977). The 1977 contract renewal, which con
tained wage tiers for A&P and Kroger, maintained the 25 cent per hour
differential between the high- and low-tier employees. 8
The 1977 contract renewal for Kroger contained location tiers, which
established a five cent per hour differential in wages based on the
geographic area of the store and whether or not an area had unionized
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competition. The differential based on a location tier was implemented
in approximately 17 Kentucky towns that had no unionized competi
tion. The RSLR reports that a Kroger spokesman believed that the loca
tion tier was a recognition by the union that a unionized company should
receive differential treatment when going head-to-head with nonunion
competition.
The 1980 contract renewal for southern Indiana and Kentucky be
tween Kroger and the UFCW widened the existing area differential to
10 cents per hour and continued all the other tiers previously in effect
(RSLR, June 12, 1980). By 1986, after A&P had almost completely
pulled out of that market, Kroger reported that wage tiers were the on
ly thing allowing Kroger to continue operating in that area. Overall,
Sichenze (1989) found wage tiers for one or more job classifications
in 91 percent of the retail food contracts that she examined, and 88 per
cent of those were permanent.
Employment-Status Tiers
Employment-status tiers, which were often implemented in combina
tion with wage tiers, typically had an adverse effect on the compensa
tion of part-time employees. For example, relatively low rates were
established at Kroger for new-hire part-timers in Ohio in 1979, and
previously hired part-timer rates were capped (RSLR, August 2, 1979).
In another part of the state, new-hire rates for part-time delicatessen
clerks differed by as much as $1.05 per hour from rates of those
previously hired (RSLR, August 23, 1979). In Pittsburgh, in early 1978,
Kroger and the Retail Clerks negotiated a contract that reduced the in
creases current part-time employees would receive when progressing
to full-time status. Sichenze (1989) found that benefit tiers existed in
86.5 percent of the contracts she analyzed, and were applied to all job
classifications, unlike wage tiers, which are often applied to specific
job classifications.
Benefit Tiers
Some of the contracts mentioned above also contained tiers that af
fected employee benefits. Both the 1980 southern Indiana and Kentucky
contract for Kroger employees and the 1984 contract covering Kroger
employees in a midwestern state reduced Sunday and holiday work
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premiums from double time to time-and-one-half for all new hires
(RSLR, June 12, 1980). A national chain in another midwestern state
cut its pension contributions in 1984 for all new hires (RSLR, August
28,1984). Also, a 1983 midcontract modification in the same midwestern
state instituted copayments for insurance for all new hires in a regional
chain, whereas previously hired employees had no copayments (RSLR,
January 7, 1985). Sichenze (1989) found that benefit tiers existed in
86.5 percent of the contracts she analyzed, and were applied to all job
classifications, unlike wage tiers, which are often applied to only specific
job classifications.
Job-Duty Tiers
Two-tier wage structures were also frequently negotiated within the
nonfood job classes based on employment date. Ross (1985) found that
supermarkets in the San Francisco Bay area had negotiated what was
called the "nonfood clerk tier" in 1974 (referred to here as a job-duty
tier). Employees in the nonfood job class received about two-thirds the
pay of the food clerks while doing identical work (the employees in
these two job classes did handle different products). A similar nonfood
job class was implemented for retail food employees in Baltimore in
1982. Other areas of the country, such as the Los Angeles area, have
also used nonfood job classes (Wessel 1985).
Changes in the UFCW's Position Toward Tiers
As the number of contracts with tiers negotiated with the UFCW in
creased,9 the number of employees on the low tier also increased.
Ploscowe (1986) notes that the increased numbers of low-tier employees
began to cause many political problems for the union; after such
employees became a majority, there was increased political pressure
to stop the extension of tiers or to eliminate them. At its executive board
meeting in February 1985, the executive board of the UFCW adopted
a collective bargaining goal to eliminate multi-tier wage and benefit struc
tures, because the union viewed tiers as inherently discriminatory to
newer UFCW members (RSLR, March 3, 1985). UFCW President
William H. Wynn operationalized this goal by saying "we're going to
equalize wage rates." Wynn was willing, however, to accept temporary
tiers with lower starting rates that would be raised to the top rate within
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a given period of time (Bernstein and Schiller 1985). The executive
board did not establish a time period within which equalization must
be reached, but instead permitted each local union to bargain with
management. The stated UFCW goal appeared to strengthen the union's
resolve not to expand previously implemented tiered compensation struc
tures or to initiate new ones.
The first and biggest major test of this resolve surfaced during an
eight-week strike/lockout affecting more than 1,100 grocery outlets and
22,000 employees in southern California during November and
December of 1985 (RSLR, November 11, 1985). Here, the contract
proposals (which involved two-tier wage structures) of the Food
Employer's Council (FEC), the multi-employer bargaining group for
the major southern California grocery chains, was rejected by the Meat
Cutters locals and the Teamsters.
This incident came to symbolize the nationwide importance that tiers
represented for this industry and the conflict regarding their implemen
tation and use. The FEC contended that tiers were "consistent with set
tlements across the country," and would not affect the wages of
employees already on the payroll. A union spokesman responded that
"it is important for us to protect workers of the future. The first step
in destroying a union is to negotiate a lower rate for new members,
and we are not going to give in on this two-tiered rate" (RSLR,
December 9, 1985). The unions threatened to take the strike nation
wide by pressuring chains with stores outside of southern California,
such as Safeway and Lucky Stores. The final settlement between the
unions and the FEC represented a compromise on tiers; the unions avoid
ed granting any permanent two-tier wage structures, and management
obtained some of the desired cost savings possible with temporary and
job-duty tiers (RSLR, January 1, 1986).

Conclusions
The unionized retail food industry has been attempting to adjust to
a continually changing competitive environment. Wage tiers were first
implemented in the industry in the 1970s in anticipation of possible future
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economic difficulties and for the purpose of gaining a competitive ad
vantage. They were generally accompanied by relatively large increases
in compensation for previously hired employees, which suggests that
those tiers were part of a strategy of expansion. By the early 1980s,
however, the strategy was altered due to changes in the external en
vironment that reduced profits for the industry. During this period, the
negotiation of tiers was usually accompanied by other concessions, which
suggests that they may have been a part of a survival strategy, at least
in certain markets. After 1985, when the UFCW position on tiers chang
ed, the unions and management found themselves in considerable con
flict over their implementation.
NOTES
1. Testimony by the president of the Retail Clerks, Multiemployer Association Bargaining, Hearings
before the General Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Education and Labor. U.S. House
of Representatives, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 1965, p. 10. Cited in Northrup and Storholm (1967),
pp 124-125.
2. The Retail/Services Labor Reports (RSLR), a weekly publication of the Bureau of National
Affairs, Inc., discusses labor relations developments affecting the retail sector. It is the only such
publication for that sector.
3. In contrast to the situation in Pittsburgh, stores in the Midwest that were sold to unionized
chains and those that were sold to nonunion independents eventually ended up operating as non
union stores.
4. In 1984, the market share held by national chains in Pittsburgh went to zero after Kroger clos
ed all its stores in the area.
5. Management officials thought that the 1979 formation of the UFCW from the Retail Clerks
and the Meat Cutters had ended wage competition and was bringing more realism to bargaining
(Business Week, December 28, 1981).
6. The 1984 settlements, however, were closely related to the strength of the economy in dif
ferent areas of the country and to company profitability, with small increases in the Sunbelt and
concessions in other areas of the country.
7. Sichenze (1989) notes that most of the early tiered provisions affected benefits and work-rules
rather than wages.
8. The 1977 A&P contract renewal lowered the starting rate from $3.73 to $3.25 for food clerks
hired after a given date. In the 1977 Kroger contract renewal, the COLA payments applied only
to those employees who had been on the payroll for six months when the increase was to be made.
9. The Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) surveys of contracts have consistently found that the
UFCW has negotiated more than twice as many settlements mentioning two-tier wages as any
other union. BNA reported 124 such settlements for the UFCW for the years 1983 through 1987
(BNA, March 1, 1988). Due to the decentralization in the retail food industry and the individual
agreements for each local geographic area, the UFCW has a very large number of contracts. Unions
operating in other industries, such as the airline industry, as shown in table 2.2, likely have a
much greater proportion of their membership working under tiered agreements than the UFCW.

Tiers and the
Mayway Food Market Company
This chapter looks at the implementation, expansion, and maintenance
of tiers at Mayway the fictitious name for the retail food company
at which our detailed case study and employee survey were conducted. l
As part of this examination, the chapter discusses the history of the unionmanagement relations at Mayway. The chapter also describes the en
vironment of the state where the focal company operated, along with
the bargaining developments that affected the process and outcomes of
retail food bargaining there and led to the widespread adoption of tiers
by other companies.

Historical Development of Mayway's
Union-Management Relations
In 1934, the Mayway Company opened its first grocery store in a
town in a mid western state. Between the time of the company's found
ing and 1951, Mayway expanded slowly, opening four more stores in
the rural areas of the state. In the early 1950s, after the rumor of a
Teamsters' organizing effort reached management, the company chose
not to resist an effort by its employees to organize an independent union
not affiliated with the American Federation of Labor-Congress of In
dustrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). All of the company's nonexempt
employees, including truck drivers, warehousemen, and those in the
food and meat departments, were then represented by that one indepen
dent union. The company benefited by only having to bargain with one
union, instead of having different groups of its employees organized
by the Retail Clerks, Meat Cutters, and Teamsters. With such a diverse
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bargaining unit, however, May way's union appeared more susceptible
to competition and conflict among its different constituencies.
Company Expansion
In the early 1960s, Mayway opened its first store to carry a large
line of general merchandise in addition to groceries. Soon after that
store's opening, a Retail Clerks local union filed with the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) seeking a separate bargaining unit for that store
on the grounds that it was a new operation distinct from the supermarkets.
In deciding the case against the Retail Clerks local, the NLRB certified
the already existing bargaining unit and the company's recognition of
the independent union. The NLRB also validated the accretion agree
ment between the parties, thereby extending the union's recognition to
any stores the company opened.
This decision would come to have a major impact on company ex
pansion and the subsequent negotiation and implementation of tiers. Had
the Retail Clerks local won this case, the new stores with general mer
chandise (GM) departments would not have been added automatically
to the bargaining unit. If the decision were reversed, the independent
union's desire for increased membership might have been thwarted by
the organizing efforts of other unions. Also, if the union were forced
to compete for membership with other unions, it would have been less
likely to agree to the lower rates for the general merchandise job classes
(the job-duty food/nonfood tier) because it would have wanted to deprive
other unions of a potential campaign issue.
Given that very few general merchandise retailers were unionized,
it was necessary for Mayway to establish lower rates for general mer
chandise (GM) clerks than comparable food clerks so as to be com
petitive with other general merchandisers (even though the duties and
skills required for both job classes were often identical). This new pay
difference formed a job-duty tier. As a result of the NLRB decision,
it was nearly impossible for other unions to organize all of the com
pany's employees (as all the stores would have to be organized at the
same time), and it was easier for Mayway to maintain the wage dif
ferences between the job-duty food/nonfood tier.
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At the time of the NLRB decision, the company had 17 stores and
about 1,000 employees in the rural areas of the state. By 1974, however,
it had expanded into the state's largest metropolitan area and had 25
stores and about 6,000 employees in the bargaining unit. All of the ad
ditional stores carried general merchandise lines, and many of the older
stores had been expanded to carry or had been replaced by new stores
carrying such lines. This addition of general merchandise lines ac
counted, in part, for the large increase in employment.
When Mayway opened its first store in the metropolitan area, another
Retail Clerks local filed a petition with the NLRB to represent the
employees at that store. In this case, the outcome was different; the
NLRB ruled against the company and independent union, noting that
the new store served a different trade area with separate economic and
marketing considerations. The NLRB decision was upheld by the Courts
in 1977 and invalidated the accretion agreement. That decision would
lead to conflict between Mayway and the union representing its
employees, as the company insisted that the union obtain recognition
at each new store through NLRB-conducted elections.

Affiliation of the Union with the Retail Clerks
In the early 1970s, a faction known as the "dissident group" developed
within the union. This group favored closer ties with organized labor,
including affiliation with the Retail Clerks, and more distance from the
company. In 1975, a union membership vote to affiliate with the Retail
Clerks was defeated, although the closeness of the vote (49.5 percent
to 50.5 percent) and the significant organized opposition to the affilia
tion were indicators of considerable conflict among the union members
over the methods of achieving union and member goals. The employees
who sought affiliation with the Retail Clerks, particularly those in the
dissident group, wanted to more readily exchange information with other
unions and sought the technical assistance provided by the international
union. They believed that through affiliation with the Retail Clerks they
would have more bargaining power to obtain desired work rules. In
addition, affiliation with an AFL-CIO union would prevent other AFLCIO affiliates from organizing within its jurisdiction and taking its
members.
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The company was concerned that its dealings with the employees at
Mayway would be significantly altered if the union representing its
employees affiliated with the Retail Clerks. With such an affiliation,
the employees could have been divided along the geographical jurisdictional lines of the Retail Clerks, thereby forcing the company to deal
with several Retail Clerks local unions. The independent union helped
the company maintain flexibility by restricting its dealings to one union.
Also, the company believed that if it was required to deal with the Retail
Clerks, it might be forced into multi-employer bargaining. If that were
the case, the resulting labor contracts would likely be less responsive
to the particular needs of Mayway. The independent union, which
represented all of May way's unionized employees and no employees
outside of Mayway, was not considered as an outsider as would be a
union affiliated with the AFL-CIO.
In 1977, the union elected all of its officers from the dissident group,
replacing an administration that had led the union for about 20 years.
During bargaining for the 1977 wage reopener, which was marked by
a membership vote to strike and lengthy negotiations, the conflict be
tween the new union administration and management intensified. The
new union administration aggressively sought affiliation with the Retail
Clerks, and in 1978 they conducted a campaign for affiliation. Mayway
still opposed such an affiliation, and the election campaign became very
fractious; support for affiliation was seen as prounion and anticompany.
In the subsequent election, votes favoring affiliation with the Retail
Clerks outnumbered those opposed by a three-to-two margin, and the
Retail Clerks International Union granted its new local union a jurisdic
tion covering all employees of Mayway within the state. 2
One month after the vote, the company refused to bargain with the
union and requested the NLRB to determine whether it was legally bound
to bargain with the new Retail Clerks local union. The company claim
ed there were allegations by certain employees about irregularities in
the conduct of the 1978 affiliation election. In a subsequent strike vote,
characterized by the Retail Clerks local as a vote for its existence,
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90 percent of those voting favored striking when the contract expired.
A federal mediator, however, averted a strike by helping to obtain an
agreement to extend the existing contract. Subsequently, the NLRB ruled
that the union election for affiliation with the Retail Clerks would stand.
After the union had won the vote and the NLRB decision, the union
officers began to portray the company in more positive terms, so as
to reduce the union-management conflict. As a result, many who had
supported the affiliation with the expectation of radically changing the
company employee relations policy were disappointed; the most senior
employees subsequently encouraged members to become more negative
toward the union.

The 1978 Negotiations and Agreement
The 1978 contract negotiations were influenced primarily by two con
ditions. First, there had been an increase in the market share held by
nonunion retail food employers in the rural market area of Mayway. 3
Second, the level of conflict between the union and management had
increased. While historically the independent union had negotiated slight
ly higher wages than the unionized competition, by early 1978 the top
rates of its employees were slightly lower than the rates negotiated by
some of May way's competitors. Thus, a priority of the new Retail Clerks
local was to obtain parity with those rates through relatively large wage
increases. Another priority of the union was to gain provisions and rights
in operational areas that were similar to what other Retail Clerks locals
had in their contracts but which had not been a concern of the indepen
dent union. The company's intentions in bargaining were to avoid multiemployer bargaining, to keep its pension and insurance plans out of
any multi-employer plans, and to lower the costs of carrying out its
strategic business expansion plans.
The November 1978 three-year contract implemented a two-tier wage
structure that established a new lower wage scale for all retail store
employees in the bargaining unit hired after the date of the contract
(except skilled meat cutters and department heads). 4 The 1978 tiered
agreement also included the negotiation of separate area-based scales
of low-tier rates (i.e., (1) for the urban area including the major
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metropolitan and cyclical subareas, and (2) for the rural area) as a result
of differences in the external competitive environments in the state. In
the major metropolitan subarea, the unionized chains controlled over
80 percent of the retail food market compared to 30 percent in May way's
rural market area. Thus, a higher scale was established for the urban
area than for the rural area, so as to more closely approximate the pay
rates of the competition in those different areas. Large savings also would
be obtained in the future as a result of combining the full- and parttime rate schedules for new GM employees. This change, which
represented a form of an employment-status tier, essentially made it
impossible for the "new" part- or full-time GM clerks to receive rates
equivalent to those obtained by the current full-time GM employees.
The new contract, however, gave part-timers the right to bid on fulltime openings. Previously, Mayway could bypass the long-term, parttime employees and hire full-timers from outside the company.
Unlike most two-tier contracts, the low-tier wage rates at Mayway
also applied to most previously hired employees who changed depart
ments after the effective date of the contract. Promotions within the
same department (food or GM), however, allowed employees to move
among the high-tier rates only where there were no separate scales for
full- and part-time employees. Thus, under the contract, high-tier, parttime GM clerks could not move onto the high-tier, full-time GM clerk
rate schedule but, for example, could move into the higher-paying, lowtier cashier job class in the food department.
Given the wage increases and other improvements the union obtain
ed in this contract for the current employees, however, the union and
its members did not consider this contract as concessionary. For ex
ample, the union received increases of between 9 and 10 percent for
the first year for most job classifications. These increases put them equal
to the highest rates in the state and above the rates of the regional chains
in the rural area. Also, while not joining any multi-employer plans,
Mayway agreed to match the benefits contained in the multi-employer
Retail Clerks plans. 5
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In addition to settling the new contract, the parties resolved the issue
of how future stores would be added to the bargaining unit, with the
union given recognition for all new Mayway stores opened within the
market area of any Mayway store in the state. By this time, the union
had organized the stores in the metropolitan subarea, and would thereafter
receive recognition for new stores opened there. The union also ob
tained an implicit agreement that the company would continue to ex
pand its operations by building new stores. With new stores added to
the bargaining unit, employees in the previously opened stores would
have increased opportunities to raise their income, both by taking higherpaying positions in a new store and by moving up to vacated positions
within their same store. In addition, the union argued that the job security
of the previously hired employees would increase as new stores open
ed. Such employees had employment rights over less senior workers
in the new stores in their geographic area in the event of layoffs.
Overall, it is unlikely that the union would have agreed to the twotier structure if future stores would not be added to the bargaining unit.
Also, in retrospect, it is unlikely that the union would have been able
to receive such large pay and benefit increases and that the company
would have been able to expand as it subsequently did, had the twotier wage structure not been negotiated.
State-Level Environment
The previous sections have shown the historical context in which
Mayway and its union negotiated various tier forms. Implementation
of tiers permitted the company to control labor costs, resulting in sav
ings that facilitated its strategic business plan of expansion both into
new lines of products and into new stores. It enabled the union to in
crease its membership and to obtain large pay increases for the current
employees in the high levels of the tier forms. The following section
describes the state-level environment in which Mayway and its union
operated and the changes occurring in that environment.
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Geographic Areas
Based on population density and economic characteristics, the state
in which Mayway operated can be divided into two areas: urban and
rural. The urban area has been and continues to be dominated by one
manufacturing industry long marked by economic cycles that significant
ly affect employment in the area. The urban area may be broken down
into two major subareas: the major metropolitan subarea and the
"cyclical industrial" subarea. The major metropolitan subarea consists
of a prominent metropolitan center and suburban areas containing more
than one-half of the state's population. The other urban subarea (cyclical
industrial) is contiguous to the metropolitan subarea but was not com
bined with it for census bureau purposes. Many of the employers in
each subarea have been very closely allied to the urban area's major
manufacturing industry.
The rest of the state will be referred to as part of the rural area. The
principal industries in the rural area are agriculture and tourism, although
it should be recognized that this area is not completely devoid of
manufacturing development. The rural area does not contain any cities
with a population of over 250,000.
The Major Unionized Chains
Table 4.1 shows the characteristics of the major unionized chains in
the state in the mid-1970s and in 1986. The mid-1970s was chosen
because it was the time when Mayway opened stores outside of its tradi
tional rural market area. At this time, the different competitive economic
environment encountered by Mayway began to strongly influence its
union-management relations and to affect the negotiation of tiers. The
date of 1986 has been included in this table because the surveys were
mailed to employees at selected Mayway stores at that time.
As can be seen in the table, there were eight major unionized chains
in the state in the mid-1970s; two of the unionized chains were national
and six of the unionized chains were regional. The greatest concentra
tion of unionized stores was in the metropolitan subarea, which con
tained five major national and regional operators. Mayway operated

Table 4.1
Characteristics of the Major Unionized Chains hi the State hi the Mid-1970s and 1986
Mid-1970s

Chain
National
I

Geographic area
of operations

Number
of
stores

1986
Unionized
store
employees

Number
of
stores

Unionized
store
employees

4,100

Metropolitan
Cyclical industrial
Rural
Total

58
14
33
105

6,500

41
4
12
57

Metropolitan
Cyclical industrial
Rural
Total

68
14
2
84

3,450

40
10
2
52

2,250

Metropolitan

58

3,000

19

1,100

Metropolitan
Rural
Total

79
1
80

5,300

C

Metropolitan

46

3,900

20

1,500

D

Cyclical industrial

25

800

24

600

E

Rural

25

550

21

450

6,000
29,500

8
5
24
37
315

J

Regional
A
B

Mayway

Metropolitan
Cyclical industrial
Rural
Total
Totals for all chains

2
2
21
25
448

84
1
~85~
6,000

n>
2

I
2
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o
o
16,000
32,000
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only two stores in the metropolitan subarea at that time and thus was
not considered by the other chains to be a major operator there. 6
Although not discernible from table 4.1, the three major regional
metropolitan chains bargained on a multi-employer basis (Company A,
which had some out-of-state operations, Company B, and Company C).
Along with the two national chains, the three regional chains establish
ed a pattern of collective bargaining agreements that was followed
throughout much of the state.
In the cyclical industrial subarea, there were stores operated by each
national chain, Mayway, and Company D. As can be seen, Company
E and Mayway were the two largest regional chains in the rural area.
There were also three smaller regional unionized chains that operated
in the rural area, as well as numerous smaller nonunion chains and non
union stores.
By 1986, changes in the environment led each national chain and most
of the regional chains to close stores and reduce the employment of
unionized store employees. Most of the stores that had been closed even
tually were reopened by lower cost nonunion independent operators.
This contributed to an increase in nonunion competition and thus to con
tinuing pressure on the unionized chains to control labor costs. While
many chains closed stores and/or operated under bankruptcy protec
tion between the mid-1970s and 1986, Mayway increased the number
of stores in each geographic area of operation and greatly increased
the number of employees per store. Further, data from industry market
surveys indicate that May way's share of the retail food market was at
least three times greater, on the average, per store than for any com
petitor with stores in the same area.
Although the total number of unionized chain stores in the state declin
ed substantially during this period, the total number of unionized retail
store employees increased. This increase in the total number of unionized
employees was largely attributable to May way's expansion and the in
creased employment within both its new and older stores. It can be
calculated from table 4.1 that the average number of employees per
store at Mayway was about six times as many as at the next largest
regional chain. 7
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Figure 4.1 summarizes many of the major events that occurred after
the mid-1970s in the years when contracts were renegotiated or modified
in midterm at Mayway. Table 4.2 illustrates the impact of the events
on the wage rates paid at the end of selected years. 8 The table shows
top rates of hourly pay for the cashier and GM clerk job classes. These
two job classes represented about one-half of May way's retail store
employees. Cashiers were also selected because they were employed
by all of the competition. It should be recognized that there was generally
no class equivalent to the GM clerks employed at May way's competi
tion. Also, all of the rates included in the table were taken from con
tract settlement data with the exception of the nonunion top rates, which
are based on estimates. The effects of the store closings, chains operating
in bankruptcy, increased competition, and the breakdown of patternsetting bargaining on the rates is apparent in both the existence of a
range of top rates and the freezing of many of the top rates between
1984 and 1987 at both Mayway and its competition.
Another result of the many store closings and changes in employ
ment levels was a reduction in the number of Retail Clerks local unions
operating in the state between the mid-1970s and 1986 from five to two.
The independent union representing employees at Mayway had affiliated
with the Retail Clerks in 1978. In 1980 and 1982, the two Retail Clerks
local unions operating in different parts of the rural market area of
Mayway merged into the union representing May way's employees. The
resulting Retail Clerks local then represented all of the unionized
employees of Mayway plus other employees of other companies in the
rural market area of Mayway. In 1983, there were mergers of the two
Retail Clerks local unions based respectively in the cyclical industrial
subarea and in the largest rural section of the state into the Retail Clerks
local based in the metropolitan subarea. The resulting local did not repre
sent any of May way's employees, even where they were employed in
the urban area. The two remaining Retail Clerks unions, however,
represented workers in different stores of the same employer other than
Mayway, such as the two national chains and Company B. There were
also separate Teamsters locals and a statewide Meat Cutters local
representing employees in the retail food industry.

Figure 4.1
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economy
1977/78

1980/81

Strong

High
unemployment

Nonunion
operations

National
chains

Regional
chains
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Mayway

Increase in rural
market share

Moderate wage
increases

Company A bankrupt,
closes stores, moderate
wage increases for others

Union affiliation with Retail
Clerks, wage tiers and higher
urban rates instituted,
subsequent expansion

Small increases
in market share

Large wage increases,
many stores outside
of metropolitan
subareas sold

Large wage increases,
except for Company A

Differentials between tiers
increased, ratio of expansion
slows
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1982/83
midterm
modifications

Highest
unemployment,
population
decreasing with
outward migration

Larger increase
in market share

Wage freezes and
contracts extended
for one year

Company C bankrupt,
cuts rates, rest freeze
wages and extend
contracts for one year

Benefit tiers instituted, rate
of expansion increases

1984

Decreasing
unemployment

Large increase
in urban market
share

Company I cuts
wage rates and
closes 35 stores,
Company J freezes
rates

Wages frozen for
three years

Differentials in wage tiers
reduced, benefits reduced and
benefit tiers eliminated, top
rates frozen with lump sums
given, expansion continues

1986/87

Strong, unemploy
ment much lower,
population
increasing again

Stable market
share

Companies I and J
initiate wage and
employment-status
tiers, J expands

Company C essentially
goes out of business,
A and B expand and
initiate wage and
employment-status tiers

Employment within stores
increases, some wage tiers
eliminated, differentials
reduced, rate of expansion
slows

Company
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Table 4.2
Top Pay Rates Paid at the End of Selected Years

Cashier
Urban
Mayway HTb
Mayway LTC
Competition
Rural
Mayway HT
Mayway LT
Competition
GM Clerk-Mayway
Part-Time HT
Full-Time HT
All Urban LTd
All Rural LT*
Nonunion Competition
a.
b.
c.
d.

1977

1978

1981

1984

1986a

1987

6.90
6.86

7.56
7.46
7.56

9.16
8.46
8.81/9.91

10.95
10.25
9.00/10.37

10.95
10.25
9.56/10.37

10.95
10.25
8.37/10.37

6.90
...
5.80/6.86

7.56
6.96
6.37/7.56

9.01
7.71
7.61

10.15
8.70
7.83

10.15
8.70
8.13

10.15
8.70
6.00/8.13

4.09
4.42
...

4.44
4.79
3.75
3.68

5.60
6.04
4.50
4.35

6.35
7.04
5.20
5.20

6.35
7.04
5.20
5.20

6.35
7.04
5.20
5.20

2.30/4.50

2.65/4.85

3.35/6.00

3.35/6.00

3.35/6.00

3.35/6.00

1986 rates are those in effect at the time the survey was mailed to Mayway employees.
HT=high-wage tier.
LT=low-wage tier. No such rates were in effect in 1977.
The GM Clerk low-wage tier rates eliminated all part- and full-time distinctions.
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State Bargaining Developments
During the late 1970s, problems began to arise in the statewide pat
tern of bargaining settlements, and these affected subsequent contracts
at Mayway. In November 1978, one of the larger regional chains (Com
pany A) in the metropolitan subarea filed for bankruptcy as a result
of overexpansion. The federal District Court in March 1979 permitted
the company to unilaterally change the terms in its labor agreements
and institute a two-year wage freeze. As a result, there were increased
competitive pressures on the other chains with higher wages operating
in that area.
The 1980 Urban-Based Agreements
In 1980, new contracts were negotiated between the remaining four
metropolitan subarea chains and the UFCW locals. 9 In addition to the
bankruptcy at Company A, there were several other indications that
problems were imminent for the 1980 contracts. First, one of the na
tional companies requested lower rates outside of the metropolitan
subarea and expressed its dissatisfaction with the rates paid in the urbanbased contracts. 10 Second, when the two-year wage freeze at Company
A terminated, the company negotiated new contracts with the unions
that provided a $1 per hour wage cost advantage over the other
metropolitan chains. Third, the market share of the five major chains
deteriorated as a result of the increased competition from both other
union and nonunion stores, and by early 1981 they were suffering signifi
cant financial losses. In addition, concurrent with the serious economic
decline of its most important industry, the state was experiencing a high
rate of unemployment.
The 1981 Mayway Agreement
In the 1981 negotiations, Mayway and the union examined the
possibilities of paying the same rates established by the other unioniz
ed urban chains. They concluded, however, that the 1980 urban con
tracts would be so costly, the contracts would have to be modified before
expiration. Thus, in the urban area, Mayway and the union agreed to
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have lower high-tier rates than the other chains were paying. In the rural
area, the high-tier rates were increased above what the other rural-based
chains were then paying, but they were increased less than the urbanarea, high-tier rates.
In contrast to the 1978 negotiations, the 1981 negotiations at Mayway
were marked by only slight disagreement; the settlement was ratified
by a two-to-one margin. In exchange for a more explicit company
strategy of expansion, the union agreed to maintain the two-tier wage
structure and increase the rate differences between the tiers. During
the term of the prior contract, the lowered labor costs resulting from
the two-tier plan had facilitated the expansion plan involving five new
stores. The new stores added about 1,500 employees to the bargaining
unit, thereby satisfying the union goals of increased membership and
greater job security.
Midterm Agreement Reopenings in 1982 and 1983
Nonunion stores continued to increase their market share at the ex
pense of the unionized chains throughout 1981. Documenting that in
crease, the trade publication, Grocer's Spotlight, reported that indepen
dent stores, which were over 90 percent nonunion, increased their
statewide market share from 54 percent to slightly over 60 percent during
1981. In addition, some of the unionized chains had implemented twotier wage structures. Others were paying lower rates than were negotiated
in the statewide patterned contracts, further increasing the competitive
pressures among the major unionized chains. Also, the state's popula
tion declined during the high unemployment in 1982 and 1983 as peo
ple moved elsewhere to find work. Those problems in the state's
economy, along with the increased competitive pressures, led to con
cessions at the chains whose contracts were negotiated in 1980 and 1981
before those contracts expired.
With many concessions occurring across the state, * l Mayway tried
to convince its employees that it also needed concessions in order to
compete more effectively. Although the union officers did not agree
that the competitive situation of Mayway warranted concessions, they
agreed to reopen the contract in late 1982. The agreement to reopen
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the contract was based on union officers' perception that contract changes
at the tune would result in a contract more advantageous to the union
in 1984. The final contract modifications resulted in new work rules
establishing a benefit tier effective with contract ratification in April
1983. 12 Also, a new form of job-duty tier was formed with the implemen
tation of a new job class, central service clerks, in all stores opened
after the date of ratification. Because these newer stores had changed
the organization of the departments from that of the older stores, this
job class had more flexible duties and a generally lower pay scale than
the job classes that had previously performed that work. Thus, due to
changes in the economic environment, a different strategy and greater
union contract concessions were needed for Mayway to remain com
petitive. Although the company strategy shifted, expansion remained
critical in Mayway's business strategy; contract modifications encourag
ed the company to open four new stores, which added about 900
employees to the bargaining unit.
The 1984 Bargaining Renewals
A severe recession led to a static level of grocery sales for the chains
and independents from the beginning of 1982 through 1984. Also, be
tween 1980 and 1984, there had been a decline in the market share from
75 percent to 50 percent for the five major chains operating in the
metropolitan subarea. This change in market share, along with substantial
losses for each operation, led each chain involved there to seek immediate
solutions. Such problems suggested that bargaining in 1984, when the
agreements negotiated in 1980 and 1981 expired, would be critical.
The Urban-Based Agreements
Increasing the pressures on all the major chains operating in the state,
but particularly those in the metropolitan subarea, was the announce
ment in May 1984 by the largest national chain that it would sell all
of its stores in the state to independent operators if it failed to obtain
the necessary contract terms when the 1980-1984 contracts expired. 13
Prior to negotiations with the UFCW locals, the national chain stated
that it would like to maintain some stores in the state rather than sell
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them to independent operators, but whether it pulled out of the state
depended on how well the unions were able to adapt to the company's
needs in bargaining. In July, after the members voted a proposed agree
ment down, the national chain closed the 70 stores. The leadership of
the International UFCW and the two locals reacted to the closure by
resuming negotiations for the purpose of reopening some stores. In
August, the national chain and the two unions reached a three-year agree
ment and the company reopened 45 stores. 14
As predicted by the urban unions, the other companies tried to ob
tain the same contract terms as the national chain. In the middle of Oc
tober, following the recommendations of the union negotiators, members
employed at the other urban chains overwhelmingly voted not to ratify
similar contracts. The union negotiators noted that, unlike the contracts
of the national chain, the rejected contracts had no guarantees to keep
stores open during the life of the contract.
Subsequently, the largest chain in terms of urban market share became
the pattern-setting target for the following agreements. Although the
new contract placed this regional company at a competitive disadvan
tage compared to the national chain, the Retail Clerks local soon reached
similar settlements with the other unionized solvent chains operating
in the urban area (not including Mayway). 15 Further, those chains were
forced to compete with the stores that the national chain had sold and
which were reopened mostly as nonunion entities. Thus the 1984 urbanbased negotiations led to four different levels of wage rates among the
unionized chains operating in the urban area. The highest urban rates
were the high-tier rates negotiated by the rural-based local union and
applied to May way's urban stores. The four different levels of the
unionized chains' wage rates resulting from the urban negotiations, as
well as greater nonunion competition, placed additional pressure on
Mayway to control labor costs in order to remain competitive.
The Mayway 1984 Agreement
The bargaining of the competing chains had a major impact on the
negotiations at Mayway. No settlement could be reached at Mayway
until the participants could determine the terms of the national chain's
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contracts, the number of stores that would remain open, and how they
would affect the competitive environment. Bargaining to renew the agree
ment covering May way's employees had begun in April 1984, but was
suspended in May until it could be determined how many stores would
be closed. Mayway and the union agreed to extend their contract ex
piring in July until they had reached a settlement. In these negotiations,
Mayway sought to eliminate double time on Sunday and holidays, reduce
paid time off, contain health care costs, and pay few, if any, wage in
creases. The company also wanted the new contract to facilitate its im
mediate expansion plans of opening four new stores within the urban
area. The union's goals were to protect its members' current wage levels
and to reduce, or at least avoid widening, the differences between the
wage tiers. Also, the union wanted to increase job security, which essen
tially meant assisting the company in carrying out its expansion plans.
The negotiated settlement appeared to meet the goals of both union
and management. It should be recognized, however, that there was con
siderable employee discontent concerning the terms of the agreement,
as reflected in the December ratification vote in which only 53 percent
voted to approve the contract. Major employee discontent developed
over the freezing of top rates for all job classes for the entire threeyear term of the contract and over the fact that Sunday double time was
eliminated. With freezing of the top rate of the wage progressions (for
both the high- and low-wage tiers), employees paid at the top rate of
their job class would be given four lump-sum payments during the life
of the contract. The lump-sum payments would vary in amount accord
ing to job class and the number of hours worked, but were 15 to 20
cents per hour worked for the largest job classes.
The settlement also established that starting rates would be lowered
by up to 78 cents per hour for both those food job classes where twotier rates did not exist and for the low-wage tier food job classes. In
addition, most food department rate progressions were lengthened by
at least one year; every low-tier GM wage progression was lengthened
except one. 16 New baggers hired after the effective date of the contract
were placed on a lower and longer wage progression, and the previous
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bagger wage tiers were combined into one schedule. Also, many start
ing GM rates in the urban area were lowered and were made equal to
the starting rates in the rural area.
The contract reduced pay for holiday work from double time to timeand-one-half. Sunday double time was phased out over the term of the
contract, so that by February 1987, all Sunday hours would be paid
at straight time. Since Sunday hours would no longer be paid at a
premium, the union negotiated the option for them to become part of
the regular weekly work schedule. Previously, by working Sundays,
part-time employees could work the same number of hours as full-timers,
although they could not receive the same benefits. The settlement on
Sunday hours led the company to promote many part-time employees
to full-time positions with required Sunday work. Consequently, the
number of full-time employees increased by almost 20 percent.
Work rules governing health care costs were also changed significant
ly. The insurance copayments required of employees hired after April
1, 1983 (those on the low benefit tier), were extended to apply to all
employees. Thus, while the benefit tier was eliminated, the company
cost for benefits was lowered. In exchange, health care coverage was
significantly improved and also extended to 2,200 part-time employees
who had previously had no such coverage. As a result, the differences
in benefits within the employment-status tier were reduced. 17
A new job-duty tier was instituted when the job class of specialty
food clerk was established with duties related to operating salad bars
and handling bulk food, duties which had previously not been perform
ed. 18 The top rate of this new class was between four and five dollars
per hour below that which the five major chains operating in the
metropolitan subarea would have to pay for a person with the same job
duties, as their contracts severely restricted the type of work that could
be paid below the cashier's rate. Observers argued that this was an ex
ample of where the union would gain in accommodating Mayway; so
many employees were hired to perform these duties, they constituted
an additional 10 percent of the retail food store workforce by 1986.
Overall, the 1984 settlement resulted in major changes to the tiered
compensation plan in effect at Mayway. Taken together, all of the con-
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tract changes facilitated the company's efforts to moderate labor costs
and to continue in its expansion plans. When viewed in the context of
the wage freeze, this contract incorporated a greater use of union con
cessions by management than in 1983. From the union's perspective,
however, relative to the 1981 contract, the percentage difference be
tween the top rates of the two-wage tiers was reduced. As calculated
from the data in table 4.2, the percentage reduction becomes somewhat
larger when factoring in the hourly lump-sum payments (which were
the same for each wage tier). These changes, along with the changes
in the bagger classification, allowed the union to contend that it was
working toward the elimination of wage tiers.
In combination with the previously existing two-tier wage structure,
it can be calculated that the changes in the wage tiers alone resulted
in an average savings for a new store of between $2 and $4 million
in payroll costs during the first four years of operation. The wage rates
in table 4.2 show that each contract negotiated after Mayway instituted
the two-tier wage plan resulted in greater absolute dollar labor cost sav
ings (over time the savings also increased due to turnover). The sav
ings resulting from the implementation of the job-duty tier with the dif
ferent food and nonfood rates (cashier versus GM clerk) are also readily
apparent. Overall, the two tier forms shown in the table, along with
the implementation of temporary tiers and the employment-status tiers
generated such large labor cost savings for Mayway that it was able
to expand considerably. In 1987, the use of wage tiers alone would save
Mayway more than 27 million dollars a year on its retail store employee
payroll, or over 13 percent of that payroll, compared to the identical
employment situation with all employees paid as though they were on
a unitary wage scale that used only the high-tier rates. The discussion
in chapter 2 suggested that tiers may be accompanied by lower produc
tivity, particularly on the part of the low-tier employees. Analyses
presented in chapter 7 and appendix C, however, provide no clear
evidence that the maintenance of tiers has negatively affected produc
tivity at Mayway.
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Further Changes
By late 1985 and early 1986, the economy in the state had improved
markedly, the unemployment level had dropped, and the state's popula
tion had begun to increase. May way opened four new stores during this
time, all in the urban area, and had two more under construction there.
Further, the company converted most of its 1985 fall and holiday tem
porary positions to permanent positions in the beginning of 1986. This
increased the average unionized workforce in each store about 20 per
cent over the previous year's level. While Mayway expanded its employ
ment, one of the regional chains in the metropolitan subarea closed 20
stores at the end of 1985 and early 1986. Many of these stores were
subsequently sold to other unionized companies, while others were not
reopened.
Urban Area Changes
Major changes in the retail food industry continued in the urban area
in late 1986 and 1987. One of the larger regional chains in the
metropolitan subarea (Company C) went into bankruptcy. By the end
of 1987, only one of its stores remained in operation. In contrast, several
other companies expanded during 1987, the first significant expansion
in several years for a major chain other than May way.
During the same period, the UFCW contracts originally negotiated
in 1984 had to be renegotiated. The largest regional chain in the
metropolitan subarea appeared to lead the way in the settlements. After
a one-week strike in August 1987, the company and the UFCW locals
agreed on a new contract that established both a wage- and an
employment-status tier. 19 The goal of that company and the other ur
ban chains was to reduce the number of full-time employees and in
crease the number of part-time employees. In order to equalize the ratio
of part- to full-time workers, no new mil-time employees would be hired.
Further, the contract established that full-time employees could be in
voluntarily moved to part-time positions. If any full-time positions
became available in the future, employees who had previously held fulltime positions would have the first rights to those positions. Thus, the
new contract established a de facto employment-status tier. The other
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companies operating in the metropolitan subarea subsequently obtain
ed similar contracts.
The Mayway Agreement
The major issue in the urban area for the other chains, the ratio of
part- to full-timers, was not an issue in the 1987 negotiations at Mayway,
since the company had obtained considerable flexibility in this respect
when the union representing its employees was independent of the AFLCIO. The union's major goal in bargaining was to increase wages, which
had been frozen since the 1984 contract. In addition, there was con
siderable interest in closing the gap between the two wage tiers. The
company was primarily interested in obtaining greater flexibility in rela
tion to job assignments. Company expansion within the union's jurisdic
tion no longer appeared to be an immediate concern.
The new 1987-1991 contract provided pay increases of between 2.5
to 5 percent for all job classes effective November 1988, with smaller
increases scheduled for 1989 and 1990. 20 For some job classes, lumpsum payments of varying amounts based on hours worked would be
paid in 1989 and 1990. Wage tiers were completely eliminated for bag
gers, the lowest paid job classification generally filled by entry level
employees or workers who wanted a temporary position. A significant
outcome of this contract was that the gap between the tiers was also
narrowed for most job classifications.
The number of job classifications was reduced by about one-third with
the establishment of new combined job classes, including one which
bridged the food and GM departments. Most important, in the urban
area, the gap between the high- and low-wage tier was eliminated for
cashiers and food clerks, moving about 2,500 employees up to the hightier rates over four years. 21 However, a third, lower wage tier level
for those two job classifications was instituted in the new contract ef
fective September 1988, using the same rates as paid in the rural area. 22
Thus, while the 1987-1991 contract made significant changes in wage
tiers, the principle of wage tiers remained intact as they were retained
for all retail store job classifications except the most and least skilled
classes.
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Summary

The implementation and development of tiers at Mayway can be seen,
first, as primarily a function of the adoption of a strategic business plan
of expansion in the 1960s and 1970s, and second, as a part of conces
sion bargaining in the 1983 and 1984 agreements. Whether accompanied
by major union concessions or not, the negotiation and implementation
of tiers at May way prior to 1987 was a vital component in the com
pany's expansion strategy. By 1987, the economy and the competitive
environment had improved enough so that the union was able to obtain
gains for its members and reduce or eliminate some of the differences
between the wage-tier levels. In addition, in 1987, the company ap
peared to have no immediate plans for expansion within the state and
the local union's jurisdiction.
Thus the evolution of tiers at May way can be placed within both the
framework developed in chapter 1 concerning why tiers are implemented
and the framework adapted from Holley and Jennings (1988) explain
ing how tiers and other collectively bargained settlements are determined.
It has been shown repeatedly in this chapter that the economy and the
competition were important factors in the negotiation of tiers at Mayway.
It has also been shown that the contract settlements that implemented
new tiers or changed previously existing tiers in order to moderate labor
costs were frequently obtained in exchange for work rules (agreements)
improving employee job security, i.e., creating new jobs by building
new stores. Through such agreements, management obtained labor cost
changes that facilitated the execution of its strategic business plans for
expansion, and the union leaders sufficiently satisfied their members
with higher wages and greater job security so that their political posi
tions were protected. The union also increased its membership through
labor agreements that assisted the company's expansion.
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NOTES
1. The material included in this chapter is based on interviews with knowledgeable individuals
concerning the labor relations aspects of the company and industry, newspaper reports, and reports
in the Retail/Services Labor Report (RSLR). Because the author agreed to anonymity for the local
union and company participating in the study, these parties will be identified by fictitious names,
1.e., Mayway. Also, to protect the anonymity of the parties, no citations are made to specific
newspaper articles or to specific RSLR issues.
2. While there was no organized employee opposition to the affiliation, the movement toward
affiliation exacerbated the divisions within the membership, as the warehouse employees, truck
drivers, and many of the most senior employees opposed affiliation.
3. The market share of the unionized stores in this area went from more than 60 percent in 1970
to about 30 percent in 1978. This was a factor in the negotiations, given that nonunion competitors
typically paid close to the minimum wage, with a top rate much less than the top rate for a similar
job in a unionized company and generally only $1 to $2 per hour above minimum wage. Further,
the costs of benefits were considerably less for nonunion companies, as they used proportionately
more part-time employees (who received few if any benefits).
4. Keeping skilled meat cutters and department heads off of wage tiers is fairly common among
retail food employers (Sichenze 1989). By doing so, Mayway facilitated keeping a core of skilled
employees who could assist in the training and supervision of new employees. J. Walsh (1988)
argues that supermarkets need a core of employees who are trained to do all of the jobs, who
know the shortcuts, and who can train and supervise new workers. Excluding this core group
from "tiering" also means that new hires can move more readily into the core group.
5. This resulted in a doubling of the GM pensions and increased the food employee pensions
by two-and-one-half times. Insurance benefits were also increased, with the company agreeing
to match both the current and future benefits negotiated in the Retail Clerks plan.
6. Its stores there were relatively new, were not organized by the same unions as the other five
chains, and did not follow the pattern of collective bargaining settlements in that subarea. In addi
tion, each of the other five chains had corporate or regional offices and warehouses in the subarea,
while Mayway did not.
7. The greater employment per store at Mayway in 1986 is largely attributable to two factors.
First, about 45 percent of the company's employees were in general merchandise departments,
compared to less than 5 percent at the other retail food chains. Second, about 75 percent of the
company's employees were part-timers, compared to 10 to 30 percent in the other chains.
8. The figures for 1977 represent the last setdement at Mayway prior to the implementation of
the two-tier wage structure. While no contract was bargained at the company in 1986, the rates
are shown in table 4.2 for the date the surveys were mailed to Mayway employees.
9. The three-year contracts between both the Retail Clerks and Meat Cutters locals of the UFCW
and the four chains in the urban area each contained increases of $2.60 in regular and limited
(capped) cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) payments as well as two unlimited COLA increases
in the second and third years of the contracts. All the contracts also increased labor costs by grant
ing more paid days off. These contracts contained much greater wage increases than the 1974
and 1977 urban-based contracts (about 44 percent including the unlimited COLA increases ver
sus 34 percent) or the 1978 Mayway agreement (24 percent).
10. Company I's dissatisfaction with the contract led it to sell its warehouse and 21 stores in the
rural area to Company D in October 1980.
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11. In the urban area, the concessions consisted of wage freezes and one year contract extensions
for the solvent chains. Bankrupt firms received wage reductions. In the rural area, concessions
were likely to consist of wage reductions. Company D received contract concessions including
wage reductions of about $1.00 per hour. Even with those contract changes, Company D was
unable to operate profitably in the rural area, and by the end of 1983, it no longer operated any
rural stores.
12. New employees on the low-benefit tier paid a portion of their health care insurance premiums,
and any Sunday hours would be paid at time-and-one-half rather than double time.
13. It was perceived by the competition that any stores sold would likely become nonunion
independents with much lower labor costs. Thus, in reaction to the threats of the largest na
tional chain, the other national chain (Company J), announced that if all the sold stores became
independent, it would consider closing all of its operations in the state. Therefore, the negotia
tions at the other three chains whose UFCW contracts expired in early August were suspended
until the situation with the largest national chain was resolved.
14. The contract contained a 13.5 percent wage cut and also reduced the amount of paid time
off. On the other hand, the unions got the company to agree to reopen 45 stores and guarantee
that 40 of them would remain open for the life of the contract.
15. After much conflict, including a nine-day strike at the largest operator in the metropolitan
subarea, similar agreements were reached between the remaining chains and the Meat Cutters.
Those agreements set meat clerk rates slightly above the food clerk rates, but had other equivalent
provisions as in the Retail Clerks contracts.
16. As an example of how these changes affected the wages of new employees, in September
1983, an urban cashier began at $5.50 per hour and took three years to reach the top hourly rate
of $10.95 per hour. From late December 1984 to September 1987, the urban cashier progression
started at $5.25 per hour and took four years to reach the same top rate. No one employed at
the time of the contract ratification in any job classification received a wage cut as a result of
the lengthened progressions or lower starting rates. These changes in the progressions and start
ing rates represented the implementation of temporary wage tiers within the permanent low-wage
tier.
17. The company also obtained savings in exchange for increased employee flexibility in scheduling
days off, when the personal days and sick days were combined into one category. Employees
with eight years seniority had such days reduced from twelve to eight. Employees with less than
eight years seniority but hired before April 1, 1983, had such days reduced from eight to six,
and employees hired after March 31, 1983, from eight to four.
18. Another change in the job class structure was that the central service clerk job class created
in the 1983 contract modifications was eliminated, with those positions reassigned to GM clerk
positions at the courtesy desk. That contract change would apply to all stores opened after April
1, 1983, plus any stores undergoing a major renovation in the future, as all those stores changed
the location and functions of the courtesy desk. For those stores, this change meant that about
7 percent of the jobs would be moved from the higher paying food-tier job classifications to the
lower paying nonfood-tier GM job classifications.
19. The top rate for clerks and cashiers remained frozen at $10.37 per hour for the life of the
contract, but lump-sum bonuses were to be paid. All new clerks and cashiers would earn a top
rate of $2 per hour less. The company offered a one-time payment of between $5,500 and $ 18,000
(depending on job class and employment status) to employees who voluntarily gave up their jobs.
20. A tentative agreement expiring in September 1991 was reached in September 1987. That agree
ment was rejected by the membership by a vote of 5,147 to 3,316. The major reason given for

106 Tiers and the May way Food Market Company
its rejection was that about 60 percent of the employees (those at the top rate of their wage pro
gressions) would receive no raise until two full years had passed. The contract was subsequently
renegotiated and ratified in December by a vote of 7,030 to 3,101. The major differences be
tween the rejected and ratified contracts were that most of the raises were moved forward a year
and that some of the job classifications received larger increases.
21. The high-wage tier employees in both classifications received increases of about 2.5 percent
in November 1988, with lump-sum payments based on hours worked of 2 percent of base pay
in November 1989, and 3 percent in November 1990. The low-wage tier employees were scheduled
to receive raises in their base rate in 1988, 1989 and 1990, at which point the high- and low-wage
tier rates would be equalized at $11.15.
22. The starting rate of the new third tier for cashiers was $4.60, 12 percent below the previous
starting rate. After 48 months, through both moving up the wage progressions and across the
board increases, the third-tier rate was scheduled to reach $9.29, approximately 17 percent below
the unified high- and low-tier rate.

5
Sample Characteristics,
Research Design,
and Data Analysis
A goal of this study is to better understand the attitudes, behaviors,
and characteristics of employees in a tiered employment situation. The
literature indicates that managers make assumptions about employee
attitudes, behavior, and performance in tiered employment situations
that often conflict with those of union leaders (Flax 1984; Harris 1983c;
Ross 1985; Salpukas 1985). Even where managers and union leaders
are reported to agree on the effects of tiers on employees, that agree
ment is generally based on anecdotal, impressionistic evidence rather
than scientific evidence (Salpukas 1987; Wessel 1985). Thus, the results
of our survey of employee attitudes in a tiered employment setting should
help both parties in making more informed decisions in the future.
This chapter begins with descriptions of the economic and employ
ment characteristics of the relevant areas and the stores whose employees
we surveyed. That is followed by a discussion of the survey develop
ment, administration, and characteristics of the respondents. The chapter
also examines the four tier forms at Mayway and concludes with a
description of the techniques used to analyze the survey data. The next
two chapters present the results of the analyses pertaining to the research
questions and hypotheses.
Area Descriptions
The areas of the state in which Mayway operates differ substantially
in terms of their economic characteristics, population density, and the
nature of labor relations in the retail food industry. In order to control
for the effects of the different environments, the survey design incor
porated six economically different geographic areas (groupings of
107
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counties) from which the 17 stores were chosen. In each of these coun
ty groupings, individuals were surveyed both from stores opened before
(old stores) and after (new stores) the two-tier structure was implemented
at May way. Each of the six county groupings is discussed, focusing
on only the most relevant information. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 present
selected economic characteristics of the urban and rural areas' county
groupings respectively. 1
Urban Area County Groupings
Cyclical Industrial
The two cyclical industrial counties were among the top three coun
ties in the state in terms of their rate of population decrease between
1980 and 1985. Their economy was highly dependent on a cyclical heavy
manufacturing industry, which had substantially reduced its employ
ment levels in the 1980s and which had many employees on layoff status
at the time of the survey. Employees from two old stores and three new
stores were surveyed in this county grouping, i.e., subarea.
Outer Suburban
The two outer suburban counties had remained largely stable in popula
tion between 1980 and 1985. Also, note that the unemployment rates
for these two counties were the lowest of those considered in this study.
Moreover, both counties are characterized by a high percentage of
managerial and professional specialty employees and high per capita
income. The two stores surveyed in this county grouping (one old and
one new) were on the outer fringe of the metropolitan subarea and also
served other areas that were more rural. Each is located about 40 miles
from the downtown of the largest city in the state.
Suburban
The two counties included in the suburban county grouping, which
were also part of the metropolitan subarea, had the largest population
of those considered, although each had suffered slight declines in popula
tion between 1980 and 1985. Similar to the urban counties, the subur
ban unemployment rate had decreased noticeably between 1980 and

Table 5.1
Selected Characteristics of the Urban Counties Where the Surveyed Employees Worked

County groupings
Cyclical industrial
Characteristic
Occupation
Managerial & professional
specialty
Technical, sales &
administrative support
Service
Farming, forestry & fishing
Precision production, craft
& repair
Operators, fabricators
& laborers
Per capital income in dollars
1970
1980
1984

County 1

County 2a

Outer suburban
County 1

County 2a

Suburban
County 1

CA

County 2a

"H.
n

18%

19%

32%

24%

19%

20%

26%
13%
1%

28%
15%
2%

30%
14%
1%

28%
11%
2%

31%
15%
0%

33%
13%
1%

15%

14%

9%

17%

12%

16%

28%

23%

14%

18%

22%

18%

4,060
10,171
13,181

3,834
9,269
11,495

4,367
11,261
14,670

4,199
10,067
13,291

4,443
9,993
12,303

4,494
10,846
14,498

era'

Table 5.1 (continued)
County groupings
Cyclical industrial
Characteristic
Population
1970
1980
1985
Unemployment rate
1970
1980
1985

County 1

County 2a

219,743
238,059
216,900

234,103
264,748
262,300

4.8%
14.0%
10.3%

5.0%
7.6%
6.1%

County 1

County 2a

445,589
450,499
433,900
5.3%
17.7%
12.3%

a. Indicates a county where no "old stores" were surveyed.

Outer suburban

n

Suburban

n

County 1

County 2a

58,967
100,289
101,800

2,670,368
2,337,891
2,174,300

625,309
694,600
689,700

4.7%
11.7%
7.1%

6.0%
13.8%
9.6%

4.8%
14.0%
9.5%

ff3.
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1985. The three surveyed stores (two old and one new) were located
10 to 20 miles from the downtown of the largest city.
Rural Area County Groupings
Rural Center
The average county population and per capita income for the rural
center counties were the lowest of any of the county groupings includ
ed in the study. These counties had the highest proportion of employ
ment devoted to agriculture of any county grouping. The two surveyed
stores (one old and one new) were located in towns of under 25,000
in population. It should be noted that a large service-oriented employer
operates in both towns.
Balanced
The economy of the balanced county grouping was marked by its
diversity, including a relatively large percentage of the workforce in
managerial and professional positions, technical sales and administrative
support positions, and blue-collar occupations. There were two old stores
surveyed in one of the counties and one new store in the other. The
county containing the new store had lost population between 1980 and
1985, while the other had experienced slight population growth.
Stable Industrial
Both surveyed stores in the stable industrial counties were located
in the same community of about 25,000, which straddled two adjacent
counties. The counties had a diversified industrial base and each was
among the 10 fastest-growing counties in the state between 1980 and
1985. Similar to the other rural counties, the per capita income was
low in comparison to the urban counties.

Table 5.2
Selected Characteristics of the Rural Counties Where the Surveyed Employees Worked

to
on

County groupings
Characteristic
Occupation
Managerial & professional
specialty
Technical, sales &
administrative support
Service
Fanning, forestry & fishing
Precision production, craft
& repair
Operators, fabricators
& laborers
Per capital income in dollars
1970
1980
1984

Stable industrial15

Balanced

Rural center
County 1

County 2a

County 1

County 2a

15%

23%

25%

21%

18%

23%
14%
6%

25%
13%
8%

31%
14%
2%

27%
13%
3%

25%
13%
4%

13%

15%

11%

13%

15%

29%

15%

17%

23%

25%

3,237
7,807
9,921

3,856
8,749
11,369
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11,651
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Population
1970
1980
1985

45,848
51,815
52,800

81,951
89,948
89,400

201,550
212,378
215,500

163,940
171,276
163,800

194,756
238,729
252,467
C/3

Unemployment rate
1970
1980
1985

"E
7.0%
11.2%
15.2%

5.1%
9.7%
10.8%

4.7%
9.4%
7.1%

5.2%
13.0%
11.1%

5.4%
8.7%
8.7%
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O
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a. Indicates a county where no "old stores" were surveyed.
b. The data for the two counties in this area have been combined because the city in which the stores were located was in both counties.
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Characteristics of the Surveyed Stores
Figures for selected economic and employment characteristics2 for
each surveyed store organized by county grouping are presented in tables
5.3 and 5.4. These tables also show the overall mean figures of each
characteristic for all urban and rural stores, respectively. In table 5.5,
the means of the same characteristics are shown for both the old and
new stores. Some of these characteristics, along with additional
characteristics, will be used in the analyses of the relationship of tiers
to productivity (see appendix C).
Urban and Rural Store Differences
Analysis of the data in tables 5.3 and 5.4 indicates that the urban stores
had significantly (p < .001) more employees and more sales floor space
than the rural stores. Also, the greater number of employees in the ur
ban stores, along with the more recent expansion of the company there,
meant such stores had a significantly greater proportion (p< .001) of
low-wage tier employees than found in the rural stores. In addition,
the average hourly rate and wage and the unitary hourly rate and wage
were significantly (p< .05) higher in the urban stores than the rural
stores. As discussed in the previous chapter, the latter differences reflect
the generally higher pay scales in the urban area.
Old and New Store Differences
Tests of the data in table 5.5 indicate that old stores had a significantly
(p< .001) lower percentage of employees on the low-wage tier than
did new stores. Because of that difference, there were several other
significant differences between the old and new stores. Employees in
old stores had significantly higher pay (p < .05), were older (p < .05),
and had more seniority (p < .001). The old stores also had significantly
(p< .05) more employees and sales floor space than the new stores.

Table 5.3
Selected Economic and Employment Characteristics of Urban Area Stores in 1986
Cyclical industrial
Characteristic
Number of employees
Average seniority (years)

Store la

475
5.10
(4.66)
Wage tier (% low tier)
71.2
Employment-status tier (% part-time)
79.8
Job-duty tier (% GM)
42.2
Average age (years)
29.07
(9.76)
Percent female
62.9
Percent minority
12.9
Average hourly rate
6.72
(3.05)
Average hourly wage
7.06
Unitary hourly rate
7.38
(2.89)
Unitary hourly wage
7.71
Sales floor space in square feet
193,000

Store 2a
451
5.14
(4.67)
72.7
81.0
42.7
29.63
(9.84)
61.3
13.3
6.83
(3.08)
7.10
7.46
(2.93)
7.73
183,000

Store 3
266
3.24
(2.86)
96.2
81.9
45.1
28.40
(9.83)
59.2
16.2
6.12
(2.75)
6.33
7.10
(2.79)
7.33
140,000

Store 4
321
3.27
(3.04)
94.4
82.8
43.2
27.39
(7.39)
59.3
4.1
6.37
(2.87)
6.64
7.22
(2.81)
7.49
140,000

Outer suburban
Store 5

Store 6a

338
515
3.24
4.39
(3.55)
(5.69)
89.1
78.1
85.9
77.9
38.7
43.8
27.52
27.14
(8.22)
(8.40)
61.3
61.2
9.1
5.0
6.37
6.37
(2.84)
(3.01)
6.61
6.65
7.16
7.03
(2.81)
(2.91)
7.42
7.32
140,000 225,000

Store 7
397
2.27
(2.97)
94.2
83.9
43.6
26.22
(9.27)
59.6
4.3
5.68
(2.57)
5.95
6.62
(2.67)
6.92
138,000
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Table 5.3 (continued)

ON
03

Overall
urban mean

Suburban
Characteristic
Number of employees
Average seniority (years)
Wage tier (% low tier)
Employment-status tier (% part-time)
Job-duty tier (% GM)
Average age (years)
Percent female
Percent minority
Average hourly rate
Average hourly wage
Unitary hourly rate
Unitary hourly wage
Sales floor space in square feet

Store 8a
614
3.75
(4.28)
77.7
77.6
46.7
26.96
(9.80)
65.4
4.9
6.07
(2.97)
6.37
6.78
(2.89)
7.08
248,000

a. Represents an "old store" opened before the two-tier wage structure was negotiated.
Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Store 9*
594
3.85
(3.33)
82.3
82.5
40.3
28.52
(10.05)
69.2
5.3
6.59
(2.97)
6.82
7.32
(2.85)
7.54
242,000

Store 10
439
2.71
(2.72)
95.0
77.7
44.6
27.42
(10.63)
62.4
5.8
6.06
(2.83)
6.29
6.91
(2.90)
7.18
110,000

All stores
441
3.69
(.97)
85.0
81.1
43.2
27.83
(1.02)
62.1
7.6
6.32
(.35)
6.58
7.09
(.27)
7.37
176,000
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Table 5.4
Selected Economic and Employment Characteristics of Rural Area Stores in 1986

Characteristic

Balanced
Rural center
Store IP Store 12 Store 138 Store 138 Store 15

Overall
Stable industrial rural mean
Store 168 Store 17 AH stores
WJ

Number of employees
Average seniority (years)
Wage tier (% low tier)
Employment-status tier
(% part-time)
Job-duty tier (% GM)
Average age (years)
Percent female
Percent minority
Average hourly rate
Average hourly wage
Unitary hourly rate
Unitary hourly wage
Sales floor space in
square feet

231
4.67
(5.65)
71.0

275
3.05
(3.57)
90.9

339
5.27
(5.85)
70.8

453
5.39
(6.47)
72.8

289
2.75
(3.10)
93.4

156
7.37
(7.23)
62.8

337
3.59
(5.75)
85.2

297
4.54
(1.55)
78.1

"2.

82.5
48.7
30.19
(11.40)
73.6
0.0
5.78
(2.59)
6.08
6.43
(2.54)
6.72

74.6
41.5
25.53
(7.45)
57.7
8.3
5.73
(2.32)
5.97
6.86
(2.51)
7.18

83.5
41.4
28.72
(10.15)
62.7
12.2
6.12
(2.69)
6.37
6.82
(2.64)
7.08

78.3
43.1
29.21
(10.69)
58.0
12.1
5.94
(2.64)
6.14
6.75
(2.55)
6.97

73.8
48.8
26.07
(8.00)
61.9
9.5
5.53
(2.27)
5.74
6.66
(2.51)
6.93

85.7
48.1
34.09
(13.51)
76.5
5.9
6.49
(2.72)
6.61
7.31
(2.37)
7.44

63.6
42.7
29.44
(12.04)
68.9
7.0
5.19
(2.14)
5.34
6.12
(2.32)
7.08

78.4
45.0
29.00
(2.77)
65.7
7.8
5.81
(.40)
6.04
6.70
(.37)
6.94

o'

126,000

125,000

145,000

168,000

130,000

67,000

120,000

126,000

a. Represents an "old store" opened before the two-tier wage structure was negotiated.
Standard deviations are in parentheses.

a

n

|
ff
%

s§
s?

tro'
1
o.
O
1

r

118 Sample Characteristics, Research Design, and Data Analysis

Table 5.5
Means of Selected Characteristics of Old and New Stores

Characteristic
Number of employees
Average seniority (years)
Wage tier (% low tier)
Employment-status tier (% part-time)
Job-duty tier (% GM)
Average age (years)
Percent female
Percent minority
Average hourly rate
Average hourly wage
Unitary hourly rate
Unitary hourly wage
Sales floor space in square feet

Overall
"old store"
mean

Overall
"new store"
mean

426
4.97
(1.01)
73.2
81.0
44.6
29.29
(2.03)
65.7
8.8
6.31
(.38)
6.58
7.02
(.36)
7.29
177,000

332
2.99
(.38)
92.3
79.1
43.3
27.21
(1.19)
61.2
6.5
5.88
(.41)
6.11
6.83
(.36)
7.09
130,000

Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Survey Development
Many items included in the survey were developed to address the
eight research questions posed in this study. 3 In addition, more general
items were developed or adapted from other sources, to test the six
hypotheses related to issues such as employee morale, performance,
satisfaction with tiers, union support, and perceived fairness of tiers.
All of the survey items and the sources of the scales that were not
developed specifically for this study are shown in appendices A and B.
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One-on-one interviewing with Mayway employees not surveyed was
carried out to ensure that the questionnaire instructions were stated clearly
and that each item was understood in the manner intended by the re
searchers. As a result, some of the instructions and wording of items4
were changed and clarified. The items and sections were ordered to
facilitate the respondents' understanding of the concepts examined.

Survey Administration and Response
In March 1986, one of the two survey forms was mailed to the
employees at the 17 Mayway stores. The first form was mailed to
employees in five of the six county groupings to collect data relating
to both the research questions and the hypotheses. The second form,
sent to employees in the suburban county grouping, contained items
relating only to the hypotheses. 5 An additional mailing in April asked
those who had not returned the survey to do so.
Of the 6,490 potential respondents, 265 employees were considered
ineligible for this study because they were found to be in job classifica
tions that did not have wage tiers (n= 110),6 or because, through a change
in job classification, they were no longer paid on a high-wage tier pay
scale (n= 155). 7 Of the 1,703 surveys returned, 1,599 surveys (25 per
cent of potential respondents) were used in the analyses (1,117 of the
first survey form and 482 of the second). Surveys were eliminated
because the respondents were in job classifications that contained no
wage tiers (n=34), had moved from a position on the high-wage tier
to one on the low-wage tier (n=44), or because the surveys were returned
with excessive missing data (n=26).
Comparisons were made between the population of potential
respondents and the respondent group on several characteristics to assess
the representativeness of the data (see table 5.6). Several significant
differences between the total population and the survey respondents were
found. The respondent group contained significantly higher proportions
of food department employees, high-wage tier employees, and females
than the population. Also, the respondents were approximately one year
older, had about 11 months more seniority with the company, and had
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a higher rate of pay (with an average difference of approximately 50
cents per hour). The respondents and the population did not differ on
store status (whether a store was opened before or after the two-tier
structure was implemented) or area (rural or urban). While it appears
that there was some response bias, the data were judged to be adequate
for the purposes of this study. 8 There were adequate numbers of
respondents from each level of each tier form, so that meaningful ex
aminations and tests of differences within each form could be conducted.
The relatively small magnitude of the differences between the respon
dent group and the population, along with the large sample size, will
permit findings to be generalized both to Mayway as a whole and to
other companies with tiers.
Table 5.6
Demographic Profile Comparison of Survey Respondents and Population
Population
Respondent
(N=6225)
(N=1599)
Characteristic8
Wage tier (% high tier)
Store-status (% new store)
Job-duty (% food)
Age (years)
Seniority (years)
Payrate ($/hour)
Sex (% female)
Area (% rural)

23.1**
40.6
57.9*
29.06**
(9.39)
4.69**
(4.79)
6.50**
(2.80)
70.9**
30.2

17.3**
41.5
54.8*
27.82**
(9.60)
3.77**
(4.42)
6.01**
(2.73)
63.7**
32.1

^Indicates a characteristic where the respondents differ from the population at the .05 significance level.
**Indicates a characteristic where the respondents differ from the population at the .001 significance level.
Standard deviations in parentheses,
a. Accurate population data are not available for the employment-status tier form in 1986.
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Tier Forms at Mayway

The collective bargaining agreements at Mayway resulted in four out
comes that met the criteria9 for being a tier form the wage tier, the
store-status tier, the employment-status tier, and the job-duty tier. Each
tier form resulted from a change in the labor agreement and reduced
the compensation for some employees who were hired or changed posi
tions after a certain date. Note that each of the tier forms consists of
two levels, with every employee on either a high or low level of each
of the four forms. 10 The percentage of employees in the low-wage,
employment-status (part-time), and job-duty (GM department) tier forms
is shown for both old and new stores (store-status) in tables 5.3 through
5.5, along with other store characteristics.
The wage tier at Mayway resulted from the implementation of new,
low-wage tier pay scales for employees who entered job classifications
after the two-tier plan was negotiated in 1978. This tier form, unlike
the other three, is classified as a permanent tier form, given that the
low-wage tier pay scales would not merge with the high-wage tier pay
scales over time unless the contract were changed.
Wage tiers had been in effect at Mayway for over seven years at the
time the survey was administered. By then, all employees on the highwage tier, and many of those on the low-wage tier, had reached the
top rate of the pay progression for their job classification. Many of the
employees on the low-wage tier, however, were still on the lower steps
of the pay progression. Thus, for this sample those on the low-wage
tier can be divided into two groups: those at the top rate of their pay
progression and those still advancing on their pay progression.
Martin and Lee (1989), in an empirical study of the standards used
by employees to evaluate pay in a tiered employment situation, treated
low-tier employees not at the top rate as a distinct group. They argued
that this group, as the most recently hired, would not be as aware of
all the psychological, economic, and political ramifications of a tiered
wage structure as employees in the other groups. They found that lowwage tier employees not at the top rate knew significantly less (p < .001)
about the labor agreement and pay structure than the other employees.
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The second form, store-status, is based on whether employment is
in stores opened before the implementation of the two-tier wage struc
ture (old stores) or in the stores opened afterward (new stores). The
store-status form results in lower compensation on the average for the
new-store employees, who were mostly hired after the wage tier was
negotiated (with the exception of a small percentage of high-wage tier
transferees). Given the lower average pay in the new stores compared
to the old stores, workers employed in new stores are considered as
a low-tier group. One should note that employees could voluntarily move
from an old store to a new store and vice versa without a change in
pay scale or wage tier.
The store-status tier form is of considerable interest because of the
large number of employees hired in the stores built after the negotia
tion of the two-tier plan. The establishment of new stores was based
on implicit and explicit agreements, whereby the company would carry
out its plans for expansion in exchange for the negotiation (and
maintenance) of the two-tier plan. The new-store employees directly
benefited from the two-tier plan through the creation of their jobs.
The new stores were comprised predominantly of low-wage tier
employees, most of whom had never worked in a store with a majority
of high-wage tier employees. Certainly, their experience with tiers and
their socialization to the tiered employment situation would differ from
that of old-store employees on both wage tier levels. Further, inter
views with union officials indicated that the more senior employees in
the old stores (who were on the high-wage tier) negatively affected the
low-wage tier employees' attitudes toward the union. In the new stores,
high-wage tier employees who had transferred from old stores generally
improved their work situation by obtaining the more desirable work
schedules or higher-paying positions. Such experiences could lead to
differences in attitudes toward tiers between the new- and old-store
employees. 11
The employment-status tier, the third tier form at May way, is based
on the established differences in weekly earnings, benefits, and hours
between the part- and full-time employees. All employees at May way
began in part-time positions and could move into full-time positions only
as openings occurred. There was a career line progression from part- to
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full-time positions; however, some employees (even those on the highwage tier with the most seniority) desired the flexibility of a part-time
position and did not aspire to a full-time position. 12 At the same time
as the implementation of the two-tier plan, the wage progressions were
lengthened for many part-time positions, and where previously separate
wage progressions had existed for part- and full-time positions, these
wage progressions were combined for the low-wage tier employees.
The newly established wage progressions were equal to or lower than
those of the previous part-time, high-wage tier schedules. Thus, after
the implementation of the plan in 1978 both the high- and low-wage
tier employees in many job classifications continued to receive the lower,
part-time pay rates after progression to full-time status within their same
job classification. Because of their lower compensation rates, their
decreased ability to increase their pay rates upon promotion to full-time
status, and their lower weekly income relative to full-time employees,
the part-time employees at this company are considered to be in another
low-tier group. 13
The fourth tier form, the job-duty tier form, manifests itself in the
difference in compensation between food and nonfood job classifica
tions. The general merchandise (GM) department employees, who are
paid considerably less yet perform many of the same duties as the food
department employees, constitute another low-tier group at May way.
There was a very strong and well-defined career line from GM depart
ment positions to the higher paying food department positions.
The last three tier forms should be viewed as temporary, since
employees could move from the low level to the high level as openings
became available. Note that any movement from a full-time to a parttime position, or from a food department position to a general mer
chandise position, would almost always be accompanied by a decrease
in income, even if the employee's wage tier level did not change.
For the respondents, the relationships among the four tier forms can
be seen in tables 5.7 and 5.8. Table 5.7 provides a cross-tabulation of
the wage tier form (broken down into low-wage tier employees not at
the top rate of their pay progression, low-wage tier employees at the
top rate, and high-wage tier employees) with the low and high levels
of the other tier forms. Within the low-wage tier, there were nearly

g

Table 5.7
Cross-Tabulation of the Wage-Tier Form
with the Low and High Levels of the Other Tier Forms
Wage tier

Total

Store-status
Old
New

Employment-status
Full time
Part tune

e>

"2.

Job-duty
Food
GM

0

o
If
PS
ff

Low-wage tier not at
top rate
Low-wage tier at top rate
Total low-wage tier

912
318
1230

435
157
592

477
166
638

838
238
1076

74
80
154

482
100
582

430
218
648

f
g>
g

Total high-wage tier
Total

369
1599

58
650

311
949

201
1277

168
322

90
672

279
927
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Table 5.8
Correlation Matrix of the Tier Forms, Pay Rate, and Seniority
Tier forms and variables
1. Wage tier (l=low, 2=high)
2. Store-status (l=new, 2=old)
3. Employment-status
(1 = part-time, 2= full-time)
4. Job-duty (1=GM, 2=food)
5. Pay rate
6. Seniority

Wage tier

Store-status Employment-status

Job-duty

Pay rate
"H.
a"

28***

O

34***
20***
.59***
.84***

.02
.00
H***
20***

-.05**
27***
39***

n>

.60***
24***

I

74***

NOTE: **ss.01; ***p<;.001. N = 1599.
era

I

i.
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three times as many respondents not at the top of their wage progres
sion as there were those at the top rate. The cross-tabulation indicates
that roughly equal proportions of low-wage tier respondents from both
groups were employed in old and new stores (approximately 50 per
cent); for the high-wage tier respondents, 84 percent were in old stores.
Fewer than 10 percent (n=58) of the new-store employees were on the
high-wage tier. The cross-tabulation also indicates that 92 percent of
the low-wage tier respondents not at the top rate were in part-time posi
tions compared to 75 percent for the respondents on the low-wage tier
at the top rate. In comparison, there were only slightly more part-time
(55 percent) than full-tune respondents on the high-wage tier. Finally,
only among low-wage tier respondents not at the top rate were GM
department employees in a majority (53 percent). In contrast,
only 24 percent of the high-wage tier respondents were in the GM depart
ment positions.
The correlation matrix of the four tier forms (the wage tier form is
divided into only high and low levels) and related variables in table 5.8
shows that seniority (upon which all of the tier forms are at least par
tially based) is significantly (p<.001) positively correlated with each
tier form. As should be expected, the four tier forms are also significantly
positively correlated with pay rate. Only weak correlations are found
among the three tier forms of store-status, employment-status, and jobduty. The wage-tier form has the highest correlation of any tier form
with each of the other three and with seniority.
Data Analysis
To address the research questions, several analyses were conducted
for the purpose of exploring the survey data. First, descriptive statistics
were determined for each relevant item. These descriptive statistics con
sisted of an overall percentage and a percentage derived for the high
and low levels of each of the four tier forms, comprising a total of nine
separate percentages. These percentages are discussed in the results sec
tion of chapter 6. Second, the results of a factor analysis were used
to determine several scales, each consisting of items tapping a similar
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underlying dimension. 14 Examination of the internal consistency of the
various clusters of items along with the concepts defined by them deter
mined the final composition of the scales derived. The investigation
of those scales was carried out using four-way analyses of variance
(ANOVAs) to determine if there were any significant differences be
tween the two levels within each of the four tier forms.
A two-step process of analysis was employed with the hypotheses
given their directional nature and the fact that multiple items or scales
were used in testing them. 15 First, a multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) was carried out for each hypothesis16 to determine whether
or not the items or scales as a group differed significantly within each
tier form. If any tier effect was significant in a MANOVA, four-way
univariate ANOVAs were run to determine the nature and direction of
the significant differences between the two levels within each of the
four tier forms for each item or scale.
Following the rationale of other research in this area (Martin and Peterson 1987), the four tier forms in this study were entered into the
ANOVAs and MANOVAs in the following order: job-duty,
employment-status, store-status, and wage. 17 This ordering provided
for a conservative test of attitudinal differences as a function of wage
tier, because differences in the other tier forms that might not be pre
sent in other companies with two-tier wage plans were taken into ac
count first. All tier effects shown in the results of the ANOVAs were
adjusted for job-duty, employment-status, and store-status. Thus, dif
ferences in those three tier forms were not confounded with the effects
of wage tier status. Similarly, the effects shown for store-status were
not confounded by differences in employment-status and job-duty, and
so forth. Tests for significant differences for the scales related to the
research questions and for each hypothesis were carried out by enter
ing the tier forms in the order described above. 18
Two complete sets of analyses were used for both the research ques
tions and the hypotheses. The first was based on the total sample. The
second set included only that portion of the sample paid at the top rate
of their pay progression. 19 The latter set of analyses was conducted to
remove some of the effects of seniority from the scale analyses and the
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hypothesis tests. Because each of the four tier forms was so closely
related to seniority, it was possible that any significant difference found
within a tier form would be tapping into a relationship between seniority
and the examined employee attitudes, behaviors, and characteristics.
The analyses that included only the respondents at the top rate of their
pay progression included only those employed for at least two years,
the length of the shortest pay progression, and in the three largest job
classifications (cashiers, GM clerks, and food clerks), for 48 months. 20
The second set of analyses eliminated most of the effects of chang
ing seniority on pay within the low-tier groups. These analyses
significantly (p < .001) reduced the correlation of pay rate with seniority
from the .74 shown in table 5.8 to .30, as a result of the restriction
of range on both variables. Given the differing characteristics of the
two sets of analyses, it was useful to examine and compare the results
of both sets of analyses to determine the relationship of tiers to the ex
amined attitudes, behaviors, and characteristics. The analyses for the
store-status, employment-status, and job-duty tier forms were conducted
both including and excluding respondents not at the top rate of their
wage progressions. Such analyses'avoided the complexity of analyses
involving more than three tier divisions, e.g., new-store employees not
at the top rate, new-store employees at the top rate, old-store employees
not at the top rate, and old-store employees at the top rate. 21
Summary

This chapter began with an examination of the sample characteristics
and followed with a discussion of the survey development, administra
tion, and response. Also, the chapter discussed the four tier forms at
May way, which met the criteria established for being a tier form. By
examining the four tier forms, this study extends the research on tiers
to forms beyond wage tiers. The chapter concludes with a discussion
of the methods used to analyze the survey data presented in the next
two chapters.
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NOTES
1.The selection of the 12 counties was constrained by the differing nature of the counties and
by the need to have old and new May way stores within each county grouping. The data shown
in tables S.I and 5.2 indicate a high degree of similarity between the two counties within each
grouping. Note that for some of the groupings, the two counties included are not contiguous.
2. The following are definitions of the relevant retail store payroll characteristics included in the
tables.
Average Hourly Rate. The average hourly rate is the average pay rate of all workers employed
within a store regardless of their full- or part-time employment status.
Average Hourly Wage. The average hourly wage is the cost of labor per hour to operate a store.
It is computed by dividing the total weekly payroll for unionized employees by the total number
of hours those employees worked that week. It is generally higher than the average hourly rate
because higher-paid job classifications, such as cashiers, have to be on duty whenever a store
is open, while the lower-paid job classifications, such as baggers, are more heavily employed
at peak customer traffic times.
Unitary Hourly Rate. The unitary hourly rate is the same as the average hourly rate except
that the pay rates of all employees are calculated as though they were on a unitary wage scale,
which use only the high-tier wage rates. The unitary hourly rate is a hypothetical figure.
Unitary Hourly Wage. The unitary hourly wage is the same as the average hourly wage except
that it is calculated as though the pay rates of all employees were computed from the high-tier
wage rates.
3. The only previously existing survey items directly concerned with wage tiers were developed
by Jacoby and Mitchell (1986), and these items have been adapted for this study to address one
of the research questions.
4. For example, most of the Mayway employees were unfamiliar with the term "two-tier wage
structure"; they referred to the employees on the high-wage tier as "onboards" (they were on
board when the tiers were implemented) and those on the low-wage tier as "hereafters" (they
were hired here after the tiers were implemented). Thus wage tiers were referred to in the survey
as the "hereafter-onboard rate differences."
5. The second survey was partially funded by the ANR Pipeline Company Foundation and was
designed to examine issues other than those included in the research questions.
6. Meat cutter and department head job classifications were not placed on permanent wage tiers;
the surveys of respondents in these classifications were excluded from the study.
7. As discussed previously, employees originally on the high-wage tier who later moved to a dif
ferent job classification in a new department, moved onto the low-tier rates for that new job classifica
tion (most of these employees moved from low-paying general merchandise positions to higherpaying food department positions). This is not typical of the way such changes are handled at
other companies with wage tiers. An examination of the data indicates that employees who had
changed wage tiers differed in several attitudes from both the high-wage tier employees and other
employees on the low-wage tier. Because of these differences, and the small number of employees
involved, the surveys of these employees were excluded from the study.
8. The population figures shown in table 5.6 do not include individuals who changed wage tiers
or who were in job classifications that were not on permanent wage tiers. Thus the population
size shown in table 5.6 is less than the total number of employees summed across the stores in
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tables 5.3 and 5.4, and the population statistics may vary slightly from those computed from the
latter tables.
9. The criteria established for this study are included in the definition of tiers presented in the
introductory chapter.
10. Exceptions to this, as mentioned in footnote 6, were those in the meat cutter and department
head job classifications. These job classifications represented 1.7 percent of the surveyed population.
11. Martin and Peterson (1987) found several significant differences in employment-related at
titudes between the employees in old and new stores.
12. Survey results for this study indicate that the longer the respondents had been employed in
particular pan-time positions, the more they desired to work the same number of hours as they
presently worked.
13.The reader is referred to the discussion provided for figure 1.3.
14. Factor analysis refers to a variety of statistical techniques whose objective is to represent a
set of variables in terms of a smaller number of variables. Thus, it helps to reduce sets of variables
to a smaller set of factors based upon the underlying patterns of relationships indicated in the data.
15. Significance tests for the individual survey items examined in the research questions are not
reported given the large number of items. Because of the large number of comparisons involved,
an increased number of significant differences may result from chance factors alone. The use
of significance tests was deemed more appropriate when the items were combined into scales.
16. A MANOVA combines together all of the items or scales being tested in a hypothesis into
one statistical procedure and analysis. This technique is commonly used when the dependent items
or scales are closely related and are being used to test the same hypothesis. In addition to examin
ing the main effects of the MANOVA, the direction of the differences of the means within each
tier form must be examined in order to determine whether the hypotheses being tested are supported.
17. For the ANOVAs, we were only interested in the significant differences between levels within
a tier form. We were not interested in the interaction effects that might indicate, for example,
that high-wage tier employees in old stores had attitudes that differed significantly from highwage tier employees in new stores. The results indicated that less than 5 percent of the interaction
effects were found to be significant in the ANOVAs of the scales in chapter 6 and of the scales
and items used in chapter 7. Only in the case where there was a very small proportion of the
sample involved, as among high-wage tier employees employed in new stores (which was less
than 20 percent of both the high-wage tier and new-store employee groups), did the direction
of the mean differences within a tier form vary from those shown in the ANOVA results tables.
18. Exploration of the data was also carried out by entering the tier forms into the ANOVAs
in the following order: store-status, employment-status, job-duty, and wage tier. The ANOVA
results using the above order entry were essentially the same as those reported in chapters 6 and 7.
19. Of the 1,117 respondents who answered the first survey form, 280 were on the high-wage
tier, 218 were at the top rate of the low-wage tier, and 619 were not at the top rate of the lowwage tier. Of the 482 who answered the second survey form, the figures were 89, 100, and 293,
respectively.
20. Several methods are theoretically available to control for or adjust for seniority differences.
Seniority could be entered into a regression equation along with the four tier forms as indepen
dent variables, and the items examined as dependent variables. Also, the same ANOVAs as were
described in the text could be run again covarying (controlling for) seniority. These two methods,
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which may be suitable in other situations, were not considered to be appropriate for this study
given the very high correlation of seniority with the wage-tier form. This very high correlation
suggested that such methods violated the homogeneity of regression assumption and led to unstable
results.
Table 5.8 shows that the three tier forms of store-status, employment-status, and job-duty had
correlations with seniority of a significantly lower magnitude (p< .001) than the wage-tier form
did. Thus, ANOVAs not including the wage-tier form which covaried seniority were run. The
pattern of significant differences found within a tier form with these ANOVAs was very similar
to that found with just respondents at the top rate of their pay progression and shown in the results
tables for those three tier forms. This suggests that mean differences that were significant for
the total sample but no longer significant for the top-rated sample for the store-status, employmentstatus, and job-duty tier forms were related to employee differences in seniority rather than to
their different location on a tier form.
21. In each set of analyses, the focus of the research questions and the hypotheses concerned
the differences between low-wage tier employees and the high-wage tier employees. This research
did not generally explore the differences that may exist between low-tier employees at the top
rate and those not at the top of the wage progression, although such an investigation may be of
theoretical interest.

6
Research Questions
Concerning Tiers

This chapter centers on the development and analysis of eight research
questions for which survey questions were designed to gather data. Most
of the research questions focus specifically on general employee views
about the two-tier wage structure at May way. The questions are deriv
ed from the literature and also from discussions with union and manage
ment officials in the retail food industry and with observers of the in
dustry. Unlike the hypotheses, which will be the focus of chapter 7,
these atheoretical research questions do not contain directional predic
tions of differences between tier levels, even though such differences
are of interest and will be discussed.
The first six research questions concern employee attitudes about the
two-tier wage plan at Mayway and about tiers in general. They are
organized into two sets of three questions each. The first set focuses
on employee views of why the two-tier wage plan was originally
negotiated at Mayway, how much various groups have benefited from
its implementation, and the perceived effects of the plan on employmentrelated outcomes. The second set focuses on employee views of predic
tions about outcomes of future bargaining over the wage structure, at
titudes toward selected changes in the compensation system and poten
tial related outcomes, and general employee attitudes toward tiers. A
number of survey items were developed to examine each of these
research questions.
Given the distinct differences between the urban and rural areas and
between the stores operating in those areas, it is important to deter
mine the impact that such differences may have had on the measured
employee attitudes. Such differences have been found to have a rela
tionship to employee work-related variables in previous studies (Adams,
Laker, and Hulin 1977; Hulin and Blood 1968). Thus the seventh
133
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research question focuses on differences among the geographic areas
for the first six questions.
The eighth research question concerns the relationship of tiers to the
potential public policy problem of equal employment opportunity.
Research Question Development
In chapter 2 we examined some of the goals the participants might
possess when initially negotiating a two-tier wage structure. For ex
ample, the parties may be concerned with such matters as helping the
employer to compete, allowing for employer expansion, increasing
employee job security, obtaining union contract concessions while get
ting the contract ratified, protecting the high-wage tier employee pay,
and helping to control labor costs. We also know that high-wage tier
employees might be concerned that the implementation of tiers could
give management an incentive to get rid of them. In this study then,
one line of inquiry concerns the employee perceptions of the reasons
why the structure was originally negotiated at Mayway.
We also discussed the potential benefits of tiered wage plans for each
of the participant groups. In addition to the employer, union, and
employees, the implementation of tiers in service industries could result
in benefits for the customer in terms of better service. An additional
area of interest thus pertains to the employee perceptions of how much
various groups have benefited from the wage structure.
The reasons why the tiered plan was initially implemented should be
linked to the employment-related effects of the structure. Survey items
related to the third research question focused on employee perceptions
of the effects that the wage structure has had on such employment-related
outcomes as store expansion, job security, compensation, promotion
opportunities, and ability to work more hours.
The preceding discussion leads to the first set of research questions.
The specific questions examined are:
(1) What goals of the negotiating parties do employees believe the
plan was negotiated to meet?
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(2) To what extent do employees perceive that the various groups
have benefited from the implementation of the plan?
(3) What employment-related effects do employees believe have
resulted from the plan?
One area of focus for the second set of questions is the employees'
predictions of various outcomes in future bargaining over the two-tier
wage structure. The literature review provides the basis for the survey
items selected to address this fourth question. Potential changes in the
wage structure may range from no change, through a narrowing of the
difference between the high- and low-tier rates, to an equalization of
the rates. The implementation of a third wage tier also is a possibility
in future bargaining. Other logical changes include those incorporating
the concerns of both the high- and low-tier employees regarding the
potentially differential treatment of employees on each tier level.
The fifth research question concerns employee attitudes toward
changes in the tiered wage structure or other changes to the compensa
tion system and the potential related outcomes. Rather than focusing
on the likelihood of a potential change to the existing wage structure,
this research question concerns the employee perceptions of selected
means for dealing with tiers in the future and the relationship of these
changes to potential outcomes affecting tiers. For example, what would
be the employee attitudes toward such a change as the lowering of highwage tier rates to the low-wage tier rates if it would assist in prevent
ing the closing of stores? All of the items examined in this research
question recognize that changes to tiers are often accompanied by other
employment-related changes.
Also of interest are the employee attitudes toward selected statements
relating to the existing wage structure and tiers in general. This sixth
question concerns a variety of matters, including attitudes toward the
company's and union's expectations for change and perceptions of the
potential that tiers have for causing political problems for the union and
tension among the union members. An additional survey item included
in this broad research question examines employee perceptions of the
relationship of tiers to the duty of fair representation.
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The preceding discussion leads to the second set of research questions:
(4) What changes related to the plan do employees believe are like
ly to occur?
(5) What are the employee attitudes toward selected changes in the
plan and the potential related outcomes?
(6) What are the employee attitudes about the company and union
expectations, problems relating to the plan, and the relationship of tiers
to the duty of fair representation?
One question, which overlaps with each set of research questions,
concerns the differences among the employees in the geographic areas.
The seventh research question examines whether differences exist for
the first six research questions among the geographic areas of Mayway's
operations. Given that such locality differences have been found to have
a relationship to employee work-related variables, it is anticipated that
the distinct differences between the urban and rural areas and stores
in those areas could impact on the employee attitudes. This leads to
the seventh research question.
(7) What are the differences in the employee attitudes examined in
the first six research questions among the geographic areas of operation?
The final research question is based on the discussion in chapter 2
concerning tiers and the potential public policy problem of equal employ
ment opportunity. Tiered compensation structures are an EEO concern
because the lower tier could contain a disproportionate number of
members from protected classes, such as women and minorities. It has
been suggested that the percentage of females and minority race
employees is increasing in industries that have implemented tiers, which
leads to the eighth research question.
(8) Are the low-tier groups disproportionately comprised of women
and minorities?
Results and Discussion
Discussion of the survey results as they address the research ques
tions is organized into four major sections: the first two sections relate
to the two sets of three research questions; the third section concerns area
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differences; and the fourth relates to the EEO issue. Descriptive statistics
for each relevant item are shown in tables 6.1 to 6.3, 6.5 to 6.8, and
6.11. The first six of those tables also include a key word representing
the name of the scale, if any, in which the item was placed. Tables
6.4 and 6.9 contain the results of the scale analyses of both the total
sample and that portion of the total sample at the top rate of the wage
progression. l The values shown in the tables are derived from the total
sample analyses. While the values derived from the top-rate sample
analyses may differ from those of the total sample, in no case did the
direction of any significant difference vary from that shown. For ease
of interpretation, the scale scores presented have each been divided by
the number of items in the scale. 2 Table 6.10 includes means only for
those scales found to differ significantly in either set of analyses be
tween the urban and rural areas. Table 6.11 includes two items relating
to EEO.

Views of Why the Plan was Negotiated, the Benefits,
and the Effects
The data in table 6.1 relate to the first research question. The table
presents employee estimates of the importance of each of 10 reasons
or goals for the initial negotiation of the two-tier wage plan. The survey
used a five-point response format that ranged from "not at all impor
tant" to "extremely important." Only the two highest responses, "im
portant" and "extremely important," are shown. Responses are shown
for the entire sample, as well as for the high- and low-levels within
each tier form.
As can be seen, 60 percent of the employees perceived that saving
the company money was important or extremely important to the par
ticipants in the negotiation of the two-tier wage structure. Of the re
maining items, company expansion or contraction, helping the com
pany to compete, protecting the jobs of union members or the wages
of the high-wage tier employees, and helping to get the contract ratified
were seen by 40 to 50 percent of the respondents as important or ex
tremely important. Giving management an incentive to get rid of the
high-tier employees was perceived as a prominent reason by only 29

Table 6.1
Perceived Possible Reasons for the Original Negotiation of the Two-Tier Wage Structure
Related to Research Question 1
(Percent of respondents answering "Important" or "Extremely Important")
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Her form and level

£*

___________________________________________________

n

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Wage
High
Low
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n=807
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Employment-status
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Job-duty
Food
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Overall
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percent of the respondents. The obvious disparity in perceptions be
tween those on the high- and low-wage tier is evident for this item,
with the former being more pessimistic.
Data pertaining to the second research question, concerning percep
tions of how much each of six groups has benefited from the plan, are
shown in table 6.2. The employees responded to a five-point response
format that ranged from "not at all" to "very much." The percentage
of respondents who reported that a group benefited "pretty much" or
"very much" is included in the table. Overall, the respondents perceived
that the company benefited the most from the plan, followed by the
union. These perceptions are likely related to the effect of the wage
structure on company savings and the facilitation of its expansion plans,
both of which have allowed Mayway to compete more effectively. Also,
the wage structure has been responsible for keeping more jobs for the
union than would have otherwise existed.
While the overall percentage indicates that the high-wage tier
employees were seen as benefiting "pretty much" or "very much"
from the plan by over one-third of the respondents, the percentages sug
gest that respondents from each of the four low-tier groups thought that
the high-wage tier employees had benefited considerably more than the
high-tier groups perceived that they had. It appears that the low-tier
groups perceive that the negotiation of the two-tier plan had resulted
in no immediate costs to the high-tier employees. Very few of the
respondents perceived that the remaining three participant groups
low-wage tier employees, employees in general at the respondent's store,
and customers had benefited "pretty much" or "very much."
Data concerning the third research question, employee perceptions
of the effects of the two-tier wage structure on selected employmentrelated outcomes, are presented in table 6.3. Respondents used a fivepoint scale ranging from "definitely decreased" to "definitely increas
ed" to report the perceived effects of the wage structure. The table shows
the percentage of respondents who answered "probably increased" or
"definitely increased" for each of the items. The overall percentages
for the first three items relating to job security suggest that most
respondents perceived little positive effect resulting from the two-tier

Table 6.2
Perceptions of How Much Various Groups Have Benefited from the Two-Tier Wage Structure
Related to Research Question 2
(Percent of respondents answering "Pretty Much" or "Very Much")
Her form and level
Wage
Scale label
Group8

Store-status
Old
New

Employment-status
Full time Part time

Job-duty
Food
GM

Overall
percent

High

Low

n=264

n=807

n=571

n=500

n=217

n=854

n=621

n=450

N=1071

1. The company

No scale

91

75

79

79

87

77

80

78

79

2. The union

No scale

55

41

48

42

47

44

45

44

45

3. High-wage tier employees
in general

HTEFFECT

10

46

31

42

23

40

31

44

37

4. Low- wage tier employees
in general

OTHERSBENF

11

10

10

10

13

9

10

10

10

90
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5. Employees in general at
the respondent's store

OTHERSBENF

6

11

9

11

8

10

10

10

10

6. Customers

OTHERSBENF

10

18

15

18

16

17

16

18

16
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i. All items were scaled from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very much)
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Table 6.3
Perceived Effects of the Two-Tier Wage Structure on Employment-Related Outcomes
Related to Research Question 3
(Percent of respondents answering "Probably Increased" or "Definitely Increased")
Her form and level
Scale label

Wage
Low
High

Store-status
New
Old

Employment-status
Full time Part time

Job-duty
GM
Food

Overall
percent

n=264

n=807

n=571

n=500

n=217

n=854

n=621

n=450

N=1071

HTEFFECT

15

37

28

37

22

35

29

35

31

No scale

44

33

36

35

36

35

39

31

36

3. The respondent's job
security

OPPORTUNITY

12

27

20

28

18

25

23

24

23

4. The number of hours the
respondent is able to
work in a week

OPPORTUNITY

18

15

18

10

18

15

18

16

5. The respondent's current
hourly pay rate

EARNINGS

12

11

13

11

12

11

13

12

6. The respondent's current
weekly earnings

EARNINGS

12

10

12

11

12

10

12

11

Effect8

1. The job security of highwage tier employees
2. The job security of lowwase tier emolovees

CoQueTincesertniorsnnsg

7. The respondent's current
fringe benefits

EARNINGS

12

13

12

13

16

12

12

14

13

8. The dollar amount of the
respondent's future raises

EARNINGS

13

13

12

15

11

13

12

15

13

OPPORTUNITY

5

13

10

13

11

12

9

15

11
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11. The opening of stores
by the company
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9. The respondent's
promotion opportunities
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67

71
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75

71

79

68

71

a. All items were scaled from 1 (Definitely Decreased) to 5 (Definitely Increased).
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plan on their own or others' job security. Other items, relating to pay,
fringe benefits, promotion opportunities, and the number of hours the
respondent is able to work in a week, were seen by very few as having
been increased. Responses to the last two items strongly suggest that
employees believed that the two-tier wage structure led to the opening
of new stores and did not lead to store closings.
Overall, there are some patterns to be seen in the responses, both
for the individual items in the three tables (6.1 through 6.3) and for
the scales developed from the first set of research questions and presented
in table 6.4. The items reflecting the stated goals of management in
implementing the two-tier plan were to save the company money, to
allow the company to expand by opening new stores, to help the com
pany compete with both unionized and nonunion competitors, all of
which are included in the Goals of Management scale. All of the items
in that scale focus on improvement of the human resource function's
contribution in the attainment of Mayway's competitive strategic
objectives.
The ANOVA results of that scale for both the total sample and for
those at the top rate of their wage progression suggest that the highwage tier employees were more aware of the stated rationale for im
plementing the plan and its role in the firm's business strategy. This
difference in the understanding of the stated goals management wished
to achieve in the initial negotiation of the plan appears related to dif
ferences in experience with the plan. In contrast to the low-wage tier
employees, the high-wage tier employees were employed when the plan
was negotiated and had the opportunity to vote on its inclusion into the
first contract. Also, the lack of any significant differences for the
Negotiation for Ratification scale was not surprising, given that the goal
of getting a new contract ratified is not unique to negotiating a two-tier
wage structure.
Another pattern in the responses both for the individual items and
for the scores of the next four scales shown in the table (Other Groups
Benefiting, Effects on Compensation, Effects on Opportunities, and Ef
fects on High-wage Tier Employees) suggests that the employees perceiv
ed very few benefits or positive effects resulting from the plan. As can
be seen in table 6.4, the overall mean for each of these four scales is
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relatively low. The lowest overall mean is for the scale Other Groups
Benefiting, relating to benefits for the low-wage tier employees,
employees in general, and customers. The ANOVA results of this scale
for the total sample, but not for the top-rate sample, indicated that the
high-wage tier employees had significantly less favorable perceptions
concerning the benefits of the wage structure for the other groups. The
scale with the second lowest overall mean was Effects on Compensa
tion. For this scale, there were no significant differences within any
tier form, as all of the tier groups shared in the perception that the ex
isting structure had not resulted in increased compensation for the
respondents.
The overall mean score on the Effects on Opportunities scale, relating
to opportunities in terms of increasing the respondent's job security,
the number of hours possible to work in a week, and promotion oppor
tunities, suggests that low-tier respondents generally were more favorable
concerning the impact of the two-tier wage structure on opportunities.
For this scale, three of the high-tier groups in both sets of analyses had
significantly less positive perceptions about the effects of the plan on
opportunities than did the low-tier groups. For the employment-status
tier form, the full-time respondents at the top rate were more favorable
concerning the effects on opportunities.
The Effects on High-Wage Tier Employees scale, consisted of items
that focused specifically on the plan's effects on high wage tier employ
ees. The analyses for this scale revealed significant differences in the
perceptions between most of the high- and low-tier employee groups.
The high-tier employee groups perceived that their employment situa
tion had been damaged by the two-tier plan giving management an in
centive to get rid of them and thus decreasing their job security. This sup
ports the statements of Bernstein and Schiller (1985), Bowers and Rod
erick (1987), and Ploscowe (1986), that the responses of the high-tier
employees may be related to perceived threats to job security, given the
economic incentive to substitute them with lower-cost new employees.
Additional perceptions of employees concerning the effects of the wage
structure on job security can be seen in the responses to items 1 and
2 in table 6.3. The responses to these items indicate that employees
in each wage tier group perceived that their group's job security had

Table 6.4
Analysis of Scales Related to the First Set of Research Questions
Tier form and level
Scale
reliability
Scale label and title

Wage

Store-status
Old
New

Employment-status
Full time Part time

Job-duty
Food
GM

High

Low

n=264

n=807

n=571

n=500

n=217

n=854

n=621

n=450

Overall
percent
N=1071

MGTGOALS: Goals of
Management

.71

3.40*

3.28*

3.28

3.34

3.39

3.28

3.28

3.35

3.31

RATIFY: Negotiation for
Ratification

.82

3.28

3.29

3.30

3.28

3.26

3.29

3.24

3.35

3.29

OTHERSBENF: Other Groups
Benefiting

.75

1.83**

2.08**

1.96

2.08

2.01

2.02

1.97

2.08

2.02

EARNINGS: Effects on
Compensation

.70

2.17

2.31

2.24

2.32

2.23

2.29

2.24

2.23

2.27

OPPORTUNITY: Effects on
Opportunities

.89

2.54***

2.83***

2.69**

2.83**

2.82

2.74

2.72*

2.81*

2.76

HTEFFECT: Effects on HighWage Tier Employees

.52

2.38***

3.31***

2.92***

3.27***

2.84***

3.14***

2.95***

3.27***

3.08
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been increased to a lesser extent than the other group perceived that
it had. Further, while about 50 percent of the respondents perceived
that a possible reason for the original negotiation of the wage structure
was to protect the high-wage tier employees (see items 8 and 9 in table
6.1), only 20 percent3 of that group perceived that they had benefited
to any great degree. In contrast, 46 percent of the low-wage tier employee
group surmised that the high-wage tier employees had benefited to a
great degree from the plan.
Focusing specifically on the store-status form, the significant dif
ferences found in both sets of analyses for the two scales, Effects on
Opportunities and Effects on High-wage Tier Employees, indicate that
the new-store employees had more positive perceptions relating to the
effects of the plan. Given the relatively high number of high wage tier
employees in the old stores, it is not surprising that the old-store
respondents believed that the two-tier wage structure had a more negative
effect on the high-wage tier employees. The old-store respondents were
also significantly less favorable about the impact of the wage structure
on their opportunities. While the mean scale scores for the new-store
employee group were relatively low, it appears that opening new stores
or work locations (which represents increases in opportunities and job
security for new-store employees) may reduce some of the overall
negative employee perceptions following the implementation of a twotier wage structure.
The responses to the items in the Negotiation for Protection scale in
dicate that nearly one-half of the respondents perceived that one set of
reasons the plan was originally negotiated was to provide employee pro
tection by keeping stores from closing, protecting union jobs, and pro
tecting high-wage tier employee wages. The responses to the items in
table 6.3, however, that focused on protecting union jobs (items 1, 2,
and 3, concerning job security) and protecting high-wage tier employee
wages (items 5,6, and 8, concerning earnings) indicate that employees,
particularly those in the high-tier groups, did not perceive that the plan
had accomplished those goals.
The scores for the scale, Effects on Number of Stores, are the highest
of the four scales concerning the specific effects of the two-tier plan.
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These were the only scores that were positive within both levels of the
four tier forms. The results indicate that each group of employees believ
ed the negotiation of wage tiers had resulted in more stores being open.
In other words, it appears that the employees were aware of the relation
ship between the implementation of tiers (i.e., Mayway's human resources
strategy) and the firm's strategic business objective of expansion.
Views Concerning Possibilities for Changes in the Plan
and Related Issues
The data in table 6.5 pertain to the fourth research question and pre
sent employee estimates of the likelihood of each of seven possible
changes to the existing wage structure over the next two contract negotia
tions. Employee responses to each item were based on a five-point
response format that ranged from "not at all likely" to "extremely like
ly." The percentage of respondents who answered "likely" or "ex
tremely likely" is shown for each of the potential bargaining outcomes.
As seen in the table, the respondents perceived that the most likely change
to the two-tier plan in future bargaining was the creation of a new third
tier. Nearly one-half of the respondents believed that this change was
likely or extremely likely. "No change in dollar differential between
the high- and low-wage tier rates" was viewed as second most likely
to occur.
Only one-quarter or fewer of the respondents perceived the remain
ing changes listed in the table as likely or extremely likely to occur.
Equalization was perceived as more likely when accompanied by a freeze
of the high-wage rates, as opposed to either lowering them or increas
ing both rates according to different schedules. Finally, the responses
to items 6 and 7 show that approximately equal percentages of
respondents perceived that either the high- or the low-wage tier
employees would receive greater increases.
The data presented in tables 6.6 and 6.7 pertain to the fifth research
question and show the employee attitudes toward selected changes in
the existing compensation structure and the potential related outcomes.
Ten statements were presented to the employees with responses to each
item based on a seven-point response format ranging from "strongly
disagree" to "strongly agree." The percentage of respondents answer-

Table 6.5
Predicted Outcomes of Future Bargaining Over the Two-Tier Wage Structure
Related to Research Question 4
(Percent of respondents answering "Likely" or "Extremely Likely")
Her form and level
Scale label
Outcome8

Wage
Low
High

Store-status
New
Old

Employment-status
Full time Part time

Job-duty
GM
Food

Overall
percent

n=264

n=807

n=571

n=500

n=217

n=854

n=621

n=450

N = 1071

1. Implementation of a new,
third wage tier with the
next contract

No scale

46

46

47

45

46

46

48

42

46

2. No change in dollar
differential between highand low-wage tier rates

No scale

24

29

28

27

26

28

27

29

28

3. Freeze high-wage tier rates,
allowing low-wage tier
rates to increase and
NARROWRATES
become equal

40

20

25

23

31

23

28

20

25

4. Lower high-wage tier pay
rates to equal low-wage
tier rates

28

14

19

16

23

17

21

14

18

NARROWRATES

a.
o

5. Raise high-wage tier rates
less than low-wage tier
rates, resulting in equal
ization over time

NARROWRATES

14

13

14

13

14

13

14

13

14

6. High-wage tier employees
will receive greater
percentage increases than
low-wage tier employees

NARROWRATES?'

12

23

17

23

19

21

18

22

20

7. Low-wage tier employees
will receive greater
dollar increases than
high-wage tier employees,
but the rates will not
be equalized

NARROWRATES

21

17

17

18

21

17

19

16

18

a. All items were scaled from 1 (Not at all Likely) to 5 (Extremely Likely).
b. To facilitate interpretation, the scoring of this item was reversed when computing its scale.

n

o
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ing "slightly agree," "agree," or "strongly agree" for each statement
is presented in the two tables. Table 6.6 contains the respondent at
titudes toward five statements. The first four statements concern various
changes equalizing the earnings of employees on the low- and highwage tiers and the potential related outcomes. The fifth statement
measures employee attitudes toward the establishment of a fringe benefit
tier in order to help obtain the outcome of larger raises. Table 6.7 con
tains statements about the establishment of a third wage tier and the
potential related outcomes.
Of the changes and potential outcomes shown in table 6.6, the
respondents were most favorable toward raising the low-wage tier rates
to the high-wage tier level, even though the high-wage tier employees
would obtain a smaller increase than those on the low-wage tier. This
was the only change endorsed by a majority of the respondents. It is
not surprising that a greater percentage of low- than high-wage tier
respondents favored this option. What is surprising is that nearly 40
percent of the high-wage tier respondents agreed with the statement.
This suggests that equalization of the wage tiers may be a politically
feasible goal for the union representing May way's employees to pur
sue. Similar to the pattern of responses for the first item, the responses
of the low-tier employees toward lowering the high-tier rates to the lowtier rates for the purpose of preventing store closings appear in line with
the statements of Balliet (1984). He argued that the low-tier employees
would have little interest in protecting the higher rates "of those who
originally negotiated their inferior status" (p. 7).
Establishing a fringe benefit tier in order to help obtain larger raises
for the current employees received the least overall support of any of
the items in the table. When combined with the results shown in table
6.7, the overall results show very little support for the concept of ex
tending tiers (instituting a third level of a wage tier or a fringe benefit
tier) when the purpose was to facilitate the company's expansion or to
get raises for current employees. The strongest support for the develop
ment of a third wage tier was found if it was related to keeping stores
from closing. Not surprisingly, there was more support from the lowthan the high-wage tier employees for the development of a third wage
tier if it would assist in equalizing the low- and high-wage tier rates.
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Data for the sixth research question regarding the respondents' percep
tions of selected statements with respect to two-tier wage structures is
presented in table 6.8. The statements focused on issues such as the
expectations of the company and union officers, the political problems
and tension resulting from the existing wage structure, and the duty
of fair representation. These statements are similar to those included
in Jacoby and Mitchell's (1986) survey regarding managerial attitudes
toward two-tier wage plans. Employee responses to each item were based
on the same seven-point response format as in tables 6.6 and 6.7 and
are displayed in the same manner as in those two tables. As seen in
the table, 49 percent of the respondents believed that the company in
tended to equalize the wage tiers by lowering the high-tier rates in future
negotiations, while a slightly smaller percentage believed that the union
would pursue equalization by raising the low-tier rates. The responses
to these two items indicate that more of the respondents in the high-tier
groups anticipate the equalization of the wage tiers to be an issue in
future negotiations.
The high-tier groups generally were in greater agreement with the
items suggesting that wage tiers had led to the development of internal
political problems for the union and tensions between employees on
the two wage tier levels. Overall, 34 percent of the respondents agreed
that tiers had created political problems for the union while only 19
percent disagreed. Also, 42 percent agreed that pay rate differences
of wage tiers had created employee tension while 31 percent disagreed.
The high-wage tier employees' responses to both items are likely related
to the fact that they were employed before the plan was negotiated and
had the opportunity to view more of the impact of the two-tier plan.
Their perceptions of the impact on union political problems and
employees tensions may be attributable to their belief that they will be
relatively disadvantaged vis-a-vis the low-wage tier employees if the
existing differences are narrowed or eliminated.
The fewest respondents expressed agreement with item 3 in the table,
that a union was still treating its members fairly when it negotiates a
two-tier wage structure. The lesser agreement of the low-wage tier
respondents is of interest, given the contention that a union has failed

Table 6.6
Attitudes Toward Selected Changes hi the Tiered Wage Structure and the Potential Related Outcomes
Related to Research Question 5
(Percent of respondents answering "Slightly Agree," "Agree," or "Strongly Agree")
Tier form and level

Change and
potential outcome8

Scale label

Wage
Low
High
n=264

n=807

Store-status
New
Old
n=571

n=500

Employment-status
Full time Part time
n=217

n=854

Job-duty
GM
Food
n=621

n=450

Overall
percent

g
%
§
QueConestions

N = 1071
g
5*
oo
_^
j|'
^

1. The low-wage tier rates should
be raised to the high-wage
tier level even though the
high-wage tier employees
would get a much smaller
increase than those on the
EQUALPAY
low tier.

39

63

57

58

49

60

58

57

57

2. The high-wage tier rates should
be lowered to the low-wage
tier level if it would prevent
the closing of all companyEQUALPAY
owned stores in the area.

19

49

35

49

34

44

41

43

42

3. The high-wage tier rates should
be lowered to the low-wage
tier level if it would help
prevent the closing of the
EQUALPAY
respondent's store.

12

44

29

44

26

38

34

38

36

a
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in its duty of fair representation to its members on the low-wage tier
by the negotiation of a permanent tiered agreement. The more technical
legal issue of whether the union's treatment of its members when it
negotiated tiers was "unfair representation" could not be adequately
addressed in the survey of employees. This is the only item included
in the survey that approaches measuring the issue of the duty of fair
representation.
Overall, some patterns can be seen in the responses to the individual
items in the four tables (6.5 through 6.8) and in the scales developed
from the second set of research questions and presented in table 6.9.
Many of the items included in the second set of research questions, and
in three of the four scales developed from them, were related to either
the likelihood of or preference for changes to the two-tier wage plan.
Thus, most of the following discussion will relate to this matter.
Both sets of analyses on the scale, Likelihood of Narrowing the
Distance between the Two Wage Tiers, showed that the high- wage tier
respondents perceived such narrowing to be more likely than did the
low-wage tier respondents. The percentages shown in table 6.5, however,
indicate that neither group perceived equalization to be a highly likely
occurrence in future bargaining. The most desired change by respondents
on each level of each tier form, equalization of the rates by raising the
low-wage tier rates more than the high-wage tier rates (item 1 in table
6.6), was perceived as the least likely to occur of the seven potential
bargaining outcomes presented. Nonsignificant correlations were found
between that desired change and the items in table 6.5 regarding the
likelihood of raising the low- wage tier rates to equal the high- wage tier
rates; the desire was not related to the perceptions of the likelihood of
that desire being fulfilled. Further, the correlations found between item
4 in table 6.5 concerning the likelihood of lowering the high- wage tier
rates to equal the low-wage tier rates with the two items incorporating
the desire to lower the high- wage tier in table 6.6 were -.14 and -.13
Both sets of analyses on the scale, Desire to Create a Third Tier,
indicated that the employees in the high-wage and old-store tier groups
were significantly less inclined to support the establishment of a third
wage tier, given the related outcomes. This follows from the high- wage

Table 6.8
Concerning Two-Tier Wage Structures
Statements
Attitudes Toward Selected
Related to Research Question 6
(Percent of respondents answering "Slightly Agree," "Agree," or "Strongly Agree")

Recesrteinaorsirnnscgh
CoQueTini8

Her form and level
Scale label

Wage
Low
High

Store-status
New
Old

Employment-status
Full time Part time

Job-duty
GM
Food

Overall
percent

n=264

n=807

n=571

n=500

n=217

n=854

n=621

n=450

N = 1071

1. The company probably expects
to lower the high-wage tier
pay rates to the low-wage
tier level in some future
NARROWRATES
negotiations.

66

44

50

48

60

46

54

43

49

2. The union officers probably
expect to raise the low-wage
tier rates to the high-wage
tier level in some future
NARROWRATES
negotiations.

53

37

42

40

50

39

43

38

41

3. When a union negotiates
two-tier rate differences,
it is still treating its
members fairly.

31

22

24

25

30

23

26

23

25

Statement9

UNIONPBSC

5?
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Table 6.9
Analyses of Scales Related to the Second Set of Research Questions
Tier form and level
Scale
reliability
Scale label and title

Wage
Low
High

Store-status
New
Old

Employment-status
Full time Part time

Job-duty
GM
Food

Overall
mean

n=264

n=807

n=571

n=500

n=217

n=854

n=621

n=450

N=1071

.02

-.03

.09***

-.03***

.05***

-.08***

0.00

3.21

3.18

4.06***

3.84

4.41

4.37

NARROWRATES: Likelihood of
Narrowing the Distance
Between the Two Wage Tiers

.50

.26***

-.08***

THIRDTIER: Desire to Create
a Third Tier

.89

2.87**

3.29**

3.01***

3.39*** 3.16

3.19

EQUALPAY: Desire to Equalize
the Earnings of the Two
Wage Tiers

.77

2.45***

4.29***

3.57***

4.14*** 3.22***

3.99*** 3.67***

UNIONPBS: Union Problems

.57

4.40

4.36

4.47**

4.25**

4.37

4.36

3.17

4.33

NOTES: Scale NARROWRATES is formed from standardized items (mean=0, standard deviation =1). The remaining scales used 7-point formats,
with higher scores indicating agreement (4 is the scale midpoint). Asterisks indicate the significance level of the difference between the two tier levels
in the total sample analyses. Underline indicates a significant difference (p < .05) when that portion of the sample paid at the top rate of its pay progres
sion is examined.
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001
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and old-store employees' greater concerns about the adverse effect of
wage tiers on both opportunities and on the high-wage tier employees
(as reflected in the scales presented in table 6.4). Also, these findings
support the statements of Seaberry (1985), who noted that some lowtier employees would rather protect their positions by agreeing to a third
tier of even lower wages for future new hires, thus passing concessions
along to those who had not yet been hired.
The responses on this scale also reflect different interests between
employees on the high- and low-wage tier and in old and new stores
regarding potential changes to tiers and job security. Two of the six
items in this scale related to store closings (items 1 and 2 in table 6.7).
Any store closing would place low-wage tier employee positions at risk,
as the high-wage tier employees with their greater seniority could ex
ercise greater job rights in a store that remained open. Further, the greater
seniority of old-store employees, when compared to new-store
employees, meant that if an old store were closed, much of the workforce
would be able to displace the new-store employees. Thus, the higher
scores of the low-wage tier employees on this scale likely reflect their
desire to protect their positions. In contrast, the high-wage tier and oldstore employees wanted to protect their status by avoiding a third wage
tier altogether.
The relationship between attitudes concerning the likelihood of changes
to the existing compensation system and the scale, Desire to Create a
Third Tier, was also examined. Correlational results suggested that the
respondents who believed the institution of a third tier was a likely out
come in future bargaining (item 1 in table 6.5) were not those who sup
ported the creation of a third wage tier. When combined with the results
concerning raising the low-wage tier and lowering the high-wage tier
discussed previously, it appears that in no instance were the respondents'
perceptions of the likelihood of a specific change significantly positively
related to the desire for such a change.
There were several significant differences between the high- and lowtier groups for the scale, Desire to Equalize the Earnings of the Two
Wage Tiers. The scale scores in both sets of analyses revealed signifi
cant differences between the high- and low-wage tier employees; the

162 Research Questions Concerning Tiers

high wage-tier employees opposed equalization while low-wage tier
employees favored the change. The responses of the employees is
understood, given that if the earnings of those on the two wage tiers
were equalized, the high-wage tier employees would benefit less or be
disadvantage*! more than the low-wage tier employees. Similarly, Wessel
(1985) noted that because the low-tier employees are becoming the ma
jority in some UFCW locals, closing the gap usually means smaller
raises for high-tier workers while giving larger raises to the low-tier
employees to get them closer to the high tier.
Focusing on specific items in this scale, the high-wage tier employee
opposition was considerable and the low-wage tier employee support
strong when equalization of the earnings would take place through the
lowering of the high-wage tier rates to the low-wage tier rates to pre
vent store closings (items 2 and 3 in table 6.6). 4 As stated previously,
if the high-wage tier rates were lowered, the high-wage tier employees
would be disadvantaged. On the other hand, if the store(s) were clos
ed, the low-wage tier employees would suffer job losses. 5 The responses
to item 4 in table 6.6 reveal the strongest (90 percent) opposition by
the high-wage tier employees, in contrast to the strong (43 percent) sup
port of the low-wage tier employees. This item suggested that if the
pay rates could not be equalized, low-wage tier employees should be
able to work more hours for the purpose of equalizing earnings. Given
that the number of hours scheduled in a store is generally invariable
hi the short run, any increase in hours by one group would necessarily
mean a decrease in hours by another. Thus, if the hours of the lowwage tier employees were increased, the high-wage tier employees would
lose income.
In the last scale in table 6.9, Union Problems, more favorable
responses were found in both sets of analyses for only the new-store
employees. This difference may be attributed to the fact that while most
employees in the new stores were and always had been on the low-wage
tier, the old stores were much more heterogeneous in relation to the
wage tier. In other words, while most of the new-store employees had
never worked in a store with a majority of employees on the high-wage
tier, most of the old-store employees had worked in stores where
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the majority of employees were on the high-wage tier. It had only been
within the previous two years when, due to turnover and the increase
of employees in the May way stores, low-wage tier employees became
a majority in the old stores. Thus the high- and low-wage tier employees
in old stores would be more likely to perceive that the plan had created
political problems for the union and had created tensions between
employees on the separate tiers.
Taken altogether, the results for several items in the scales shown
in table 6.9 support the suggestion that employee group divisiveness
is a major potential problem in tiered employment settings. As such,
the maintenance of tiers leads to different and conflicting interests among
employees. The moderately low disagreement with item 4, table 6.8,
that tiers have created tensions between employees, is perhaps the most
direct support. The conflicting interests and divisions between wage
tier groups are seen in the responses to most items in the scales, Desire
to Create a Third Tier and Desire to Equalize the Earnings of the Two
Wage Tiers. Rather than supporting the objective best interests of the
workforce as a whole, i.e., keeping more stores open, the employee
responses were consistently more favorable toward supporting each
group's own interests to the disadvantage of the other group.
Attitude Differences by Geographic Area
Analyses of the scales derived from the first two sets of research ques
tions revealed more statistically significant differences between the ur
ban and rural areas than within those areas. Thus, table 6.10, pertain
ing to the seventh research question includes only those scales that show
ed significant differences between the urban and rural areas. 6
For both sets of analyses, the table shows that for each significant
difference, the urban area had a more positive or favorable response
to the scales than the rural area. Urban employees were more likely
to believe that the tiers were originally negotiated to protect the
employees; they had less negative perceptions concerning the effects
of tiers on compensation, on the high-wage tier employees, on the other
groups who might have benefited, and on any problems the plan might
have caused the union. Those in the urban area also believed that the
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Table 6.10
Significant Scale Differences by Area
Related to Research Question 7
Area
Urban

Rural

Scale label and title

n=604

n=468

OTHERSBENF: Other Groups Benefiting

2.07

1.97

EARNINGS: Effects on Compensation

2.31

2.23

HTEFFECT: Effects on High-Wage
Tier Employees

3.16**

2.94s1

PROTECT: Negotiation for Protection

3.37**

3.21**

NUMSTORES: Effects on Number
of Stores

3.71**

3.60**

THIRDTIER: Desire to Create a
Third Tier

3.31**_____3.02**

EQUALPAY: Desire to Equalize the
Earnings of the Two Wage Tiers

3.96**_____3.66**

UNIONPBS: Union Problems

4.32

4.43

NOTES: Asterisks indicate the significance level of the difference between the two areas in the
total sample analyses. Underline indicates a significant difference (p< .05) when that portion of
the sample paid at the top rate of its pay progression is examined.
**p<.01
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negotiation of wage tiers had resulted in more stores being open. They
also had more favorable attitudes toward the concepts of creating a third
tier and equalizing the earnings of the two wage tiers.
The direction of these differences appears related to the dissimilarities
in the economic conditions, the nature of the retail food industry, and
the different wage rates paid in the two areas. For example, urban
employees were more sensitized to the problem of store closings, given
the extensive number of recent closings by the unionized competition
in the urban area. This divergence could explain the differences on four
scales (Negotiation for Protection, Effects on Number of Stores, Desire
to Equalize the Earnings of the Two Wage Tiers, and Desire to Create
a Third Tier), which include items pertaining to opening stores or keeping
them from closing. Logically, the urban employees would be more in
clined to ascertain a positive relationship between the negotiation of
tiers at May way and the number of stores in operation. In contrast, the
altogether stronger economy with generally lower unemployment rates
during the 1980-1983 recession likely led to less concern for store clos
ings and job loss among rural area employees.
The differences in perceptions by area for the scales, Other Groups
Benefiting, Effects on Compensation, and Effects on High-Wage Tier
Employees, may be partially attributed to the generally higher wage
rates paid in the urban area. 7 When the wage tiers were first implemented
at Mayway, the urban low-tier rates were set at a higher level than those
in the rural area. In the first contract extending tiers, the high-tier rates
in the urban area were also set at a higher level than those in the rural
area. By the time of the survey, some of the urban low-tier rates were
almost as high as the highest rates of the competition. The results in
the table suggest that the urban employees perceived that high-wage
tier employees had been less negatively affected by the implementa
tion of tiers, and for those with greater seniority (at the top rate of their
rate progression), that other groups had benefited more and that com
pensation had been less negatively affected. Thus, the area differences
on these three scales is not surprising.
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Finally, the finding that urban employees at the top rate were
significantly less likely to perceive that wage rate differences had led
to union problems may be in part attributed to the greater proportion
of new stores in the urban area. With a greater proportion of new stores,
there would be less diversity and decreased contact between the highand low-wage tier employees in the urban area, resulting in a percep
tion there that rate differences between tiers had led to fewer problems
for the union.
Equal Employment Opportunity
The data presented in table 6.11 pertain to the eighth research ques
tion and are the percentages of employees in two EEO-protected
classes—female and minority group members. For each set of analyses,
significant differences indicate disproportionate employment of a pro
tected class within a tier form. The concern expressed in the literature
(e.g., Bowers and Roderick 1987; Jacoby and Mitchell 1986) is the
disproportion^ employment of protected classes on the low level of
the tier forms, particularly the wage tier form. As can be seen in table
6.11, the data for the wage-tier form suggest that women and minorities
are not disproportionately employed on the low-wage tier at May way.
In fact, both sets of analyses indicate that significantly more women
were employed on the high-wage tier than on the low-wage tier.
Members of the minority classes, while not a large percentage of the
workforce, were equally employed on both levels of the wage-tier form.
The results concerning the other tier forms are unequivocal for both
sets of analyses in relation to minority group members. Approximately
equal percentages of minority group respondents were employed on the
high and low level of each of those tier forms. A disproportionate per
centage of females, however, was employed on the low level of three
tier forms in the total sample analyses. Further examination of the results
of both sets of analyses, in combination with additional survey data,
suggests that the protected classes are not disproportionately employed
involuntarily on the low level of any tier form. Although both sets of
analyses indicate that females are disproportionately employed in parttime positions, the responses to a survey item used to determine whether

Table 6.11
Equal Employment Opportunity Items
Related to Research Question 8
Tier form and level
Wage
High
Low
Variables
1. Sex (% female)3
2. Race (% minority)

Store-status
Old
New

Employment-status
Full time Part time

Job-duty
Food
GM

Overall
average

n=369

n = 1230

n=949

n=650

n=322

n=1277

n=927

n=672

N=1599

77***

62***

62*

66*

60***

70***

60**

71**

64

88

968878

8

NOTES: Asterisks indicate the significance level of the difference between the two tier levels in the total sample analyses. Underline indicates a signifi
cant difference (p< .05) when that portion of the sample paid at the top rate of its pay progression is examined,
a. Variable 1 is based on a test of population differences, rather than the sample.
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001

n
o
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employees were working part-time voluntarily or involuntarily suggest
that significantly fewer female than male top-rated employees were
employed involuntarily in part-time positions. 8 In addition, the data in
dicate that as women increase in seniority, they are promoted from GM
to food department positions and are proportionately employed in both
old and new stores.
Concluding Comments
This chapter has focused on the development and subsequent examina
tion of eight research questions related to tiers. Most of the research
questions focused specifically on general employee views about the twotier wage structure at Mayway. As the first empirical study of employee
perceptions of their tiered compensation structure, our findings go
beyond the largely anecdotal reports and news articles reviewed in
chapter 2. Of particular interest is the consistent finding that high-wage
tier employees perceived that the tiered wage structure had less beneficial
effects than did the low-wage tier employees. Another finding of note
is that new-store employees generally had more positive attitudes toward
wage tiers and their effects than old-store employees. Overall, many
of our findings support the conventional understanding regarding
employee perceptions of tiers and their effects. In chapter 8, conclu
sions drawn from this chapter will be integrated with the findings from
chapter 7 to build testable and generalizable propositions.

NOTES
1. Overall, for tables 6.4 and 6.9, it was not unexpected that the most significant differences
found within any tier form were within the wage tier form, given that three of the research ques
tions focused specifically on the wage tiers. Also, given the very close relationship between the
negotiation of wage tiers and the establishment of new stores, it was expected that the store-status
tier form would also have a moderate number of significant differences; this was indeed the case.
There were fewer significant differences found within the remaining two tier forms, and only
one significant difference found for each of those two tier forms in the top-rate analyses. If a
significant difference was found within the employment-status and job-duty tier forms, there was
also a significant difference within the wage-tier form for that scale. Further, the differences within
the employment-status and job-duty tier forms, given their significant correlation with the wagetier form, appear at least partially attributable to the differences within the wage-tier form. Thus,
there is little separate discussion of results for the employment-status or job-duty tier forms for
either set of research questions.
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2. The table also presents the scale reliability. This was determined by means of Cronbach's alpha
(Cronbach 1951), which depends on the average inter-item correlation and the number of items
in the scale. Scale reliabilities of .50 or greater are generally considered adequate for exploratory
research.
3. The figure, 20 percent, is derived from averaging the 36 percent of high-wage tier employees
who responded to the two lowest response choices on item 10 in table 6.1 ("not at all important"
and "not too important") with the two other items in the scale, Effects on High-wage Tier
Employees. In computing the scale, the 36 percent figure does not appear in the table because
the former item is reversed. Note that this percentage and the percentage shown in the table do
not total 100 percent because responses at the scale midpoint, "somewhat important," were ex
cluded. A similar process was used to calculate the 46 percent for the low-wage tier employees.
Other percentage figures presented in the text will be calculated in the same manner.
4. About 80 percent of the high-wage tier employees opposed instituting each of those two op
tions (i.e., answered "strongly disagree," "disagree," or "slightly disagree").
5. It might be argued that the choices presented in the items in this scale pit the two wage tier
groups against each other in an artificial manner. The pattern of results (but not the magnitude
of percentages), however, is the same for all four items in the scale. Implementing the changes
in the first item would not lower the income of the high-wage tier employees in an absolute sense.
Yet, as for every other item in the scale, a greater percentage (44 percent) of the high-wage tier
employees opposed that change than favored it, and a greater percentage of the low-wage tier
employees favored such a change than opposed it. Further, several retail food companies in the
state where Mayway operated had asked employees for reductions in wage rates in order to avoid
closing stores. Thus, the options presented do not appear artificial and, even if they were, would
not likely have distorted the results and therefore the conclusions.
6. Four of the scales in table 6.10 showed significant wage tier effects. Because the percentage
of high-wage tier respondents (and employees) was significantly (p<.001) lower in the urban
than in the rural area (19 versus 32 percent), it was possible that the significant area effects were
really tier effects. To check for this possibility, separate analyses were performed examining ur
ban and rural differences within both the low- and high-wage tiers. Those analyses showed that
all but one of the eight scales in the table had significant area differences independent of a wage
tier effect.
7. This can be clearly seen in the top wage rate for cashiers, one of the largest job classes. That
rate for urban high-wage tier cashiers was $10.95 an hour; for urban low-wage tier cashiers,
it was $10.25 an hour. The top rate for rural high-wage tier cashiers was $10.15 an hour; for
rural low-wage tier cashiers, it was $8.70 an hour.
8. The sex difference for employment-status is not restricted to tiered employment situations,
as Deutermann and Brown (1978) note that women have traditionally been far more likely than
men to work part time. They state, similar to the situation at Mayway, that women are more
than twice as likely as men to be working part time. Using the Current Population Survey as
their primary data source, they note that in May 1977, one in three women employees were working
pan time, compared with one in seven men. Also, about half of all men who worked part time
did so regularly and by choice versus 70 percent for women.
Treiman and Hartmann (1981) contend that, while it is clear that women are concentrated in
jobs that pay less, it is unclear to what extent this is because women select jobs with low pay,
to what extent women are restricted to such jobs, and to what extent some jobs pay less than
others because they are disproportionately held by women. At Mayway, while the sample data
indicate that men were paid significantly (p < .001) more per hour than women, the overall average
difference was only a little over $.11 per hour.

7
Hypotheses Concerning Tiers
Theory, research, and experience clearly indicate that employees view
their compensation as a principal reward or outcome in the employ
ment relationship (Heneman 1985). Because of this, employees naturally
have many behavioral and attitudinal reactions to compensation, and
thus to tiered employment situations which affect compensation. This
chapter focuses on the development and subsequent testing of five
hypotheses concerning the relationship of tiers to employee behaviors
and attitudes. All of the hypotheses contain directional predictions of
differences between the tier levels. As with the research question scales,
the analyses involve both the total sample and the top-rate sample. In
addition, there will be discussion of some post hoc tests within certain
tier forms.
The chapter begins by presenting a framework based on equity theory.
In the sections that follow, equity theory is used extensively in the
development of the hypotheses and in the interpretation of results.
Hypothesis Framework Based on Equity Theory
The concepts of equity invariably are involved in any discussion of
pay or compensation satisfaction. It has been proposed that employees
are guided by notions of justice and equity in the evaluation of their
pay (Adams 1965; Homans 1961; Patchen 1961). Certainly, the pro
cess of establishing fair and equitable compensation practices is one
of the more important activities carried out by an organization (Hills
1980; Milkovich and Newman 1987). The justness of actual pay and
actual pay distribution becomes more salient for employees in a setting
where there is "built-in" inequity, such as a tiered employment situa
tion (Martin and Lee 1989; Martin and Peterson 1987).
Equity theory suggests that a person formulates a ratio of outcomes
(e.g., pay, job security) to inputs or investments (e.g., effort, atten171
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dance). A critical premise of equity theory is that employees compare
and attempt to equate their ratios of work outcomes to work inputs with
the ratios of other relevant individuals or their own experiences, based
on the standards they select, called referents (Adams 1965; Dittrich and
Carrell 1979; Mowday 1983; Pritchard, Dunnette, and Jorgenson 1972;
Vecchio 1984). l If the two perceived ratios correspond, the employees
experience feelings of equity and satisfaction. Divergence in the ratios
of individuals and their standard of comparison, however, leads to feel
ings of pay inequity and dissatisfaction. If an employee's ratio is less than
the referent's ratio, the employee feels inequitably undercompensated.
If the employees's ratio exceeds the referent's ratio, the employee
feels inequitably overcompensated. 2 Note that inequity does not
necessarily exist if an employee has high inputs and low outcomes as
long as the referent used for comparison has similar outcome/input ratios.
Knowing how individuals choose a standard of comparison against
which to evaluate inputs and outcomes will help to better understand
the different behaviors and attitudes of employees in different tier groups.
Goodman (1974) examined the types of referents or actual comparison
standards used in evaluation and differentiated between three classes:
(1) others, (2) self, and (3) system referents. He notes that the most
common class of referents discussed in the literature is other individuals.
These could be persons internal or external to the individual's organiza
tion. For example, within the same organization, comparisons may be
made with persons holding equivalent or different positions in the same
or other tier groups—internal referents. Comparisons may also be made
with persons similarly employed in other organizations, with persons
employed in specific industries, or with family and friends—external
referents—(Martin and Lee 1989).
Self referents or standards are unique to the individual but different
from the current ratio of outcomes to inputs, i.e., comparing the cur
rent ratio against the ratio associated with an earlier job. Thus, past
ratios can be compared to current ratios, or an expected ratio can be
compared with a current ratio.
The third class of referent, system referents, refers to an employee's
implicit or explicit contractual expectations of the organization's
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compensation plan. At the time of hire, for example, an employee may
be promised rewards in the future, and this can become a foundation
for evaluating the employment relationship.
Equity theory research has found that individuals may choose from
one or more referents in determining the equitableness of their com
pensation and other employment conditions, and that they often use multi
ple referents (Goodman 1974; Hills 1980; Martin 1981; Mowday 1983;
Oldham, Kulik, Stepina, and Ambrose 1986; Ronen 1986). Goodman
(1977) and Mowday (1983) have suggested that the selection of a referent
is a function of both the availability of information about the referent
and the relevance or attractiveness of a referent in relation to its ability
to satisfy the comparer's needs.
Feelings of inequity (dissatisfaction) will likely cause the employee
to attempt to reduce the inequity (Adams 1965). Weick (1966) notes
that the most common methods for employees of reestablishing equity
involve reducing their inputs (such as effort) in ways that impose costs
on the organization. Overall, equity theory emphasizes that pay satisfac
tion is affected by feelings regarding the equity of the compensation
received. These feelings of equity or fairness are the result of an
employee's perceptual and multiple comparison processes (Goodman
1977). These processes are rather complex, suggesting that satisfac
tion with compensation may be influenced in many different ways.
Equity Theory and Tiers
Other researchers have used equity theory in empirical examinations
of the attitudes and behaviors of employees in work settings with tiers. 3
Cappelli and Sherer (1988) applied equity theory to a tiered employ
ment setting examining differences in attitudes between employees on
different levels of a wage tier. They cite economists' arguments that
job satisfaction comparisons, including pay comparisons, use the labor
market and, in unionized companies, use other contract settlements
(Dunlop 1957; Livernash 1957; Ross 1948). Cappelli and Sherer con
clude that the behavioral arguments closest to those of the economists
were the ones associated with equity theory. Martin and Peterson (1987)
generated hypotheses based on equity theory to analyze data from
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workers employed on several tier forms at Mayway in 1983. They found
that the vast majority of their significant results were consistent with
predictions derived from equity theory. Martin and Peterson further
argue that in unionized companies, labor agreements and union
newspapers provide relevant information, both about the internal pay
structure and what the competition is paying, which readily enables com
parisons to be made and referents to be selected.
Descriptions of tiered employment situations suggest that low-tier
employees resent their lower pay, considering it less fair than the pay
of the high-tier employees (Ross 1985; Seaberry 1985). Low-tier
employees receive the lowest pay, the least favorable work schedules,
and the fewest allotted hours per week. Although we believe that both
the high- and low-tier group members perceive inequity associated with
tiers, this inequity might best be viewed along a continuum, with the
low-tier groups discerning greater inequity. A greater understanding
of these differences requires some identification of the relevant referents
that may be used by these tier groups.
The existence of tiers would likely result in the selection of different
referents by employees in the different tier groups against which their
outcome/input ratios are evaluated (Cappelli and Sherer 1987; 1988;
Martin and Lee 1989; Martin and Peterson 1987). In such situations,
it appears that two factors impact greatly on the selection of referents:
first, the length of time the individual has been employed in a particular
tiered employment setting (i.e., seniority, which is closely related to
one's position on a tier or a wage progression within a tier), and sec
ond, whether a second or successive contract maintaining tiers has been
implemented. Further, the literature reviewed in the second chapter link
ed these two factors to the problems and concerns associated with tiers
(Bernstein and Schiller 1985; Ross 1985).
Regarding the first factor, both Martin and Peterson (1987) and Cap
pelli and Sherer (1987; 1988) found significant attitudinal differences
among employees in different tier groups related to such outcome
variables as pay equity, pay satisfaction, job satisfaction, and commit
ment. Both studies argued that those differences were likely related to
both the tier level employees were on and their position on the wage
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progression within a tier level. Therefore, it appears that the selection
of referents hi a tiered employment setting is based on both the
employee's tier level and position on the wage progression.
In relation to the second factor, employees would likely perceive the
plan as a more permanent part of the employment situation after a se
cond contract extending tiers has been negotiated. The low-tier
employees as a group (or at least a large portion of them) would no
longer be as new4 to the company as under the first contract, and thus
the employees in that group would likely have different referents than
they did prior to the second contract. The relative permanency of tiers
is also important because, during the negotiation of succeeding con
tracts that maintain tiers, the employer may pressure the union to lower
the compensation of the high-tier groups to a level equal to or closer
to that of the low-tier groups (Wessel 1985). At this point, the pay that
the high-tier groups had expected prior to the negotiation of a succeeding
contract becomes relevant as a referent.
Selection of Referents by Tier Form
Table 7.1 lists three major types of pay referents that are likely to
be used by employees in the different tier groups. They are: (1) inter
nal referents, i.e., other high- and low-wage tier employees; (2) exter
nal referents, i.e., employees at other companies; and (3) self referents,
i.e., work history, and pay expectations or perceived entitlements. Based
on the previous research on pay referents and on their use within tiered
settings, specific predictions are made regarding which referents are
most relevant for each tier group.
Martin's (1981) work is useful in understanding referent selection
in a tiered employment situation, as she found that the two most com
monly used referents were upward similar and upward dissimilar ones.
The work of Festinger (1954) and Suls and Miller (1977) similarly sug
gests that when the outcomes being compared are valued, individuals
prefer to make upward, rather than downward, comparisons. Martin
further notes that downward comparisons were very unlikely.
In table 7.1, which is a cross-tabulation of the tier groups with possi
ble referents, X denotes possible referents that are likely to be used by

Table 7.1
Relevant Referents for Employees in Each Tier Group
Tier Form and Level
Possible referents
Internal referents
1. High- wage tier
2. Low-wage tier
3. Full time
4. Part time
5. Food department
6. General merchandise
department
7. Old store
8. New store
External referents
9. High paid
10. Low paid
Self-referents
11. Past
12. Expectations

High

Low

X

X
X

Full time Part time

Food

GM

X

X
X

Store-Status

Job-Duty

Employment-Status

Wage

Old store New store
X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X
XXX
X

X

X

NOTE: The "X" indicates the most likely relevant referents for employees in each tier group.

X

X
X

X
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those in a particular tier group at May way. For example, for the wagetier group columns, high-wage tier employees would use high-wage tier
employees as referents (which would include some upward similar and
some upward dissimilar comparisons), and low-wage tier employees
would use both high-wage tier referents (upward comparisons) and lowwage tier referents (which would include some upward similar and some
upward dissimilar comparisons). A similar pattern of referent selec
tion for high- and low-tier employees in the other three tier forms is
shown in the table.
Dornstein (1988) argues that employees will compare themselves with
those similar in skills and productive contributions. Her work suggests
that high-tier groups would find high-paid external referents relevant,
and that the low-tier groups would find low-paid (yet possibly better
paid) external referents relevant. Thus, each high-tier column has an
X for a high-paid external referent, and each low-tier column has an
X for a low-paid external referent. The following discussion focuses
primarily on the additional referents that likely would be used by
employees at May way.
Wage-Tier Referents
High-wage tier employees have greater information than employees
on the low-wage tier about the existing tiered compensation structure
and the concessions that occurred following its implementation. 5 Thus,
it appears that an additional relevant referent for high-wage tier
employees would be an expected pay referent, that is, the pay schedule
that they believe would have existed for them in the absence of the twotier wage structure. The work of Cappelli and Sherer (1987; 1988) sug
gests that the referents used by the high-wage tier groups would likely
include other high-wage tier employees6 and their expectations about
future pay. Martin and Lee (1989), in a study of referents used at
May way,7 found that the most salient referent for the high-wage tier
group was an expected pay referent, which was negatively related to
an evaluation of their work situation.
Employees on the low-wage tier who have been with the organiza
tion long enough to reach the top rate of their wage progression, would
likely find their position of being between the high-wage tier group and
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the remaining low-wage tier employees to be most salient in selecting
referents. At May way, top-rate, low-tier employees are paid (mean=
$8.23 per hour) significantly (p < .001) less than those in the high-wage
tier (mean=$9.53), but significantly (p<.001) more than the more
recently hired low-tier employees (mean=$4.70). At this time, further
increases for the top-rate, low-tier employees would be difficult to ob
tain without changing the contract. Thus, for these employees, rele
vant upward internal comparisons would be associated with a negative
evaluation of their work situation. Martin and Lee (1989) found that
the use of internal referents by this group was negatively related to at
titudes about pay.
An important determinant of the referents selected by the low-wage
tier employees not at the top rate relates to their relative newness to
the organization and their relative lack of information about the existing
tiered employment setting. 8 The most recent hires are likely to focus
their attention on the peculiar norms and practices of their organiza
tion which maintains a novel compensation system even though they
may generally understand it (Louis 1980). It is likely that these employees
are not as aware of all of the psychological, economic, and political
ramifications of tiers as those in the other groups. Cappelli and Sherer
(1987; 1988) argue that because the low-wage tier employees would
be "new" to the company and not identify with it as strongly (and
perhaps not have as much information about its pay structure) as the
remaining employees, such employees would be less likely to make pay
comparisons within the company than with their former jobs (self*past)
or other jobs that they could have had (low-paid external).
The next three sections discuss the potential referents employees in
the other three tier forms might use. Unlike the permanent wage-tier
form, remember that these three forms are temporary, with employees
able to move to the higher level as openings occur. It is argued here
that, for those on the high levels of these three tier forms (who are limited
in their ability to increase their pay outcomes), the referents selected
would be essentially the same as those used by the high-wage tier group.
Thus, the following discussion will focus primarily on the potential rele
vant referents used by employees in the low-tier groups.
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Job-Duty Tier Referents
There appear to be two predominant situational factors that may im
pact on the selection of referents by employees working in the general
merchandise departments. The first factor affecting the selection of
referents by general merchandise employees is the wage disparity bet
ween GM and food department employees. The average food depart
ment employee on either wage tier earned approximately $3.50 more
per hour than the GM department employees. The second factor was
a clearly defined career path from the GM positions to the food posi
tions. The career path was highly salient, given that most GM employees
aspired to work in the food departments. Thus, an important relevant
referent for them would be the food department employees, likely leading
to a negative evaluation of their work situation. Additionally, it appears
that the GM employees would use other GM employees as standards
of comparison.
Employment-Status Tier Referents
The findings of Logon, O'Reilly, and Roberts (1973) and Martin and
Peterson (1987) and the discussion in Miller and Terborg (1979) sup
port the argument that the most relevant referents for full-time employees
would be other full-timers and for part-time employees, other part-timers.
Also, a salient situational factor for the Mayway part-timers is the career
line which exists from part- to full-time positions (although not as strong
as the one from GM positions to food positions). Those who aspire to
full-time positions would likely perceive full-timers as a relevant stan
dard of comparison, which would subsequently lead to a negative evalua
tion of the part-time employee's situation.
In addition to the internal referents at Mayway, other possible referents
for the part- and full-time employees would be the low-paid and highpaid external referents respectively. While there are few unionized parttimers, they typically receive a much greater wage premium over their
nonunion counterparts than full-timers do (Martin and Peterson, 1987;
Mellor and Stamas 1982; Nollen and Martin 1978). To the extent that
the two groups rely on the use of their external counterparts as referents,
the part-time employees may actually perceive greater pay equity than
the full-time employees.
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Store-Status Referents
There are two situational factors which likely affect the selection of
referents by new-store employees. First, the new-store, high-wage tier
employees, as voluntary transferees, would have likely improved their
work situation over their old-store positions in some manner. The use
of their previous old-store positions as a referent would likely lead to
a favorable evaluation of their work situation. A second situational factor
is that high-wage tier employees are not a large proportion of the newstore employees (only 8 percent of the new-store employees would be
on the high-wage tier versus 32 percent for the old stores). This means
that most interactions in new stores take place among low-wage tier
employees. It also means that for the new-store, low-wage tier employees,
there are few employees above them in the job hierarchy. Thus, they
would likely perceive greater promotion opportunity than similarly
situated old-store employees. To the extent that new-store, low-wage
tier employees see more opportunity for promotion, they will evaluate
the pay and work situation more positively (Patchen 1961).
As new-store, low-wage tier employees reach the top rate, they would
become more knowledgeable about the permanent pay rate differences
associated with wage tiers. 9 At that time, the high-wage tier employees
(or at least their rates) would likely become more relevant as a referent.
Given the career lines to full-time and food positions, it is unlikely that
the high-wage tier rates would be as important to the part-time and GM
employees. Thus, the new-store employees will evaluate their pay and
work situation less favorably if the high-wage tier employees or rates
are perceived as the most relevant referent. If, however, promotional
opportunity is seen as more important, these employees will select
referents resulting in a more positive evaluation of their pay and work
situation.
Hypothesis Development
Similar to the method used with the research questions, the five
hypotheses predict differences in employee behaviors and attitudes be
tween the high and low levels within each of the four tier forms. Analyses
of both the entire sample and that portion of the sample at the top rate
will be used to test the hypotheses. As was indicated in chapter 5, some
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of the effects of seniority on the tests of the hypotheses are eliminated
when the top-rate sample is used. Further, analyzing and comparing
both the total sample and that portion at the top rate has two important
implications relative to equity theory.
First, employees on the low-wage tier not at the top of their pay pro
gression are able to increase their pay outcomes at a more rapid rate
than employees in the other two groups. Since employees in the latter
groups are already at the top rate, they have fewer opportunities to in
crease their pay outcomes; the contract in effect at the time of the survey
contained no increases for employees at the top rate of their pay pro
gression on both wage tiers over the three years from 1984 to 1987.
Thus, such employees could no longer increase their outcomes simply
by remaining longer in their job classification but instead would need
promotions, as their pay outcomes were generally constant. In contrast,
low-wage tier employees not at the top rate of their wage progression
could improve their pay outcomes both in relation to their own work
history and relative to those of the remaining employees until they reach
ed the top rate. The second implication, as indicated in the research
discussed previously, is that employees on the low-wage tier not at the
top rate likely use different referents than employees who have reach
ed the top rate. Thus, use of the two sets of analyses permits a com
parison of findings where the change in pay outcomes and referents
varies widely within the low-wage tier with findings where they are
more constant.
Employment-Related Behaviors
The first two hypotheses concern behaviors used to restore equity
for the high- and low-tier employees at May way. The predictions are
based on two factors: (1) the literature reviewed previously concern
ing the selection of referents and the differential perceptions of inequi
ty by those on different tier levels; and (2) the discussion of the poten
tial problems of tiers in the second chapter. Equity theory states that
employees who perceive inequity can balance the inequality by reduc
ing their work inputs (Adams 1965; Mowday 1983).
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Carrell and Dittrich (1976) found that perceived equity of employees
within a service organization was a significant predictor of absenteeism
within departments. Dittrich and Carrell (1979) stated that absenteeism,
as a form of withdrawal behavior, could represent a reduction in effort
or "leaving the field," two forms of inequity resolution. They demon
strated that employees are most likely to be absent and permanent
ly withdrawn from an organization when they perceive their pay as
unfair.
An additional means of behaviorally restoring equity is through in
creasing or decreasing the effort expended on the job. Mowday's (1983)
review of research on employee behavioral reactions to compensation,
suggests support for equity theory predictions related to effort. Schuster
and Clark (1970) found that employees attempt to "balance pay with
performance.'' Both Ross (1985) and Salpukas (1987) report the belief
that low-tier employees put less effort into their work than high-tier
employees. Ross also concludes that they are less productive than hightier employees. A way to examine whether low-tier groups are less pro
ductive is to examine the data on an aggregated storewide level. For
example, the proportion of employees in the low-tier groups could be
associated with store productivity. A discussion of this method appears
in appendix C, along with the results of such an examination.
Another means of behaviorally restoring equity is to reduce the amount
of political support provided for a union. Summers, Betton and DeCotiis
(1986) state that equity theory may contribute to our understanding of
the relationship between job satisfaction and union voting behavior. They
suggest that perceptions of inequity trigger search behavior for a level
ing mechanism (i.e., a union) that serves to increase outcomes while
holding inputs constant. Kochan (1979) found indirect support for this
suggestion. Employees who find their unions ineffective in improving
comparative ratios of outcomes to inputs may vote against the union
in a decertification election.
Reducing political support for the union can serve as withdrawal for
those perceiving inequity in their employment situation. The literature
suggests that low-tier employees will be less politically supportive of
the union because they perceive that the union did not support them,
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both when it first negotiated the two-tier plan, resulting in their lower
class status, and when it continued the plan (Balliet 1984; Ploscowe
1986). Both Balliet and Ploscowe offer anecdotal evidence to suggest
that the low-tier groups might not be active in the union. Further,
Ploscowe cites union sources who believe that the low-tier employees
would oppose the union leadership that maintained tiers. Opposition
by the low-tier employees could involve both withdrawal behavior and,
by voting against incumbent union officers who maintained tiers or voting
against ratifying contracts containing tiers, they may be able to restore
equity through the elimination of tiers. By voting against ratifying con
tracts containing tiers, the low-tier employees are taking direct actions
to change the outcomes of both the high- and low-tier employees.
The preceding discussion leads to the first two hypotheses. The specific
hypotheses are as follows.
(1) The employees in the low-tier groups will have a higher
absenteeism rate and report less effort expended on the job than will
the employees in high-tier groups.
(2) The employees in the low-tier groups will participate less in union
activities, and be more likely to (a) vote against ratifying union con
tracts that maintain tiers, and (b) vote against incumbent union officers,
than will the employees in the high-tier groups.
Employment-Related Attitudes
The next three hypotheses concern employment-related attitudes
related to the inequity of tiers for employees at Mayway. It is predicted
that the low-tier employees will perceive specific inequities and low
union instrumentality where tiers have maintained apparently discre
pant ratios between those on different tier levels. Specifically, it is ex
pected that the employees in the low-tier groups would have less
favorable attitudes on issues directly related to tiers or outcomes, such
as their pay, the actual two-tier wage plan, and the number of hours
they work.
This leads to the third hypothesis. The specific hypothesis is as follows.
(3) Compared to the employees in the high-tier groups, the employees
in the low-tier groups will have: (a) perceptions of less pay fairness and
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lower union instrumentality in obtaining fair pay; and (b) lower satisfac
tion with their pay, the two-tier plan, and the number of hours they work.
Two important predictors of such employment-related attitudes as com
mitment and job satisfaction are the employees' perceptions of internal
promotion opportunity and perceived external employment mobility (Hall
1979; Mowday, Porter, and Steers 1982). Both of these predictors, but
particularly the latter, are closely related to employee turnover (Mowday, Porter, and Steers 1982) and would be relevant to include in a
study of tiers given that employee turnover on the low-tier levels has
been identified as a potential problem (Ross 1985; Wessel 1985). A
study of Telly, French, and Scott (1971) further suggests that turnover
may be one method used by employees to remove feelings of inequity.
While absence and turnover may originate from the same feelings (Dittrich and Carrell 1979), withdrawal from an organization may be more
directly influenced by the perceived possibility of intra-organizational
work transfer and by the perceived number of extra-organizational alter
natives (March and Simon 1958).
Regarding promotion opportunity, all the high-tier employees have
reached the top of their wage progressions and many have moved to
food and full-time positions or reached the highest classification possi
ble given their training and abilities. In contrast, a large proportion of
the low-tier employees began in part-time positions, at lower level job
classifications (e.g., bagger), lower paid departments (e.g., GM), and
would not have reached the top of the wage progression. Thus, it is
predicted that the low-tier employees will perceive more opportunity
for promotion than the high-tier employees.
The high- and low-tier groups may differ in the perceived opportuni
ty for external employment based on their determination of employ
ment stake; that is, by their estimates of the benefits of working for
a new employer minus the personal costs to them of leaving their cur
rent employer. Relative to the low-tier groups, the high-tier employees
would likely be older, more dependent on their employer for support
of themselves and their family, and higher in seniority. This dependency
is reinforced by the heavy personal investments (economic and
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psychological) that they have made as a result of their tenure with the
company (Romans 1961).
Additionally, the high-wage tier employees are generally paid higher
wages than the competitors' employees and would likely believe that
no other employer would pay the same rates and benefits they current
ly receive. Further, if these employees moved to another employer,
they would not likely be placed at the top of the wage progression. They
would tend to see themselves as being "locked in" to their employ
ment situation and feel compelled to stay regardless of their attitudes
toward their employer and union. The low-tier employees, in contrast,
are less dependent on their employer, with some intending to stay at
their current jobs for only a short period of time. It is believed that
many of them would consider leaving if better opportunities became
available. Thus, it is predicted that the low-tier employees will perceive
external employment opportunities that would enable them to increase
their outcomes to a greater degree.
The preceding discussion leads to the fourth hypothesis. The specific
hypothesis is as follows.
(4) The employees in the low-tier groups will perceive greater pro
motional opportunity and greater opportunity for external employment
than will the employees in the high-tier groups.
A critical concern raised by the existence of a two-tier structure relates
to its effect on the employment-related attitudes of workers toward both
the company and union. Commitment, whether to the employer or union,
is important both as an attitude and as a predictor of turnover and job
satisfaction (Gordon, et al. 1980; Mowday, Porter, and Steers 1982).
Cappelli and Sherer (1987) state that anecdotal manifestations of a lack
of company and union commitment on the part of low-tier workers have
frequently been reported in news analyses. Given that perceived pay
equity (Rhodes and Steers 1981) and such personal characteristics as
age and tenure (Angle and Perry 1981; Hall 1979) have been found
to be related to commitment, it would appear that high-tier employees
would have higher commitment. However, the development of a
hypothesis concerning company and union commitment and job satisfac-

186 Hypotheses Concerning Tiers

tion requires the consideration of specific events surrounding the negotia
tion and implementation of tiers at Mayway that appear to have had
a significant enduring impact on both commitment and job satisfaction.
For example, the two-tier plan was negotiated immediately after the
1978 affiliation of May way's independent union with the Retail Clerks.
Many of those employed at the time of the affiliation subsequently
became more negative in their perceptions of the union, partially because
the union attempted to improve relations with the company. Clearly,
many members, all of whom would have been on the high-wage tier
at the time of the survey, did not have their goals met after the indepen
dent union affiliated with the Retail Clerks, i.e., the outcomes anticipated
by these employees prior to the affiliation were not realized.
On the other hand, many of the low-tier employees could perceive
the creation of their jobs as having resulted from the negotiated exchange
between the union and management. Viewing the union and manage
ment leaders as having created the low-tier jobs, the low-tier employees
would likely have higher commitment to the union and employer than
they would have had in the absence of such nonpay outcomes. These
contextual factors suggest that high-tier employees, many of whose ob
jectives were not fulfilled after the independent union affiliated with
the Retail Clerks and who perceived lower levels of job security, 10 would
have lower attitudinal commitment toward both the union and employer.
While such a prediction may appear situational, Cappelli and Sherer
(1987) also found that low-tier employees had higher union and employer
commitment (and higher job satisfaction and job security) than the hightier employees in their study.
Given the relationships suggested between job satisfaction and other
variables examined in this study, it is of interest to examine how this
affective reaction relates to tiers. Wiener and Vardi (1980) noted that,
while the overall dynamics of the commitment/satisfaction relationship
appear quite complex, job satisfaction has been found to be associated
with organizational commitment. Although the relationship between
commitment and satisfaction is not fully understood, their conclusion
that organizational commitment was an antecedent to job satisfaction
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assists in predicting differences in job satisfaction between the highand low-tier employees. Also, considering that the unmet expected out
comes of the affiliation of their union with the Retail Clerks led to rather
enduring dissatisfaction for many high-tier employees, it is predicted
they would have lower job satisfaction than would the low-tier
employees.
The preceding discussion leads to the fifth hypothesis. The specific
hypothesis is as follows.
(5) The low-tier groups will have higher union and employer com
mitment and higher job satisfaction than will the high-tier groups.

Results and Discussion
Results of tests of the hypotheses are presented in tables 7.2 through
7.6. 11 Significant differences are shown only where a significant total
sample multivariate tier effect existed, with all variables testing a
hypothesis entered as a block. 12 Each table displays the variable scores
in essentially the same manner that the scale scores were displayed in
the previous chapter. One exception is that for any significant difference
found for a variable within the top-rate analyses where there was no
difference within the total sample analyses, the higher group mean is
marked by a footnote. Where significant differences were found for
variables within both sets of analyses, the direction of the top-rate dif
ference is the same as that for the total sample difference.
A brief examination of the results reveals that the first two hypotheses
generally were not supported in either set of analyses, while the third,
fourth, and fifth hypotheses received considerable support. As can be
seen in table 7.4 for both sets of analyses, the majority of items testing
hypothesis 3 indicate that the high-tier employees in the wage and jobduty tier forms had significantly more positive attitudes. Mixed results
were found for the store-status and employment-status tier forms. Tables
7.5 and 7.6, which present the results for hypotheses 4 and 5, general
ly indicate higher scores and more favorable perceptions for the lowtier employees. This trend holds for all tier forms in both sets of analyses

Table 7.2
Behaviors to Restore Equity
Variables Testing Hypothesis 1
CoHyTinpcoeterhnersisnegs

Tier Form and Level
Wage
Variable8

1. Self-reported effort

2. Days absent during 1985

Scale
reliability

.77

Store-Status

Employment-Status
Full
Part
time
time

Job-Duty
Food

GM

Overall
mean

n = 1277

n=927

n=672

N=1599

5.59***

5.23***

5.25*

5.38*

5 .30

(1-01)

(1.12)

(1.07)

(1.06)

(1.12)

(1 .09)

4.19*

3.59*

4.28*

3.82*

4.25**

3.36**

(4.95)

(4.21)

(5.14)

(4.48)

High

Low

Old

New

n=369

n=1230

n=949

n=650

n=322

5.35

5.29

5.27

5.35

(1.19)

(1.06)

(1.14)

4.37

3.74

(5.08)

(4.43)

(4.78)

(4.42)

3,.29
(4..32)

NOTES: Standard deviations are in parentheses below the group means. Asterisks indicate the significance level of the difference between the two tier
levels in the total sample analyses. Underline indicates a significant difference (p< .05) when that portion of the sample paid at the top rate of its pay
progression is examined.
a. Variable 1 used 7-point formats with higher values representing higher effort. The total sample size for variable 2 is 1004.
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001

Table 7.3
Behaviors to Restore Equity
Variables Testing Hypothesis 2
Tier Form and Level
Wage

Variable8

1. Union activities
2. Voted against ratifying the
current contract (%)
3. Voted against an incumbent union
officer (%)

Scale
reliability

.70

Store-Status

High

Low

Old

New

n=353

n=687

n=633

n=407

1.94***

-1.03***

.29**

-.51**

Employment-Status
Full
Part
time
time
n=294
1.37***

n=746
-.57***

(6.10)

(2.91)

(5.03)

(3.45)

(5.99)

(3.59)

57*

43*

51*

44*

53*

46*

(.50)

(.50)

(.50)

(.50)

(.50)

(.50)

9*

5*

10

(.29)

(.23)

(.30)

13***
(.33)

4***
(.21)

Job-Duty
Food

GM

Overall
mean

n=687

n=353

N=1040

.38***
(4.50)
53***

-.82***
(4.36)
37***

-.02
(4.49)
48

(.50)

(.48)

(.50)

7

8

7

8

(.26)

(.27)

(.26)

(.27)

ffi
*<

!
O9

NOTES: Standard deviations are in parentheses below the group means. Asterisks indicate the significance level of the difference between the two tier
levels in the total sample analyses. Underline indicates a significant difference (p< .05) when that portion of the sample paid at the top rate of its pay

progression is examined.

a. The items making up the "Union Activities" scale can be found in appendix B. The overall sample size for variable 2 was 1007, and for variable 3 was 846.
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001

a

VI

n
O

Table 7.4
Work-Related Outcome
Variables Testing Hypothesis 3
Wage
Variable8

Scale
reliability

1. Satisfaction with two-tier
pay plan

High

Low

n=369

n = 1230

3.20***

2.63***

(1.79)
2. Pay fairness

.78

4.43***

4. Union instrumentality

.93
.81

n=949
2.72

.71

2.83

n=322
2.87b

n=1277
2.74

(1.58)

(1.76)

(1.58)

3.83

3.92*

3.79*

(1.40)

(1.50)

(1.40)

4.05***

(1.39)
3.28***

(1.73)

(1.74)

3.69b

3.69

(1.76)
3.61**

pcoeterhnersisnegs
CoHyTin190
Job-Duty
Food

GM

Overall
mean

n=927

n=672

N=1599

2.90***

2.58***

2.76

(1.67)
(1.52)
4.14*** 3.38***

(1.62)
3.82

(1.42)
(1.38)
(1.36)
4.04*** 2.66*** 3.45

3.44

3.36

3.48

(1.77)
3.81**

(1.70)

(1.78)

3.55

3.37

(1.55)
(1.52)
-.10***
.01
.34***

(1.53)

(1.53)
(1.55)
(1.55)
.63*** -.16*** -.05*

(1.53)
.11*

(1.55)

(.89)

(.89)

(.89)

(.88)

(.89)

3.47

(1.63)
5. Satisfaction with number of hours

n=650

(1.64)
(1.54)
3.64*** 3.81
(1.43)

(1.35)
3. Pay satisfaction

Tier Form and Level
Employment-Status
Store-Status
Part
Full
time
time
New
Old

(.85)

(.87)

-.01

(.64)

(.87)

(1.77)
(1.56)
(1.68)
3.90*** 3.41*** 3.69
.00

NOTES: Standard deviations are in parentheses below the group means. Asterisks indicate the significance level of the difference between the two tier
levels in the total sample analyses. Underline indicates a significant difference (p< .05) when that portion of the sample paid at the top rate of its pay
progression is examined.
a. All scales except "Satisfaction with number of hours" used 7-point formats with higher values being more favorable. That scale is formed from
standardized variables (mean=o, standard deviation=1) with higher scores representing more satisfaction.
b. This group mean is significantly higher than the mean of the other tier level when that portion of the sample at the top of the pay progression is examined.
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001

Table 7.5
Perceived Promotion and Employment Opportunity
Variables Testing Hypothesis 4
Tier Form and Level

Variable8

Scale
reliability

Wage
Low

Old

New

n=369

n = 1230

n=949

n=650

n=322

n=1277

3.61***

3.17***

3.62***

3.05***

3.43***

(1.78)
(1.82)
-.76*** .15*** -.04
(2.04)
(1-94)
(2-01)

(1.54)
2. Perceived employment mobility

.76

Employment-Status
Full
Part
time
time

High

2.51***

1. Perceived promotion opportunity

Store-Status

(1.83)
-.10
(1.97)

Job-Duty
Food

GM

Overall
mean

n=927

n=672

N=1599

3.26*

3.49*

(1.80)
(1.86)
(1.80)
(1-84)
-.44*** .03*** -.47*** .49***
(1.97)

(1.99)

(1.97)

(1.89)

3.36
(1.82)
-.07
(2.00)

NOTES: Standard deviations are in parentheses below the group means. Astensks indicate the significance level of the difference between the two tier
levels in the total sample analyses. Underline dicates a significant difference (p < .05) when that portion of the sample paid at the top rate of its pay
progression is examined.
a. Variable 1 used a 7-point format with a higher value representing high opportunity. Variable 2 is formed from standardized variables (mean=0,
standard deviation =1) with higher scores representing more perceived employment mobility.
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001
00

H
a'

Table 7.6
Variables Testing Hypothesis 5
HyCopTinoctehrensirsensg

Tier Form and Level
Store-Status

Wage
Variable*

1. Company commitment

Scale
reliability

.85

High

Low

Old

New

n=369

n = 1230

n=949

n=650

3.51***

4.14***

3.80***

4.28***

Employment-Status
Part
Full
time
time
n=322
3.78**

(1.54)
(1.40)
(1.54)
(1.44)
3.60***
3.31***
3.52***
3.35b
3.12***
(1.54)
(1.51)
(1.52)
(1.50)
(1.58)
4.49*** 4.91*** 4.66*** 5.03*** 4.78
(1-59)

2. Union commitment
3. Job satisfaction

.93
.82

(1.56)

(1.42)

(1.51)

(1.37)

(1.43)

n=1277

Job-Duty
Food

GM

Overall
mean

n=927

n=672

N = 1599

4.05**

3.93

4.09

4.00

(1.48)

(1.52)

(1.47)

(1.50)

3.45

3.42

344

3.43

(1.52)

(1.55)

(1.49)

(1.52)

4.82

4.80

4.83

4.81

(1.47)

(1.47)

(1.46)

(1.47)

NOTES: Standard deviations are in parentheses below the group means. Astensks indicate the significance level of the difference between the two tier
levels in the total sample analyses. Underline indicates a significant difference (p< .05) when that portion of the sample paid at the top rate of its pay
progression is examined.
a. All variables are scaled 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree).
b. This group mean is significantly higher than the mean of the other tier level when that portion of the sample at the top of the pay progression is examined.
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001
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for hypothesis 4, while a more complex pattern of findings is evident
for hypothesis 5. The remainder of the chapter will examine in detail
the results related to each of the hypotheses.
Behaviors to Restore Equity
The two variables of self-reported work effort and absenteeism relate
to the first hypothesis concerning behavioral means of restoring equity
and are shown in table 7.2. The significance levels and the direction
of the overall mean differences shown in the table suggest that the
hypothesis was not supported for any tier form.
For the variable of self-reported effort, only within the employmentstatus tier form was a significant difference found that was consistent
with the predictions. In each of the analyses, the part-time employees
reported expending less effort on the job. Discussions with informed
individuals revealed that it was commonplace for employers in retail
trade to assign tasks with more difficult components (some of which
required more physical or mental effort) to full-time employees so that
fewer employees would need to be trained in such tasks. Thus, this dif
ference is likely attributable to the greater proportion of full- than parttime employees involved in assignments requiring more effort. The jobduty tier form differences in self-reported effort were not in the predicted
direction. One can only speculate on the cause (i.e., situational fac
tors, referent selection, job content); post-survey interviews did not lead
to any explicit conclusions.
The first hypothesis also considered employee absenteeism as a means
of behaviorally restoring equity. The results for each set of analyses
indicate that in no instance were the number of days absent during 1985
significantly higher in the low-tier groups. No difference was found
within the wage-tier form, with employees on the low levels of the other
three tier forms generally absent significantly fewer days. Although these
results clearly run counter to our prediction and counter to the findings
of Dittrich and Carrell (1979), it appears that these results may be situa
tional, given May way's policies concerning absences.
As discussed in chapter 4, employees with eight years seniority at
Mayway were allotted eight paid absences per year. Nearly all such
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employees would be on the high-wage tier and most would be on the
high level of the other tier forms. For the employees with less than eight
years experience but hired before April 1,1983, six paid absences were
allotted per year. Employees hired after this date received four paid
absences per year. All employees receiving the four paid absences would
by definition be on the low-wage tier, and most would be on the lowlevels of the other tier forms. Naturally, because employees in the hightier groups received more paid absences, it follows that they would have
higher absenteeism rates than employees in the low-tier groups. 13
Overall, the two variables examined in the first hypothesis had such
a low proportion of predicted significant differences that the first
hypothesis was not supported.
As shown in table 7.3, the second hypothesis examining behaviors
to restore equity included three variables relating to union activities and
different forms of union political support. This hypothesis states that
the low-tier groups will participate less in union activities and will be
less supportive of the union. Examination of the direction of the group
mean differences suggests that the hypothesis was not supported within
any tier form. In both analyses, the only differences found consistent
with the hypothesis were for the union activities variable. The members
of each low-tier group reported that they participated significantly less
in union activities. Contrary to the second hypothesis, however, in the
total sample analyses a higher percentage of each high-tier group reported
that they voted against ratifying the current contract. In the top-rate
sample analyses, only the job-duty tier form difference remained signifi
cant. Also in opposition to the hypothesis in both analyses, the highwage tier employees were more likely to report that they had voted
against an incumbent union officer. Overall, just under one-half of all
respondents stated that they voted against ratification of the current con
tract, while a much lower percentage of all respondents reported voting
against an incumbent officer.
The results for the first two hypotheses indicate that the low-tier
respondents did not use the behaviors measured in the survey to restore
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equity, i.e., changing either the outcomes (the contract or the union
officers) or the inputs (absences or effort) of the outcome/input ratios.
There appear to be two factors, however, that qualify the results relative
to the second hypothesis. As discussed in chapter 4, the last contract
negotiations prior to the administration of the survey had eliminated
double-time pay on Sundays and frozen the top wage rate for both wage
tiers. These changes had a more negative effect on the high-wage tier
employees because Sunday shift scheduling was based on seniority and
because all of the high-wage tier employees were paid at the top rate
(compared to about one-fourth of those on the low-wage tier). Thus,
the high-tier employees were more likely to vote against ratifying the
current contract and perhaps to vote against the incumbent officers. 14
Further, numerous studies (Anderson 1979; Hoyman and Stallworth
1987) have found that seniority is significantly positively correlated with
participation in union activities. The lesser participation in union ac
tivities among the low-tier employees is logical, given the relationship
between the different tier levels and seniority at May way. Although
some literature has suggested that low-tier employees would be less in
clined to support the union, the results in this study did not support
that suggestion.
Employment-Related Attitudes
The five tier- or work-related outcome variables shown in table 7.4
relate to the third hypothesis, which states that the low-tier groups have
lower satisfaction with their pay, the two-tier plan, and the number of
hours they work. The hypothesis also predicts that the low-tier groups
will perceive less pay fairness and lower union instrumentality in ob
taining fair pay. The group means for the first item in the table, "satisfac
tion with the two-tier pay plan," are of interest because they are all
below the scale midpoint of 4 (neutral). This suggests that no tier group
was satisfied with the pay plan. In both sets of analyses, the high-tier
groups in the wage and job-duty tier forms had more favorable attitudes
on this item, as predicted. The next two items showed a similar pattern
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of significant differences as the high-wage tier and food department
employees also had more favorable attitudes toward their pay.
Within the other two tier forms, however, only one significant dif
ference was found in both sets of analyses for the first three items. The
part-time employees perceived their pay as significantly less fair. Those
who aspired to full-time positions likely viewed full-timers as a rele
vant standard of comparison and subsequently evaluated their pay as
unfair. The difference in satisfaction with the plan, seen only in the
top-rate analyses between part- and full-time employees, suggests that
many part-time employees who only desired short-term, part-time
employment had left the organization. Many of the remaining top-rate,
part-time employees, who likely aspired to full-time positions, were
dissatisfied with the plan as a result of the inability to increase their
pay rate upon promotion to full-time status.
A different pattern of significant differences can be seen for the re
maining two variables testing hypothesis 3. In the total sample analyses,
there were differences within the store-status and job-duty tier forms
regarding the union's instrumentality in obtaining fair pay and benefits.
In the top-rate analyses, significant differences were found for the wage
and department tier forms for this item.
The direction of the difference for the store-status form, however,
was opposite to the stated hypothesis. Employees not at the top rate
constituted two-thirds of all new-store employees, and likely used an
external referent, leading to a favorable evaluation of the union's in
strumentality. It is likely that old-store employees with relatively low
seniority would have been actively socialized by the more senior
employees to be more negative toward the union, and thus they would
tend to see the union as less instrumental. As new-store employees in
teract primarily with low seniority employees, they would remain more
favorable in regard to the union and its instrumentality. In the top-rate
analyses, employees in both old and new stores faced a three-year wage
freeze, and thus their perceptions of union instrumentality would like
ly converge. Finally, the lack of differences within the store-status form
for the other variables suggests that the employees were not likely to
make comparisons between old and new stores.
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Additionally, the "union instrumentality" variable differs significantly
within the wage-tier form for the top-rate analyses, but not for the total
sample analyses. The newer employees, those not at the top rate, like
ly using an external or past pay referent in comparisons, perceived that
the union had been more instrumental in gaining valued economic out
comes such as fair pay and benefits than did the low-wage tier employees
at the top rate. 1S Apart from changes in group mean differences which
are caused merely by excluding the newer employees, a logical explana
tion for the difference rests in the different selection of referents by
the top-rate, low-wage tier employees, i.e., high-wage tier employees.
This would result in less favorable perceptions regarding union in
strumentality than either the high-wage tier group or the remaining lowwage tier employees.
For the final variable shown in table 7.4, "satisfaction with number
of hours," the analyses found significant differences that were consis
tent with the hypothesis within the wage and employment-status tier
forms. The significant difference within the job-duty tier form was not
consistent with the predictions. The results appear attributable to the
fact that the high-wage tier and GM departments had a significantly
higher proportion of full-timers than did the low-wage tier and food
departments. Thus, in reference to satisfaction with number of hours
worked, the use of full-time employees as a comparison may lead to
a negative evaluation. For the store-status form, there was an approx
imately equal percentage of part-time employees in both the old and
new stores.
The fourth hypothesis examined the two variables of "perceived pro
motion opportunity" and "perceived employment mobility" shown in
table 7.5. This hypothesis, which states that the low-tier groups will
perceive greater promotional opportunity and greater opportunity for
external employment, was generally supported in each of the analyses
for each tier form.
For the "perceived promotion opportunity" variable in the total sample
analyses, each of the low-tier groups perceived significantly greater op
portunity. The cross-tabulation of various tier forms (see table 5.7) sug
gests that many employees are indeed promoted by the time they reach
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the top rate. For example, often by the time that many employees who
began in part-time or GM positions reach the top rate, they have pro
gressed to full-time and/or food department positions. Given that most
of the promotions would have taken place, the lack of significant dif
ferences in the top-rate analyses for the employment-status and job-duty
tier forms is understandable.
For the wage-tier form, it is not surprising that the high-tier employees
perceived significantly less promotion opportunity given that they had
a minimum of seven and one-half years of seniority. The significantly
higher scores among the new-store employees in both sets of analyses
are probably related to the high proportion of low-wage tier employees
in new stores (Martin and Peterson 1987).
The results also indicate that the low-tier employees perceived ex
ternal opportunities that would enable them to increase their outcomes
to a greater extent than employees in the respective high-tier groups.
The higher perception of external employment mobility among the lowtier employees may be one factor contributing to higher low-tier
employee turnover rates reported by Ross (1985) and Wessel (1985).
The three employment-related attitudinal variables of "company com
mitment," "union commitment," and "job satisfaction" are shown
in table 7.6 and pertain to the fifth hypothesis. This hypothesis states
that the low-tier groups will have higher union and company commit
ment, and job satisfaction. The significant differences for the three
variables within the wage and store-status forms supported the hypothesis
for the total sample analyses. The significant difference for company
commitment within the employment-status tier form also was consis
tent with the hypothesis.
In the top-rate analyses, the predictions were supported only in the
store-status tier form. Note that the differences found in the total sam
ple analyses for the wage and employment-status tier forms were no
longer significant in the top-rate analyses. Also, the significant difference
in the top-rate analyses for "union commitment" between part- and
full-time employees was opposite to the predictions.
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The changes in the significant differences between the two analyses
for the employment-status tier form may be explained by seniority and
the use of different referents. The new part-time employees (not at the
top rate) likely use external part-time positions as referents (Cappelli
and Sherer 1988). As discussed previously, the wage premium that
May way's unionized part-timers earn in comparison to most other parttime positions is much greater than it is for Mayway's full-timers. Thus,
irrespective of the referent used by the full-timers, their employer com
mitment would likely not be as high as that of the part-timers. In the
top-rate analyses, however, the part-time employees would have greater
knowledge of the pay and working conditions of May way's full-time
employees. Further, as many of them aspired to full-time positions, they
would likely use those full-timers as a referent (Martin 1981), resulting
in no significant difference in employer commitment between the two
groups.
The results concerning union commitment within the employmentstatus form showed a different pattern. The new part-time employees
would not likely know much about the union and thus would not differ
from the full-timers on union commitment. The part-timers at the top
rate would have been employed long enough to be socialized by the
senior employees to acquire some negative attitudes toward the union.
These part-timers would also find that most of the promotions to fulltime positions had taken place, with further promotions more difficult.
If they blamed this fact on the union, they would tend to have lower
union commitment than the full-timers.
The complex pattern of results for this hypothesis resulted in several
additional analyses. As can be seen for the wage tier form, significant
differences were found for each variable only in the total sample analyses.
For the three variables, the additional analyses revealed that the lowwage tier employees who were not at the top rate had significantly more
favorable attitudes than the top-rate, low-wage tier employees and highwage tier employees. This relationship held irrespective of whether the
employees were in old or new stores. Thus, it appears that the large
proportion of low-wage tier employees not at the top of their rate pro
gression accounted for the higher scores for company commitment,
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union commitment, and job satisfaction of the entire low-wage tier group
in the total sample analyses.
For the store-status form, the results show significant differences for
all three variables in each set of analyses. The lack of difference bet
ween the two analyses indicate that there were not major seniority or
socialization effects working to change the referents and employee at
titudes for this tier form. The results suggest that the new-store employees
used referents that resulted in a more favorable evaluation of their "com
pany commitment," "union commitment," and "job satisfaction." As
the new-store employees interact primarily with the less senior lowwage tier employees, they remain more favorable toward the company,
union, and job than their counterparts at the old stores. These findings
support the research of Martin and Peterson (1987), who found that
each attitude they measured among low-wage tier employees was
significantly more favorable in new stores than in old stores.
Further analyses focused specifically on low-tier groups in old and
new stores for the eight items testing the third and fifth hypotheses.
Of the 24 tests between old- and new-store employees, 14 indicated
that the new-store employees had significantly more favorable attitudes
toward the employment situation. In no case did the old-store employees
have more favorable attitudes. These results indicate that new-store
employees who were in the low level of the other tier forms generally
had more favorable work-related attitudes. Overall, these results, in
combination with the results from chapter 6, strongly suggest that the
new-store employees do not consider themselves as disadvantaged due
to their store status.
Summary
This chapter has centered on the development and subsequent testing
of five hypotheses which focus on the relationship between tiers and
employee behaviors and attitudes. Of the five hypotheses developed from
equity theory, the first two, which related to behaviors to restore equi
ty, were generally not supported. In retrospect, it appears that the large
proportion of nonsupportive results were a function of the nature of
the variables used to test the hypotheses. Moderately strong support
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was found for the remaining three hypotheses relating to employment
attitudes. Excluding the tests of the store-status tier form, for each set
of analyses there would be a total of 30 separate tests spread equally
across the three tier forms. Support was found in 20 of the 30 tests in
the total sample analyses, with the results of one test opposite in direc
tion to the prediction. In the top-rate analyses, support was found in
16 of the tests, with the results of two tests opposite in direction to the
prediction.
Chapters 6 and 7 have gone beyond the largely anecdotal literature
concerning tiers and their relationship to employee attitudes, behaviors,
and characteristics; they provide a systematic empirical examination
of these relationships at one tiered employment setting. Chapter 8 will
further discuss some of the results presented in the last two chapters
and generalize from them to other settings. The final chapter will in
clude the author's overall conclusions.
NOTES
1. While pay appears to be the most common basis for comparison (Mowday 1983), other job
facets, such as hours, job security, and benefits may be related to the selection of referents (Oldham
et al. 1986).
2. Martin and Peterson (1987) argue that high-tier employees would not perceive themselves as
overcompensated because they would view their pay rate as the historical standard rate and make
equity comparisons with their own pay history rather than with the low-tier employees.
3. Other theoretical frameworks that may be useful in explaining the effects of tiered compensa
tion structures include social construction of reality theory (Salancik and Pfeffer 1978), behavioral
commitment theory (Salancik 1977; Staw 1974), and relative deprivation theory (Martin 1981).
4. The typical labor contract is in effect for about three years It is likely that employees would
base their perceptions of the permanency of tiers and thus their selection of referents on the length
of contracts normally in effect at their employer.
5. At Mayway, the perceived knowledge of the collective bargaining contract as measured by
a five-point scale was significantly (p < .001) less among the low-wage tier employees. The results
also indicated that they had read significantly (p <.001) fewer issues of the union newspaper
in the prior year. Both of these results support the suggestion that low-wage tier employees have
less knowledge about tiers and concessions.
6. Cappelli and Sherer (1987; 1988) suggest that high-wage tier employees used other employees
in their industry as referents. Their discussions indicate that respondents were using individuals
in comparable positions and on the high-wage tier of the competition.
7. Martin and Lee (1989) used a different data set; that data collection was funded by an ANR
Pipeline Company Business Administration Fellowship.
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8. Using the same items discussed in note 5, low-wage tier employees not at the top rate knew
significantly (p < .001) less about the contract and read significantly (p < .001) fewer issues of
the union newspaper than the top-rate, low-wage tier employees.
9. Using the same items discussed in notes 5 and 8, new-store employees not at the top rate knew
significantly (p < .001) less about the contract and read significantly (p < .001) fewer issues of
the union newspaper than those at the top rate.
10. The first three items in table 6.3 support the suggestion that low-tier employees perceive greater
job security than high-tier employees.
11. The hypothesis tests are based on the sample size of 1599, although for some of the analyses
the sample size was smaller. For example, to vote in the union officer election, an employee had
to be employed by November 1983. Similarly, a meaningful analysis of the number of absences
taken during 1985 meant that the respondent had to be employed prior to 1985. The sample size
shown in the tables for some of the other items may represent a larger number than was actually
analyzed due to missing data on a particular item or set of items.
12. In no case where the total sample effect for a tier form was not significant was a significant
top-rate multivariate effect found. Also, in only one instance where the multivariate effect was
not significant was a significant difference found for a variable within a tier form. See chapter
5 for further discussion of the methodology.
13. Another method of examining days absent during 1985 focuses on the number of unpaid absences
taken by employees. In both sets of analyses, significantly (p < 001) more unpaid absences were
taken by high-tier employees only for the wage tier form. This change does not alter the conclu
sion that the hypothesis was not supported.
14. Voting is often considered a union activity (Anderson 1979). In this study, the two union
voting items are separated from the union activities variable because, unlike the concepts includ
ed in the general union activities variable, the union voting items incorporate the notion of being
against the union goals or officers.
15. A one-way ANOVA found that the low-wage tier employees not at the top rate had significantly
(p< .01) more favorable perceptions of "union instrumentality" than the top-rate, low-wage tier
employees.

8
Summary and Conclusions
This book is the first to examine in detail the impact of tiered com
pensation structures on unions, employers, and employees. Chapters
1 and 2 introduced tiers and described their role in the United States
industrial relations system. Chapter 1 defined tiers and examined their
types (permanent and temporary) and forms (wage, benefit, job-duty,
employment-status, among others). Also, two predominant views of
tiers expressed in the literature were discussed. Overall, in contrast to
other discussions (Cappelli and Sherer 1987; 1988; Jacoby and Mitchell 1986), tiers have been presented here as a more complex and broad
phenomena. Chapter 2 examined the industries and conditions under
which tiers are most likely to be found, how they function, potential
benefits and problems, and trends in the incidence of tiers. Chapter 3
included a detailed discussion of labor-management relations in the retail
food industry and the competitive pressures that led to the implementa
tion of tiers. The first three chapters together provide the groundwork
for the remainder of the book.
Chapter 4 discussed the historical and environmental factors that led
to the implementation and maintenance of tiers at May way Food Market
Company, the company whose employees were surveyed. Chapter 5
described the sample and the methodology used in the survey. Both
chapter 6 (which examined the research questions) and chapter 7 (which
examined the hypotheses) concerned the perceptions of rank-and-file
employees at Mayway and built upon the previous research and literature
on tiers. The hypotheses were developed and the results were inter
preted within the framework of equity theory.
This chapter begins with the advancement of five propositions which
appear generalizable to other mature tiered employment settings. The
chapter also examines the relative costs and benefits of maintaining tiers
at Mayway and the generalizability of the Mayway experience. It also
discusses the limitations of this study and presents some additional areas
203
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for research. The chapter concludes with the author's perspective on
the future of tiers.
Propositions
Five testable propositions appear to be generalizable to settings where
tiers have been in effect through more than one contract (referred to
as mature tiers), and where there is at least a large minority of low-tier
employees. These propositions integrate findings from throughout the
book. The five propositions either support the current conventional
understandings or add to our understanding of the impact of tiered com
pensation structures.
Proposition 1: Employee groups on each level of each tier form will
perceive few, if any, benefits from a two-tier compensation plan. Fur
ther, all employee groups will express dissatisfaction with the existence
of such a plan and will oppose the establishment of new, lower tier levels
for new cohorts of employees.
Much of the literature reviewed in chapter 2 that examines the
dissatisfaction of tiered employees focuses on low-tier employees. Less
attention has been given to the disenchantment of the high-tier employees
or, in nontiered situations, to the potential high-tier employees. The
results of this study indicate overall dissatisfaction with the effects of
tiers among the high-wage tier employees, which in some cases was
significantly greater than among the low-wage tier employees. This sur
prising finding can be explained in terms of the perceived disparity bet
ween their actual compensation (and other actual work-related outcomes)
and the higher compensation (and other more favorable work-related
outcomes) high-tier employees believe they would have obtained in the
absence of tiers.
All of the tier groups expressed dissatisfaction with the two-tier plan
and perceived that the plan had negative effects on compensation, job
security, and promotion opportunities. Although more than 70 percent
of the employees perceived that the existence of the plan had increased
the opening of new stores (a stated goal of management in negotiating
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the plan and one which objectively led to increased promotion oppor
tunities and job security), less than one-eighth and one-fourth of the
respondents perceived that their promotion opportunities and job security,
respectively, had been increased by the negotiation of the plan. Also,
the results indicated moderate to strong opposition to the notion of new
lower levels for the wage or benefit tier, even if such changes would
lead to larger raises for the current employees.
Proposition 2: The implementation of wage tiers will result in
divisiveness between the employee groups on the two wage-tier levels.
Some of the literature reviewed in chapter 2 suggests that the
maintenance of disparate wage rates through tiers leads to different and
conflicting interests among the employees and results in friction be
tween those on each wage tier level. The findings of this study were
consistent with that suggestion. First, each wage tier group preferred
changes to tiers given the related outcomes that would benefit their own
tier group and disadvantage employees on the other tier level. Second,
each group perceived that the other group had benefited more in terms
of some specific work-related outcomes, i.e., job security. Third, over
40 percent of all respondents perceived that pay rate differences had
created tensions between employees on the two tier levels. Although
not directly addressed by the survey, it appears that the implementa
tion of tiers may eventually lead to friction and hostility among employee
groups and/or poor union-member relations. These employee percep
tions make clear the need for improved communication to the workforce
regarding the plan and its effects on work-related outcomes.
Proposition 3: When employees on the low-wage tier become a
sizeable minority, it may be politically feasible for the union to seek
to raise the low-wage tier rates up to the high-wage tier level.
This study's findings indicated that a majority of all respondents and
a large minority of those on the high-wage tier supported raising the
low-wage tier rates up to the high-wage tier level. Although such a
change is potentially volatile, given the larger percentage and dollar
increases of the low-wage tier group, equalization may limit the
divisiveness and friction among employees in the long run. Through
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equalization, a union may be able to limit political losses and increase
the solidarity among the membership over the long term. Salpukas (1987)
gives an example of where tiers were eliminated by providing the highwage tier employees with lump-sum payments and by raising the lowwage tier rates to the high-tier level over a six-year period. When the
wage disparities resulting from tiers are eliminated, the new rate is usual
ly below what the rate would have been had wage tiers or other con
cessions not been negotiated (BNA 1988; Wessel 1985).
At Mayway, in both 1984 and 1987, the union eliminated wage dif
ferentials for some job classes, while instituting a new, lower wage tier
level for those same classes. The union also narrowed the differences
between the tiers for many of the other job classes. Those changes, along
with the survey results, suggest that equalization can be carried out
without the union incurring too great a political cost. The institution
of a new, lower tier would likely increase the employer's willingness
to raise the low-wage tier, despite possible employee resistance to that
option. 1
Proposition 4: Companies with tiered compensation structures that
expand to new geographically separate locations (from the previous work
locations) will find less negative attitudes concerning tiers and their ef
fects than companies with tiers that do not expand.
While there has been some work that examined tiers as part of a
business strategy for expansion (see chapters 1 and 2), little is known
about the effects of expansion on employee attitudes. Although prop
osition 1 suggested that employee groups on all levels of each tier form
will perceive few benefits from a two-tier plan, it appears that com
panies with tiers that expand will find employees in new locations, i.e.,
those established after tiers were implemented, will have more favorable
attitudes than employees in previously established locations. Also, com
panies with tiers that expand will find more favorable attitudes among
employees in general relative to companies with tiers that do not expand.
As stated previously, a concomitant of expansion with its creation
of new jobs is that both high- and low-tier employees benefit from in
creased promotion opportunities. They also benefit from increased job
security, as previously-hired employees have rights to the new jobs in
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the event of layoffs. To test proposition 4, it is necessary to compare
the attitudes of employees in similar companies with wage tiers, one
that has expanded geographically and one that has not. While the relative
impact of the objective benefits from expansion on high- and low-tier
employee attitudes remains an empirical question, both the literature
and our findings suggest that employees in companies that expand will
have more favorable attitudes.
As noted in chapter 7, Martin and Peterson (1987) found that newstore employees had significantly more favorable attitudes than old-store
employees. They attributed these findings to the much greater propor
tion of low-tier employees in new stores and the much greater perceiv
ed promotion opportunity in such stores. They argued, therefore, that
the referents selected by new-store employees would result in a more
favorable evaluation of their work situation. The findings of this study
indicate that the new-store employees had more favorable perceptions
concerning the effects of tiers on their opportunities and on the highwage tier employees. New-store employees also perceived that the
negotiation of wage tiers had caused the union fewer problems. Fur
ther, greater job satisfaction and union and employer commitment were
found among new-store employees. These findings may be attributed
largely to differences between low-wage tier employees in new and old
stores. Such store-status differences include the socialization of the lowwage tier employees, their knowledge of the tiered pay plan, their selec
tion of referents, and the amount of contact and thus the degree of "fric
tion" with employees on the high-wage tier.
Proposition 5: Disproportionate employment of women and minori
ty groups on the low-tier levels is not a necessary outcome of tiers.
The discussion in chapter 2 identified the EEO public policy concern
associated with the implementation and maintenance of tiers. The belief
was that, due in part to changes in the labor market, the low-tier groups
would consist of a disproportionate number of protected class members,
such as women and minorities. The results of the current study suggest
that disproportionate employment of protected class members on the
low tier levels is not a necessary outcome of tier implementation and
maintenance. At May way, minority group members were employed
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proportionately on each level of the tier forms. Further, there was ac
tually a higher percentage of women on the high-wage tier rather than
the low-wage tier. Where there existed a disproportionate number of
women on the low level of a tier form, the data indicate that as they
gained seniority the women progressed to the high level, or in the case
of part-time employment, a significantly greater percentage were volun
tarily employed part-time. The violation of the tenet of equal pay for
equal work is inherent to most tier forms, discrimination on the basis
of race and sex is not.
Costs and Benefits of Tiers at Mayway
This section discusses the costs and benefits of tiers at Mayway for
the three principal participants in the labor relations process as iden
tified by Holley and Jennings (1988) framework: management, union
leaders, and employees.
Tiered compensation allows management to reduce direct employ
ment costs over the long term. In this study, we did not assess the in
direct employment costs of recruitment, selection, training, and turn
over that may have increased as a result of the implementation of tiers.
What could be determined was that in 1987 the use of wage tiers alone
saved Mayway over 13 percent of its retail store employee payroll, or
more than 27 million dollars a year. This was determined by compar
ing the existing situation with the identical employment situation with
all employees paid as though they were on a unitary wage scale that
used only the high-tier wage rates. The use of tiers had also greatly
facilitated both the building of new stores and the expansion of jobs
within the new stores and the previously built stores. Sixteen new stores
had been built and a minimum of 6,000 new employees had been added.
A critical potential problem for management, as suggested by the
literature on tiers and equity theory, is that the marked wage disparity
between high- and low-wage tier workers performing essentially the
same jobs would result in decreased productivity and low morale. The
data examined in this study were inconclusive as to the effects of wage
disparities on Mayway productivity. Low morale, however, is suggested
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by the finding that all of the tier groups expressed dissatisfaction with
the two-tier plan and perceived that the plan had negative effects on
compensation, job security, and promotion opportunities. While not
assessed, the employees' negative attitudes about the work and the work
setting may have been associated with increased turnover (or turnover
intention), increased absenteeism and tardiness, and decreased quality
of customer service (and possibly, customer decisions to shop elsewhere),
all of which may increase costs to the employer.
Of particular concern to the union is the effect of different and con
flicting interests, e.g., goals for the union to pursue in bargaining, among
the various employee groups and the resulting friction between those
on each wage tier level on the membership solidarity. As stated in the
discussion of proposition 2, the results of this study suggest that the
maintenance of disparate wage rates through tiers leads to different and
conflicting interests between the employee groups. The research ques
tion results indicate that many respondents perceived that pay rate dif
ferences had created tensions between employees and agreed that rate
differences had created internal political problems for the union. At
Mayway, the conflicting interests and tensions have not led to such poten
tial problems as decertification drives and campaigns to remove incum
bent union leaders. Last, the movement toward the elimination of tiers
had become an area of contention in negotiations between union and
management and may be seen as a cost for both union and management.
The union benefited from a substantial increase in membership as
the new jobs were filled by new union members. The local union, unlike
many local unions during the 1980s, did not lose members but instead
showed a substantial increase in membership. Further, new-store
employees had more favorable attitudes toward the union than their
counterparts in old stores. An often cited benefit of tiered compensa
tion structures is that the union can preserve the current pay levels and
increase employment without harming the current employees. The union
representing Mayway's employees, which did not want to negotiate con
cessions for members already on the job, did not decrease the wage
levels of the previously employed members.
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The actual benefits of tiers for May way's employees were the greater
promotion opportunities and job security resulting from the increased
number of new stores and the increased number of jobs within each
store. In addition, many of the jobs held by May way's low-wage tier
employees were a direct result of the organization's expansion. Even
though the high-wage tier employees indicated disfavor with tiers, a
benefit to them was that their wages had not decreased as would have
occurred with some other labor cost containment methods, i.e., acrossthe-board cuts. All employee groups at May way, as stated in the first
proposition, however, expressed dissatisfaction with the two-tier plan
and perceived that the tiers had several major negative employmentrelated effects.
Generalizability of the May way Experience with Tiers
This section examines the generalizability of May way's experience
with tiers. Chapter 4 outlined in detail the company expansion that ac
companied the implementation and maintenance of tiers at May way.
Given the benefits derived at this company, one must ask whether the
functioning of tiers and their effects at May way are an anomaly.
The author believes that the functioning of tiers and their impact are
clearly generalizable to those organizations marked by a continuing in
crease in the proportion of new employees on the low-wage tier, such
as expanding companies or those with a high rate of turnover. Addi
tionally, generalizations may be made to organizations possessing high
opportunities for employee advancement. At Mayway, with the develop
ment of the job-duty tier and the establishment of the employment-status
tier, the low-tier employees would be able to progress from the lower
to higher paid positions as openings occurred. Finally, the permanent
wage tiers at Mayway never included the most skilled positions or depart
ment heads (equivalent to leadmen or leadwomen in other industries)
in the bargaining unit. Thus, the experience at Mayway may
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be generalized to organizations with a core of skilled workers who super
vise and train new employees, who know most of the jobs in the
workplace, and who are able to react to environmental changes fairly
rapidly. The company expansion created such positions and also the
need to have them filled.
The Mayway experience with tiers is also clearly generalizable to
other organizations using a proactive business strategy of expansion while
operating under strong exogenous forces and constraints. Thus, the com
pany's experience appears generalizable to those organizations with tiers
that exist in environments where restraints or conditions limit some
behaviors or outcomes yet permit latitude and choice in others, e.g.,
organizations with tiers in highly competitive environments that
nonetheless maintain high individual choice of strategy. May way's ex
perience with tiers would be less generalizable to situations where
organizations have minimum choice or where tiers have been introduced
as part of a business strategy for economic survival.
The characteristics of the union and its approach to negotiating tiers
were critical to the Mayway experience and thus should be noted here.
The union leaders, who were secure in their positions, continually work
ed to convince the members of the benefits of tiers over the shorter
run. In the most recent bargaining rounds, in 1984 and 1987, they con
vinced management to reduce the distance between the wage tiers for
most job classes, and eliminated them for a few large job classes. They
also raised a large number of employees in two highly paid low-tier
job classes to the high-tier rates by equalizing rates over a four-year
period. Further, the union leaders created a third wage tier level that
would eventually become the low-wage tier. These changes to the tiered
employment structure, as well as the existence of the promotional op
portunities discussed previously, probably provided the low-wage
employees with some hope that they would not be on the low-wage tier
permanently.
Overall, the generalizability of this company's experience is enhanced
because the major common goals of the participants in the labor relations
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process at Mayway were standard participant goals (see discussion of
framework in chapter 1). The standard goal for management was to
increase profits, which was done at Mayway through the moderation
of labor costs and company expansion. The principal objective of the
union leaders, protecting their political positions, was accomplished by
obtaining increases in employee wages and job security. The standard
employee goals of increased wages and job security may be viewed as
either sufficiently satisfied or as not thwarted to the extent that the union
leaders suffered significant political damage.
Limitations of the Study and Additional Areas for Research
There are several limitations of the study that may potentially restrict
the generalizations and predictions as they apply to other sites and in
dustries. First, the survey data were obtained from one company in a
single industry at one point in time. While some information was ob
tained through interviews and technical reports, the data did not allow
the making of any causal inferences. Second, the resources allowed for
the surveying of employees in only 17 of the 39 stores covered by the
union-management agreement. These stores were selected in geographic
areas with differing economic conditions so as to be widely represen
tative, although in each subarea the number of stores surveyed was very
small. Further, store- and individual-level data that would have per
mitted the assessment of the nature of the relationship between tiers
and productivity or other economic performance measures with a higher
degree of confidence could not be obtained.
A third limitation of this study relates to the nature of the survey in
strument. Prior research has focused almost exclusively on the wage
tier form (Cappelli and Sherer 1987; 1988; Jacoby and Mitchell 1986);
thus this study began with that focus. The considerable impact of the
other tier forms was not recognized until after the survey was ad
ministered. Fourth, regarding equity theory, alternative explanations
for the study results are possible given that many factors were uncon
trolled for and the actual referents selected were not determined. Inter
pretation of these results becomes equivocal to the extent that respondents
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used different referents in evaluating facets of their work situation than
we predicted.
Despite the limitations of the current study, the findings should be
of interest to other researchers and practitioners interested in tiers. Clear
ly, additional research in this area is necessary if we are to more ade
quately understand the effects of such structures. Often, research ef
forts focusing on tiered compensation structures have been limited
because union leaders and management were unwilling to cooperate.
Unions and management may be concerned that the results of such
research will be used by their counterparts in collective bargaining. In
addition, many factors (i.e., the highly competitive nature of American
industry) may increase the reluctance of management to participate in
such a study or to permit surveying and/or access to hard data, such
as that related to productivity.
Additional research is necessary on the relationship between produc
tivity and a marked wage disparity among workers performing essen
tially the same jobs. This may be assessed by comparing the perfor
mance/productivity of individuals in similar positions but who are on
different tier levels within the same company, statistically controlling
for employee background variables which may differ systematically by
tier level, i.e., age. Five additional areas requiring attention include
the following: (1) longitudinal investigations of multiple sites in both
the manufacturing and service sectors; (2) analyses of sites where tiers
have been terminated; (3) comparisons of unionized and nonunion tiered
settings; (4) comparisons of the costs and benefits of different tier forms;
and (5) assessments of the costs/benefits of tiers versus other methods
of controlling labor costs. Such research would provide unions and
management with additional information upon which to make inform
ed decisions regarding tiers.
The Future for Tiers
A wide range of opinion currently exists as to the appropriateness
of tiers as a response to the changes in the competitiveness of the
economic environment. Thus, it is not surprising to find a lack of con-
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sensus among prognosticates concerning the future prevalence of tiers
in the United States. Predictions based on data collected prior to 1986
or based on a predominantly managerial perspective (e.g., Essick 1987;
Jacoby and Mitchell 1986; Ploscowe 1986) are relatively positive with
regard to the suitability of tiers as a means of responding to environmental
pressures. Predictions based on data collected after 1986 or based
predominantly on union views (e.g., Bernstein and Schiller 1985; BNA
1988; BNA March 2,1988) tend to be less favorable. These latter predic
tions suggest that union leaders now are heightening their efforts to
eliminate or avoid such structures, and they have suggested that there
is evidence that tiers are falling from repute with management as well.
Overall, based on the literature, technical data, several in-depth in
terviews, and changes in the economy and workforce demographics since
the early 1980s, it is believed there will be an increase in the rate of
elimination of the existing two-tier structures, along with a more rapid
decrease in the negotiation of new plans. Thus, during the early and
mid-1990s, the proportion of contracts containing tiers will peak and
then decline. Where mature tiers exist in a contract, unions will con
tinue in their efforts to eliminate or lessen existing wage disparities and
to convert permanent tiers to temporary tiers. Therefore, it is believed
that permanent tiers will become less common as they are phased out
or replaced by temporary tiers.
Tiers, while still a potential human resource strategy option, will likely
be seen as just one of several newer and alternative compensation
strategies available for adoption by management to lower or control
labor costs. These include such pay policies as lump-sum payments,
knowledge-based pay, gain sharing, employee stock ownership plans,
profit sharing, pay for performance, and work rule changes, among
others, to help control labor costs (BNA 1988; Katz and Milkovich 1986;
O'Dell and McAdams 1986). These other newer strategies will be more
attractive to unions and their members because they have much less
potential to adversely affect union solidarity. Further, tiers are the on
ly alternative compensation option that cannot enhance the use of par-
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ticipative human resource strategies. If these other compensation
strategies are not seen as viable options for the employer, however,
unions will likely opt for tiers when the alternative is incurring acrossthe-board wage cuts.
Finally, it is also believed that tiers will become even more concen
trated in the service sector relative to the manufacturing sector of the
economy. Tiered compensation structures, in the context of proactive
business plans, will continue to facilitate the expansion of many ser
vice sector companies into new markets. Tiers in the manufacturing
sector will have a shorter life span (in any particular company there),
as they may be terminated when the need for immediate contract con
cessions passes.

NOTE
1. As tiers and changes to them are the result of bilateral negotiations, management agreement
would be needed to achieve such equalization. Chapter 2 suggested that management would like
ly take into consideration such factors as the state of the labor market, comparisons of both the
low- and high-wage tier rates with alternative jobs, comparisons of the company's rates to those
of the competition, the company's competitive position, and the company's profit picture. Clear
ly, neither party would want changes to result in job loss or a decrease in the rate of job expan
sion (based on speculations of the rate of job expansion that would occur without alterations).

Appendix A
Survey Items and Response Formats
Section 1
THIS FIRST SET OF STATEMENTS CONCERNS YOUR FEELINGS
TOWARD YOUR WORK SITUATION, PAY, AND RELATED ISSUES.
Please indicate how strongly you AGREE or DISAGREE with each by circling
the number representing the most appropriate response to each statement.
1. I am satisfied with the number of hours I normally work in a week.
2. All in all, I am satisfied with my job.
3. It would be very difficult for me to find another job that is as good as
the one I have now.
4. Local [X] has obtained fair pay for me.
5. During the past year, the effort I put into my job was much more than my
typical co-worker.
6. I put more effort into my job beyond what is necessary to do satisfactory
work.
7. I am very happy with the amount of money I make.
8. Considering my skills and the effort I put into my work, I am very satis
fied with my pay.
9. During the past year, my job performance was much better than that of
my typical co-worker.
10. I would probably refuse a promotion if one were offered.
11. I am likely to receive a promotion within the next two years.
12. It would be very hard for me to leave my job even if I wanted to.
13. Local [X] has obtained fair benefits for its members.
14. I talk up my employer to my friends as a great employer to work for.
15. I find that my values and my employer's values are very similar.
16. I am proud to tell others that I am part of my employer's organization.
17. In general, I like working here.
18.1 talk up Local [X] to my friends as a great organization to be a member of.
19. My values and the Union's values are very similar.
20. I feel a sense of pride being a part of Local [X].
21. Local [X] has helped the membership in general obtain fair pay.
22. In general, I don't like my job.
23. My pay is fair compared to the pay of people doing the same kind of work
for other employers.
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24. My pay is fair compared to that of onboard employees in general in my
store.
REMINDER: Onboard employees (entering their job title prior to
November 1978) receive a higher top pay rate than hereafter employees
(entering the same job title after that date).
25. My pay is fair compared to that of hereafter employees in general in my
store.
26. My pay is fair compared to the pay of other people doing the same job
in my store.
The response format for Section 1 and Section 8 was as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Slightly Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Slightly Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree
Section 2

THIS SET OF QUESTIONS CONCERNS MORE GENERAL FEELINGS
ABOUT YOUR WORK SITUATION. Please answer each question by circling
the number in front of the appropriate response to each question.
1. If you really look for another job in the near future, what do you think are
your chances of finding one as good or better than your present job?
1. No chance of finding such a job
2. Some chance of finding such a job
3. Probably would find such a job
4. Certain to find such a job
2. Choose the one statement which best tells how well you presently like the
hereafter-onboard pay plan.
1. Very dissatisfied
2. Dissatisfied
3. Slightly dissatisfied
4. Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
5. Slightly satisfied
6. Satisfied
7. Very satisfied
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3. How
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

satisfied are you with the amount of pay you get?
Very dissatisfied
Dissatisfied
Slightly dissatisfied
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
Slightly satisfied
Satisfied
Very satisfied

4. In general, which one of the following best reflects how you feel about
your pay?
1. am very much overpaid
2. am moderately overpaid
3. am slightly overpaid
4. am paid about right
5. am slightly underpaid
6. am moderately underpaid
7. am very much underpaid
Section 3
LISTED BELOW ARE A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE REASONS WHY
EMPLOYERS AND UNIONS NEGOTIATE DIFFERENT RATES FOR
HEREAFTER AND ONBOARD EMPLOYEES WITH THE SAME JOB
TITLE. Please examine each of them and then circle the number in the ap
propriate column which represents your best estimate of how important you
think each might have been as a reason for your employer and union to negotiate
the hereafter-onboard rate differences in the first place.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

To
To
To
To
To
To
To
To
To
To

help [the company] compete with nonunion competitors
help [the company] get a new contract ratified
help Local [X] get a new contract ratified
allow [the company] to open new stores
help [the company] compete with other unionized competitors
protect the wages of the onboard employees at [the company]
keep stores from closing
save the company money
protect the jobs of Local [X] members in general
give management an incentive to get rid of onboard employees
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The response format for section 3 was as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Not At All Important
Not Too Important
Somewhat Important
Important
Extremely Important
Section 4

HOW DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN AFFECTED BY
THE EXISTENCE OF THE HEREAFTER-ONBOARD RATE DIFFER
ENCES AT [THE COMPANY]? Please circle the number which represents
your best personal estimate of the effect on each of the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

The closing of stores by [the company]
The opening of new stores by [the company]
The job security of onboard employees in general at your store
The job security of hereafter employees in general at your store
Your personal job security
The number of hours you are able to work in a week
Your promotion opportunities
Your current hourly pay rate
The dollar amount of your raises in the future at [the company]
Your current weekly earnings
Your current fringe benefits

The response format for section 4 was as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Definitely Increased
Probably Increased
Probably No Effect
Probably Decreased
Definitely Decreased
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Section 5
ABOUT HOW MUCH HAVE EACH OF THE FOLLOWING GROUPS
BENEFITED OVERALL FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE HEREAFTERONBOARD RATE DIFFERENCES? Please circle the number in the
appropriate column which best represents your estimate of how much each
group listed below has benefited, if at all, from these rate differences.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

The Company ([name])
The Union
Onboard employees in general
Hereafter employees in general
Customers
Employees in general at your store

The response format for section 5 was as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Not At All
Somewhat
A Moderate Amount
Pretty Much
Very Much
Section 6

Now think about what might happen in the future. HERE ARE SOME POSSI
BLE RESULTS FROM BARGAINING OVER THE HEREAFTERONBOARD PAY RATES DURING THE NEXT TWO (2) CONTRACT
NEGOTIATIONS. Please predict the likelihood you think each possibility listed
below has of occurring by circling the number in the appropriate column.
1. Lowering the onboard rates down to equal those of the hereafter rates
2. Freezing the onboard rates until the hereafter rates rise up to equal the
onboard rates
3. New lower pay scales will be negotiated for employees hired after the date
of the next contract
4. There will be no change in the dollar differential between the hereafter and
onboard rates
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5. Raising both hereafter rates and onboard rates so that after a period of
time, both will be equal
6. Onboard employees will receive greater percentage increases than hereafter
employees
7. Hereafter employees will receive greater dollar increases than onboard
employees, but the rates will not be equalized
The response format for section 6 was as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Not At All Likely
Not Too Likely
Somewhat Likely
Likely
Extremely Likely
Section 7

This next set of questions relates to your own activities. Please circle the number
which represents the most appropriate answer for you.
1. About how many issues of the Local [X] newspaper have you read in the
last year!
None at all....................................
1 or 2 issues...................................
3 or 4 issues...................................
5 to 7 issues...................................
8 or 9 issues...................................
All of them....................................

0
1
2
3
4
5

2. About how many issues of the company newsletter ([name]) have you read
in the last year!
None at all....................................
I or 2 issues...................................
3 or 4 issues...................................
5 to 7 issues...................................
8 to 10 issues..................................
II to 15 issues.................................
16 to 20 issues.................................
All of them....................................

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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3. From the list below, please put a check mark next to each experience you
have had since 1978 as a member of Local [X].
__ 1.
__ 2.
__ 3.
__ 4.
__ 5.
. 6.
. 7.
. 8.
. 9.
.10.
.11.
__12.

I
I
I
I
I

served as a steward
served as a union officer or business representative
served on a bargaining committee
served on another union committee
attended a new member meeting
ran for a union office
filed one or more grievances on my behalf
worked on a union election campaign
worked on a union organizing drive
voted against ratifying our current contract
voted against an incumbent union officer
NONE OF THE ABOVE

4. Approximately how many days on which you were scheduled to work
were you absent for any reason during 1985?
None .........................................
1 or 2........................................
3 to 5........................................
6 to 8........................................
9 to 12.......................................
13 to 16......................................
17 to 21......................................
22 to 25......................................
More than 25..................................

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

5. About how often do you go to regional Union meetings?
I never go to the meeting-(0%)...................
I sometimes go to the meetings-(about 25%)........
I go to about half the meetings-(about 50%)........
I usually go to more than half the meetings-(about 75%)
I go to almost all the meetings-(about 90-100%).....

1
2
3
4
5
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6. How knowledgeable are you about your collective bargaining contract?
I don't know anything at all about what is in the
collective bargaining contract...................
I know a little about what is in the contract.........
I know some of what is in the contract.............
I know quite a bit of what is in the contract.........
I know a lot about what is in the contract...........

1
2
3
4
5

Section 8

In this section, please indicate your personal FEELINGS about the hereafteronboard rate differences.
1. If the pay rates cannot be equalized, hereafter employees should be able to
get more hours than onboard employees so they can earn as much in a week
as onboard employees do.
2. If it would help me get a larger raise in the next contract, I would personally
favor creating additional lower pay scales for all new employees hired.
3. If it would help the company open new stores, I would personally favor
creating additional lower pay scales for all new employees hired.
4. If it would help keep my store from closing, I would personally favor
creating additional lower pay scales for all new employees hired.
5. If it would help keep the company from closing other stores (not my store),
I would personally favor creating additional lower pay scales for all new
employees hired.
6. If it would help keep my store from closing, I would personally favor
lowering the onboard rates down to those of the hereafter rates.
7. If it would help keep the company from closing all its stores in this area,
I would personally favor lowering the onboard rates down to those of
the hereafter rates.
8. I would personally favor raising the hereafter rates up to those of the
onboard employees even though the onboards would get a much smaller
increase than the hereafter employees.
9. If it would help me get a larger raise in the next contract, I would personally
favor reducing the fringe benefits for all new employees hired.
10. If it would help raise the current hereafter rates up to the onboard rates
in the next contract, I would personally favor creating lower pay scales
for all new employees hired.
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11. The hereafter-onboard rate differences have created tensions between the
hereafter and onboard employees.
12. Our company probably expects to LOWER the pay of the onboard
employees to hereafter pay rates in some future negotiation.
13. Our union officers probably expect to RAISE the pay of the hereafter
employees to the onboard pay rates in some future negotiation.
14. Hereafter pay rates should only be implemented when the employer's
current level of pay is high relative to the competition.
15. When a union negotiates hereafter-onboard rate differences, it is still
treating all its members fairly.
16. The hereafter-onboard rate differences have created internal membership
political problems for Local [X].

Appendix B
Scales
The first four scales were adapted from the work of Martin and Peterson
(1987). All item references are to appendix A.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Pay Fairness, items 23 to 26, section 1.
Union Instrumentality, items 4, 13, and 21, section 1.
Company Commitment, items 14, 15, and 16, section 1.
Union Commitment, items 18, 19, and 20, section 1.

The following three scales were adapted from the Michigan Organizational
Assessment Package (Institute for Social Research, 1975).
5. Pay Satisfaction, items 7 and 8, section 1, and item 3, section 2.
6. Job Satisfaction, items 2, 17, and 22 (reverse scored).
7. Perceived Employment Mobility (all items were reverse scored) items 3
and 12, section 1, item 1, section 2. The last item is from Danserau,
Cashman, and Graen (1973).
8. The "Self-Reported Effort" scale was adapted from the work of Alien
and Keaveny (1985), and consisted of items 8, 9, and 11, section 1.
9. The "Union Activities" scale was adapted from the work of Magenau,
Martin, and Peterson (1988), and consisted of items 1, 3-1, 3-6, 3-7,
3-8, 3-9, 5, and 6, section 7.
10. The scale, "Satisfaction with Number of Hours," was developed specifical
ly for this study and consisted of item 1, section 1 and the following
item taken from the demographic and background variables section.
If you had a choice, would you work:
More scheduled hours each week ... 1
Less scheduled hours each week ... 2
The same number of scheduled hours each week ... 3
(Choice 1 was receded to 2.)
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Appendix C
Tiers and Store Productivity
Wage bill savings resulting from the implementation and maintenance of
a tiered compensation structure may not translate directly into cost savings
if the reduced cooperation of labor leads to decreased productivity, and the
unit labor costs (defined as payroll costs per dollar of output) increase.
The discussion in chapter 4 indicated that the implementation of tiers at
Mayway led to labor cost savings and facilitated the company's expansion plans.
Yet a critical question which needs to be addressed concerns the relationship
of a tiered compensation structure to store productivity at Mayway. A predomi
nant perception found in the literature reviewed in chapter 2 is that low-tier
employees are less productive than high-tier employees (e.g., Ross 1985;
Salpukas 1987). This perception is in accordance with predictions derived from
equity theory (see chapter 7), which suggests that the greater perceived pay
inequity of low-tier employees may be negatively associated with work-related
behaviors. The studies reviewed in chapter 2, however, do not adequately
answer the question at hand; these studies suggest that the impact may vary
depending on the situation. Likewise, no relationship was reported in chapter
7 between employee tier level and the productivity-related measures of selfreported effort and absenteeism.
Given the concerns about the potentially negative impact of permanent wage
tiers and other tier forms on employee productivity, we attempted to examine
this relationship. Although other methods, such as cohort analyses, may more
adequately address the proposition that low-tier employees are less produc
tive than high-tier employees, with the data available we examined the rela
tionship between the proportion of employees on the low levels of each of
the tier forms and productivity across stores. We believe other factors being
equal, that if low-tier employees were less productive than high-tier employees,
it would follow that the greater the proportion of employees on a low-tier form
within a store, the lower that store's productivity would be.
Productivity Measurement
Simply and broadly defined, productivity is the ratio between the inputs that
go into producing a particular product or service and the outputs, the actual
product or service itself (Barocci and Wever 1985). Barocci and Wever note
that the inputs may include capital, labor, intermediates (purchased goods and
services), and energy. Outputs would be the quantity or dollar value produc
ed. Partial measures can be used to determine the productivity of specific in229
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puts. Thus the formula used to measure labor productivity is simply outputs
divided by labor inputs.
Greenberg (1975), in a review of productivity definitions and concepts, notes
that the most common type of productivity ratio is labor productivity, usually
expressed as output per man-hour. He contends that the most appropriate pro
ductivity index, conceptually, "would be one in which the output component
is obtained by combining the different products or services with weights equal
to the hourly earnings assignable to each product or service" (p. 7). Such an
index would take into account the disparities in compensation present in a tieredemployment situation. The use of labor costs as opposed to labor hours as
an input, however, is not completely accepted by economists because earn
ings generally rise over time (Greenberg 1975; Siegel 1983). The use of labor
hours as an input (with the outputs stated in terms of quantity of units produc
ed) is a more useful index for determining changes in productivity over time.
Determining changes in productivity is less reliable when unit labor costs are
used. Because of its simplicity, however, Siegel states that, "In business circles,
unit labor cost, which is of interest in its own right, is frequently commended
as a better measure of productivity than productivity itself!" (p. 31). In fact,
Hochner, Granrose, Goode, Simon, and Applebaum (1988), in their discus
sion of retail food store economic outcomes, argue that unit labor costs are
conceptually very closely related to productivity.
Store Productivity Indices

The number of hours worked should be included in an input quantity
(denominator), given that hours can be increased or varied according to store
sales volume. Also, any determination of store productivity must recognize
that the hours worked can be expanded as store interior is redesigned to in
crease or vary the mix of products. Further, the dollar costs of the hours worked
must be included in the input to incorporate the differences in compensation
due to tiers. The average hourly wage, as defined in note 2 of chapter 5, in
corporates both the individual employee hours worked and pay rates. Multiply
ing the average hourly wage by the number of employees in a store gives the
total average hourly payroll used in this study as the input for the store pro
ductivity index. This input incorporates the rates of employees in high- and
low-paid job classifications and on the high and low levels of the different
tier forms and incorporates individual differences in the hours worked. 1
The output quantity (numerator) included in this study's productivity index
for retail stores is dollar sales. Due to the highly competitive nature of the
retail food industry, May way's sales figures on a store by store basis were
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not available for analysis. Thus, a reasonable sales estimate had to be deter
mined from a proxy. That sales proxy was lottery ticket sales as obtained from
the state lottery bureau. The lottery tickets were sold along with groceries and
other merchandise at May way's checkout lanes. 2 Analyses of sales data for
eight stores from a competitor3 revealed a significant positive correlation
(r=.84, p <.01) between the lottery ticket sales and total store sales. 4
Further examination of unpublished data from the state lottery bureau in
dicated that lottery tickets were sold differentially to various population
segments and differentially between urban and rural areas. Since the surveyed
stores in the urban and rural areas served differing socioeconomic groups,
it is possible that lottery ticket sales represented different proportions of total
store sales. To check for that possibility, store lottery ticket sales were first
divided by the total weekly hours worked in each store to adjust ticket sales,
at least in part, for store sales volume. A two-way ANOVA was then carried
out on (1) area (urban or rural) and (2) store status ("old" or "new") with
the result of the previous division as the dependent variable. 3
That analysis revealed no significant effects, suggesting that lottery ticket
sales at May way did not represent significantly different proportions of total
store sales by area and store status. Further, there were significant (p < .001)
correlations between lottery ticket sales and two other factors closely related
to potential store sales volume (Food Marketing Institute 1986): the number
of employees in a store (r=.82) and the sales floor space (r=.79). The high
correlation between lottery ticket sales and total store sales for the competitor,
as well as the other characteristics of lottery ticket sales at May way discussed
above, suggested that the two sales figures would be significantly correlated
at May way.
Therefore, the productivity index used in this study is the lottery ticket sales
divided by the total average hourly payroll. 6 Due to the potential unknown
character of lottery ticket sales as a measure of total store sales, we recognize
that the productivity index used in the analyses is a rough estimate that may
not have captured systematic differences in store productivity.
Tiers and the Productivity Index

Table C.I repeats some of the most relevant store characteristics from the
tables in chapter 5, as well as adding the following: total average hourly payroll
(the number of employees multiplied by the average hourly wage), sales proxy
figure, and productivity index (sales proxy figure divided by total average hour
ly payroll). Using the store as the unit of analysis, we can now look at the
relationship between tiers and productivity and examine whether a greater

Table C.I
Summary of Mayway Store Characteristics
Subarea and
store number
Cyclical industrial3
1*
2*
3
4
5
Outer suburban3
6*
7
Suburban3
8*
9*
10
Rural center
11*
12
Balanced
13*
14*
15
Stable industrial
16*
17

u>
to

Number of
employees
(1)

Percent of
low-wage
tier
(2)

Average
hourly
wage
(3)

Total
average hourly
payroll
(4) = 1x3

Sales
proxy
(5)

Productivity
index
(6) =5/4

475
451
266
321
338

71.2
72.7
86.2
94.4
89.1

7.06
7.10
6.33
6.64
6.61

3353.50
3202.10
1683.78
2131.44
2234.18

63,694
58,500
38,500
33,000
31,000

18.99
18.27
22.87
15.48
13.88

515
397

78.1
94.2

6.65
5.95

3424.75
2362.15

52,000
28,500

15.18
12.07

614
594
439

77.7
82.3
95.0

6.37
6.82
6.29

3911.18
4051.08
2761.31

63,752
52,500
51,809

16.30
12.96
18.76

231
275

71.0
90.9

6.08
5.97

1404.48
1641.75

32,500
37,000

23.14
22.54

339
453
289

70.8
72.8
93.4

6.37
6.14
5.74

2159.43
2781.42
1658.86

30,000
41,500
30,500

13.89
14.92
1839

156
337

62.8
85.2

6.61
5.34

1031.16
1799.58

16,000
25,000

15.52
13.89

a. These subareas are all urban, the remainder are rural.
*Represents an "Old Store" opened before the two-tier wage structure was negotiated.
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proportion of low-tier employees is related to lower store productivity. To
test this proposition, correlations were computed between the proportion of
store employees on the low levels of three tier forms (wage, employment-status,
and job-duty) and the store productivity index. A statistically significant negative
correlation would mean that the higher the proportion of low-tier employees
on the particular tier form, the lower the store productivity as measured by
the index used here. 7
Due to the significant differences among the stores as discussed in chapter
5,8 the following five sets of correlations between the proportion of employees
on the low level of three tier forms and the productivity index were computed:
(1) the 10 urban stores; (2) the 7 rural stores; (3) the 9 old stores; (4) the 8
new stores; and (5) all of the 17 stores together. Analyses using all May way
stores, while providing a larger sample size and thus more statistical power
could be confounded by combining stores from different areas and old and
new stores. Separate analyses by area and by store status were thus carried
out to control partially for possible differences in store ticket sales and the
input components of the productivity index. The results of these analyses in
dicated that only one of 15 correlation coefficients (five sets of three correla
tions) was significant; the significant correlation was opposite in direction to
the stated proposition. Thus, the stated proposition was not supported.
Another method of testing the proposition was to examine the store sales
and productivity data for each of the six subareas, i.e., county groupings (see
chapter 5). Greenberg (1975) notes that the characteristics of store workforces,
which vary according to labor market differences, could affect productivity.
This examination reduced some of the confounding effects of subarea and
socioeconomic differences; however, the method was only possible for the
wage-tier form. 9 As shown in table C. 1, every new store had a higher propor
tion of employees on the low-wage tier than every old store. Thus, a com
parison was made between the productivity of old and new stores within each
subarea.
When the data presented in table C.I are examined by subarea, three dif
ferent types of relationships emerged between store status and the productivi
ty index. Within three of the subareas, Rural Center, Stable Industrial and
Outer Suburban, the old store had a slightly higher productivity index. Within
the Suburban and Balanced subareas, the new store had a higher productivity
index. Finally, no clear relationship emerged between old and new stores among
the five stores in the Cyclical Industrial subarea. Overall, examining the store
data in this manner showed no consistent pattern. Thus, the results of the above
analyses do not support the predominant perception that employees on lowtier levels are less productive.
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Discussion

Given the presence of several limitations, any conclusions concerning the
relationship between tiers and productivity must be considered tenuous. One
must question whether the proxy measure used was a valid indicator of store
sales at Mayway. Also, the conclusions are limited because the data assessed
were from a single time period. Certainly, if the resources had allowed, using
actual productivity data in a cohort analysis design would provide a more ade
quate examination of the proposition. Further, the very small sample size of
stores from which data were collected and the division of stores by subarea
suggest that extreme caution must be exercised in making any generalizations.
A final limitation is that the entire concept of productivity is different in
the service and manufacturing sectors. Daft and Steers (1986) have identified
two principal differences related to the concept of productivity between these
sectors. First, the output of a service firm is intangible and cannot be stored
in an inventory. Second, in the service sector, customers are involved in the
production process; the customers and employees interact to deliver the ser
vice. Others have noted that these characteristics, particularly the customer
contact, affect productivity in the service and manufacturing sectors differently
(Greenberg 1975). 10
It is likely that a closer relationship would be found, if one exists, between
tiers and productivity in the manufacturing sector. Since most manufacturing
sector industries only increase the number of hours worked, e.g., by adding
a shift to increase production (i.e., the amount of product manufactured), it
is likely that the number of employee hours worked is more directly related
to production. Also, if the identical product were manufactured at multiple
plants, plant location by itself should not be a cause of variability in labor pro
ductivity. 11 In contrast, for the service sector industries, labor productivity is
dependent on the location served, and thus on the number of customers, their
scheduling, and the amount and types of their purchases. As a result, a ser
vice sector company with geographically separated units likely would have
varying productivity by location. Thus, where the distribution of employees
on low-tier levels varies among manufacturing plants producing an identical
product, it is likely that the relationship between tiers and productivity would
be more directly evident than for a similar distribution of employees on the
low-tier levels among firms offering the same service in the service sector.
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Conclusion
This appendix has presented two different types of analyses which examin
ed the relationship of tiers to a proxy measure of store productivity. The
analyses indicate no consistent patterns to suggest that low-tier employees were
more or less productive than high-tier employees. Any conclusions drawn from
these analyses must be tenuous given the limitations in the design, and dif
ferences in the concept of productivity between service and manufacturing
sectors.
NOTES
1. Analyses using the total weekly hours worked as the input of the productivity measure were
also carried out. With one exception, the magnitude of the findings from these analyses were
identical to those reported in this appendix. That exception was that within the Stable Industrial
subarea, the new store had a much lower productivity index than the old store.
2. If an individual desired to purchase lottery tickets only, they were available at other more easi
ly accessible licensed lottery outlets such as drug stores, newsstands, and liquor stores.
3. The eight stores of the competitor were in both urban and rural areas and geographically close
to and in direct competition with the surveyed stores.
4. Lottery ticket sales were relatively stable between the first quarters of 1985 and 1986 for both
Mayway and the competitor (for both companies, r=.90, p<.001).
5. Such an ANOVA was not carried out on the competitor stores' data given no "old" and "new"
store classification and only two rural area stores.
6. All of the Mayway stores across the state were open the same number of hours, thus simplify
ing the calculations used.
7. The store-status tier form was not analyzed in this manner given no variance within the two
types of stores, i.e., old or new. An analysis of variance on store status using area as the covariate
(with the productivity index as the dependent variable) found no significant store status or covariate
effect.
8. Analyses in chapter 5 indicated that urban stores compared to rural stores had significantly
more employees (p< .001), a significantly higher average hourly wage (p < .05), and a significantly
greater proportion of employees on the low-wage tier (p < .001). The same data also indicate that
new stores compared to old stores had significantly fewer employees (p < .05), a significantly
lower average hourly wage (p < .05), and a significantly greater proportion of employees on the
low-wage tier (p< .001). The proportion of employees on the low level of the other tier forms
did not differ significantly between either urban or rural stores or old or new stores.
9. The data presented in chapter 5 indicate that the proportion of employees on the low level
of the employment-status and job-duty tier forms did not vary systematically by store status within
all subareas.
10. Other service industries which have implemented tiered compensation structures, such as the
airline industry, share many of the characteristics that differentiate the retail food industry from
industries in the manufacturing sector. The number of customers both for a particular retail food
store and for a route of a specific airline is dependent on the competition, the type of market
served, and the services offered.
11. There may be some variability in productivity by plant location related to the characteristics
of the different labor markets from which the plants hire their workforces.
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